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1. Introduction 
National defense and economic growth are pivotal objects of investigation for scholars in the 
field of public economics. First, the capability to defend national sovereignty belongs to the 
main constitutional responsibilities and obligations of the nation state. National defense is a 
public good provided by the government. A wide range of needs and preferences among human 
beings (one of them being security), however, must be reconciled with restrictions in resources 
and budgets. This is where the fields of political economy and public finance interact. Second, 
economic growth reflects the rise of the common welfare of a society and the amount of 
resources that can be redistributed within a society. Understanding economic growth is a key 
challenge for scholars and among many other determinants, scholars have shown that political 
institutions influence economic growth.  
This dissertation contributes to the literature on defense economics, economic growth 
and the role of political institutions. I examine how political institutions shape defense 
spending, how supply and demand for arms are related and how political instability influences 
economic growth. Specifically, my dissertation consists of four self-contained research papers, 
each of which is included as an individual chapter: Chapter 2 examines the role of government 
changes for compliance with the NATO two percent spending target, Chapter 3 examines how 
democratic transitions in the context of democracy’s third wave have influenced national 
defense spending, Chapter 4 investigates the relationship between national arms production, 
national defense spending and arms trade, and Chapter 5 examines the effect of political 
instability on economic growth and uses coups d’état as one aspect of political instability.  
The end of the Cold War did not mark the end of armed conflicts and the need for armed 
forces, which is the starting point for Chapter 2. Figure 1.1 shows world defense spending 
from 1988 to 2018 by region.1 After the arms race between the United States and the Soviet 
 
1 Data is provided by the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database. 
 2 
Union during the 1980s, world defense spending remarkably decreased after the Cold War until 
the late 1990s. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 unveiled new security threats through international 
terrorism and both the Georgia war in 2008 and the annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 
March 2014 unveiled Russia’s striving for being perceived as a world power. The US 
campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq starting 2001 and 2003 considerably increased the US 
defense budget while the defense budget of European NATO allies remained at low post-Cold 
War levels.2 In Asia and in the Middle East, defense spending steadily increased from 1988 to 
2018. The strong expansion in defense spending for Asia is attributed to the rise of China, which 
aims to increase its spheres of military influence particularly in the East and South China Sea. 
China accounted for almost half of the total defense spending in Asia in 2018. Other Asian 
countries like India and Pakistan, however, also considerably increased their defense budgets 
 
FIGURE 1.1: WORLD DEFENSE SPENDING 1988-20183 
 
2 The United States accounted for around 90% of the total defense spending in North, Middle and South America 
during the depicted period. 
3 Figure 1.1 follows an illustration by SIPRI (https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2019/world-military-
expenditure-grows-18-trillion-2018, accessed January 14, 2020). No totals for years prior to 1988 and for the year 
1991 are shown because of missing data for the Soviet Union. 
 3 
from the late 1990s onwards. Worldwide defense spending shows that military power—be it 
for deterrence or war—plays a larger role than expected after the fall of the Iron Curtain. 
European NATO countries, however, only dedicated around 1.5% of their GDP to national 
defense in the past decade, while the United States spent a GDP share of between 4.4% (2012) 
and 3.4% (2019) for national defense. 
There is a long-lasting debate within NATO about burden sharing and free-riding within 
the alliance since NATO countries contribute to collective security which is nonrival within 
NATO and no NATO country can be excluded from it (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966). A 
spending target of 2% defense spending relative to GDP has been discussed since the early 
2000s to counteract free-riding. At the NATO summit in Wales in September 2014, NATO 
countries with defense spending below 2% relative to GDP committed themselves to no longer 
decrease defense spending and to reach the two percent target by 2024. Countries, however, 
face a time inconsistency problem when international agreements are signed. A government 
which does no longer endorse the international agreement is inclined to no longer comply with 
it. Non-compliance is, thus, more likely when the government has changed after an agreement 
has been signed. The two percent target allows examining this commitment problem in the field 
of defense spending. 
Chapter 2 is joint work with Niklas Potrafke (Blum and Potrafke 2019). We examine 
whether changes of government influence compliance with international agreements by means 
of the NATO two percent target. The empirical analysis covers the period 2010-2018 for 27 
NATO countries. Countries below the two percent spending target show rising growth rates in 
military expenditure relative to GDP since the NATO summit in 2014. Countries which do not 
(yet) comply with the two percent target have, however, smaller growth rates in military 
expenditure relative to GDP after a large change of government (e.g. a change from a rightwing 
to a leftwing government) following the 2014 NATO summit than countries without such a 
large change of government. Countries with a large change of government after the NATO 
 4 
summit are therefore less likely to comply with the two percent target by 2024 as they pursue 
the spending target with less effort. 
The NATO two percent target as of 2014 only allows analyzing a rather short time 
period of defense spending in NATO countries after the military alliance has been confronted 
with new challenges in the 21st century. Apart from the power struggle between the United 
States and the Soviet Union that the fall of the Iron Curtain has ended, it also initiated the 
democratizations of the former Soviet countries and Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe and 
marked the peak of democracy’s third wave (Huntington 1991a, 1991b), which sets the scene 
for Chapter 3. Democratic transitions in the past two centuries increased the level of political 
institutions worldwide. Figure 1.2 shows democratic and non-democratic governance according 
to the dichotomous democracy measure by Bjørnskov and Rode (2019) over the period 1950 to 
2018. The second wave of democratizations after the Second World War stagnated during the 
1960s, which marked the end of the second wave. The third wave started with the 
democratization of Portugal in 1974 and with Spain and Greece becoming democracies in the 
mid-1970s. The third wave particularly gained momentum in Latin America with the 
democratization of countries like Argentina and Chile in the 1980s and in Eastern Europe in the 
1990s after the fall of the Iron Curtain.4 The end of the Cold War marks the point at which more 
countries have been governed democratically than autocratically. In 2018, almost two thirds of 
all countries were described as democracies, which is a remarkable increase in the quality of 
political institutions. 
This spread of democracy may have lowered national defense spending. With regard to 
government spending, autocratic regimes must ensure the loyalty of the military elite and often 
rely on the armed forces to preserve the regime (Kimenyi and Mbaku 1995, Bove and Brauner 
2016, Geddes et al. 2018). In democracies, in turn, civilian public goods spending may crowd 
 
4 Democratizations in selected African and Asian-Pacific countries also belong to this third wave. 
 5 
out defense spending to ensure the electorate’s support (Dudley and Montmarquette 1981, Blum 
2018). Political institutions are therefore likely to influence government spending and have 
shown to lower national defense spending (Dunne and Perlo-Freeman 2003, Collier and 
Hoeffler 2007, Albalate et al. 2012, Blum 2018).5 
 
FIGURE 1.2: SHARE OF DEMOCRATIC AND NON-DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES ACCORDING 
TO THE BJØRNSKOV AND RODE (2019) DEMOCRACY MEASURE 
Chapter 3 investigates how the third wave of democracy influenced national defense spending 
(Blum 2020). The panel consists of 110 countries over the period 1972-2013. The empirical 
analysis for this time span is possible in the first place since the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI) has extended its data on military expenditure to years prior to 1988 
for a large number of countries. Democracy is difficult to quantify and different democracy 
measures may give rise to different empirical results. I therefore apply four democracy 
 
5 Immanuel Kant (1795) argued in his seminal work “Perpetual Peace” that the spread of liberalism may foster 
peace and lower the relevance of armed forces. According to the Democratic Peace paradigm, political scientists 
argue that democracies even do not go to war with each other (Doyle 1983a, 1983b, Maoz and Russett 1993, 
Russett and O’Neal 2001). 
 6 
measures in the empirical analysis. Estimation results provided by a dynamic panel data model 
suggest that the third wave of democracy decreased national defense spending relative to GDP 
by about 10% within countries that experienced democratization. Region-specific estimation 
results do not yield that the impact of democracy’s third wave on national defense spending has 
been heterogeneous across world regions which the third wave reached in different sub-waves. 
To overcome endogeneity problems, I follow an instrumental variable (IV) approach which 
exploits the regional diffusion of democracy in the context of the third wave of 
democratizations. The IV estimates indicate that democratization in the context of democracy’s 
third wave decreased national defense spending relative to GDP by about 20% within countries. 
OLS results thus underestimate the effect of democratization on defense spending. According 
to the estimated dynamics in defense spending, the cumulative long-run effect of 
democratization on national defense spending for both OLS and IV estimates is almost three 
times higher.6 
The demand for defense spending has implications for other economic variables such as 
debt and economic growth (Dunne et al. 2004, Dunne et al. 2005, Alptekin and Levine 2012) 
as well as it contributes to the perceived threat originating from a country and the likelihood of 
arms races. The demand for defense spending, moreover, affects arms production, which 
Chapter 4 investigates. Figure 1.3 shows arms sales by the top 100 arms-producing and 
military services companies. 43 of these 100 companies are US companies and the top five 
companies are all located in the United States.7 The sales of arms and military services by US 
companies therefore even exceed the sales by the rest of the world (excluding China). The peak 
in the late 2000s for arms sales by US companies reflects the high level of US defense spending 
at that time and the latest increase reflects the risen US defense spending from 2017 to 2018. 
 
6 The topic of this chapter is related to earlier work I published based on my master’s thesis in Defence and Peace 
Economics (Blum 2018), which has not been included in this dissertation. Chapter 3 reaches far beyond my earlier 
publication with regard to data, empirical strategy and results.  
7 Data is provided by the SIPRI Arms Industry Database. No data is available for Chinese companies. 
 7 
The steady increase in arms sales in the rest of the world from 2002 to 2018 well corresponds 
with the increase in world defense spending (see Figure 1.1). 
 
FIGURE 1.3: ARMS SALES BY THE TOP 100 ARMS-PRODUCING AND MILITARY 
SERVICES COMPANIES 
Since arms and military equipment are not entirely sourced from domestic suppliers and the 
arms industry also strives for economic profits via arms exports, defense spending is also likely 
to affect the trade in arms. Many studies have estimated demand functions for national defense 
spending and international arms trade has been investigated by scholars, too. How supply and 
demand for military goods are related has, however, only been investigated in formal models 
or on a highly aggregated level yet.  
Chapter 4 examines the relationship between arms production, national defense 
spending and arms trade (Blum 2019). It investigates the relationship between the supply of 
military goods by arms-producing companies and the demand for military goods by the national 
government and foreign governments, which involves national defense spending and arms 
trade. The empirical analysis is based on a panel of up to 195 of the world’s largest arms-
 8 
producing companies in 21 countries over the period 2002-2016.8 The results indicate that an 
increase in the demand for national defense spending by 1% increases the arms sales by a 
country’s largest arms-producing companies by up to 1.2%. An increase in exports of major 
conventional weapons by 1% increases sales by up to 0.2%. The estimation results moreover 
show that arms imports do not affect domestic arms sales. This result reflects that imported and 
domestically produced arms are complements rather than substitutes because countries mainly 
import arms they do not produce themselves. Country-specific estimation results among 
countries with strong arms industries like the United States, the United Kingdom, France or 
Germany suggest that geopolitical conditions and international relations explain whether the 
arms industry of a country serves economic rather than own security purposes. The results 
reveal, for instance, that arms-producing companies in the United States primarily serve their 
own security purposes, i.e. the own armed forces, while arms-producing companies in Germany 
primarily serve the export market, i.e. the security interest of others. 
Output in goods and services on the firm-level provides insights into the relevance and 
structure of an industry. Output in goods and services by an economy, in turn, reflects the 
welfare of a society. Scholars have investigated economic growth—i.e. how economic output 
evolves—for a long time, and Chapter 5 contributes to its understanding. Figure 1.4 shows 
percentile ranks according to the “Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism” index 
from the World Bank. This index measures the perception on how likely political instability 
and politically motivated violence are. While the traditional view argues that political stability 
fosters economic growth (Barro 1991, Alesina et al. 1996), countries that are described as 
politically rather unstable are among the fastest growing economies (e.g. China, Indonesia and 
India). It is therefore a worthwhile endeavor to investigate whether stability in political 
institutions is indeed the breeding ground for economic growth. 
 
 
8 At the time this research paper has been written, the SIPRI Arms Industry Database did not yet extend to the year 
2018 as in Figure 1.3. 
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FIGURE 1.4: POLITICAL STABILITY ACCORDING TO THE WORLD BANK’S ‘POLITICAL STABILITY 
AND ABSENCE OF VIOLENCE/TERRORISM’ INDEX  
Chapter 5 is joint work with Klaus Gründler (Blum and Gründler 2020). We examine how 
political instability influences economic growth by using coups d’état as a certain aspect of 
political instability. A novel dataset on coups d’état by Bjørnskov and Rode (2019) allows to 
cover 180 countries over the period 1950-2017 in the empirical analysis. Since coups are 
difficult to predict, they help overcoming identification problems when estimating the effect of 
political instability on growth. Results from panel difference-in-differences and dynamic panel 
data models indicate that coups have drastic consequences for economic growth and depress 
economic growth by about 2-3 percentage points. To overcome endogeneity problems, we first 
present case study results with synthetic control methods. Second, we exploit regional patterns 
of coup occurrence as an instrumental variable (IV) for coup occurrence. Third, we exploit the 
geospatial dimension of coups on the sub-national level by geocoding the Bjørnskov and Rode 
(2019) dataset for about 2,660 sub-national regions. The IV results as well as the estimation 
results on the sub-national level strongly support the baseline estimation results. With survey 
data for about 250,000 households in 85 countries, we also examine the effect of coups on the 
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household level. The micro-level results indicate that coups have adverse effects on 
employment and worsen the financial situation of households as well as health and life 
satisfaction of individuals. These adverse effects turn out to be stronger for women and for 
poorer households. 
The four research papers included in this dissertation have either been published in 
refereed journals (Chapter 2 and Chapter 4) or are in the process of publication at the time 
this dissertation is finalized (Chapter 3 and Chapter 5). The four chapters are therefore almost 
identical to the published or latest submitted versions of each research paper. References and 
appendices to the individual chapters are separately included at the end of each chapter.  
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Abstract* 
We examine whether changes of government influence compliance with international 
agreements. We investigate compliance with the NATO two percent target to which all NATO 
countries committed themselves during the NATO summit in Wales in 2014. The dataset 
includes the military expenditure by NATO countries over the period 2010-2018. The results 
suggest that countries that do not (yet) comply with the two percent target have smaller growth 
rates in military expenditure relative to GDP when they experienced a large change of 
government, e.g. a change from a rightwing to a leftwing government, than countries that did 
not experience such a large change of government since the NATO summit in 2014. Countries 
that experienced a large change of government are, thus, less likely to comply with the two 
percent target. Future research should examine the credibility problem of national governments 
in other international agreements too.
 
* We thank Raul Caruso, Martin Gassebner, Kai A. Konrad, the participants of the Silvaplana Political Economy 
Workshop 2018, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and Lisa Giani-Contini for proofreading. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Countries sign international agreements to commit themselves to policy targets. Prominent 
examples are climate change agreements. When do countries, however, comply with 
international agreements? We examine a new aspect of when countries are not likely to comply 
with international agreements: when national government changes. It is conceivable that new 
governments are less willing to comply with international agreements signed by a previous 
government, especially when the new and the proceeding government have different platforms. 
We use the NATO two percent target to investigate empirically how changes of government 
influence compliance with an international agreement.  
The two percent target has been discussed within NATO since the early 2000s to avoid 
problems of free-riding when defense burdens are shared. The United States have often 
criticized NATO allies for free-riding, meaning that it has long been an intriguing issue. The 
NATO countries agreed on the two percent target at the NATO summit in September 2014. 
Allies with military expenditure relative to GDP below 2% committed themselves to no longer 
decrease military expenditure and to reach the two percent target within the next ten years, i.e. 
by 2024. Decreasing military expenditure relative to GDP therefore means non-compliance 
with the two percent target. Because the target year is 2024, full compliance with this target 
cannot be confirmed yet. Countries that aim to meet the two percent target by 2024, however, 
will not meet the target overnight, but need to increase military expenditure for many years. We 
focus on efforts to increase military expenditure relative to GDP by those countries that have 
not met the two percent target yet. Whether countries reduce their efforts to increase military 
expenditure relative to GDP after government has changed has important implications for 
compliance with the two percent target in 2024 because many NATO countries are likely to 
experience at least one change of government within this ten-year period.  
New governments are less willing to comply with international agreements signed by a 
previous government. The reason is a time inconsistency problem from a nation’s perspective 
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related with international agreements. Compliance with international agreements depends on 
manifold issues such as agreement design, incentives, and cost-effectiveness. Empirical studies 
have investigated compliance with climate change agreements, anti-pollution standards, 
international monetary law and human rights treaties.  
We use panel data for 27 NATO countries for the period 2010-2018 to examine how a 
change of government influences the growth rate in military expenditure for those countries 
that are below the two percent target. We observe rising growth rates in military expenditure 
for countries below the two percent target after the NATO summit in 2014. Countries that 
experienced a large change of government, e.g. a change from a rightwing to a leftwing 
government, after the summit, however, had lower growth rates in military expenditure relative 
to GDP than countries without such a change. Countries that experienced such a change of 
government after the NATO summit in 2014 are less likely to comply with the two percent 
target because they reduce their efforts to reach the target. Future research should investigate 
how changes of government influence compliance with other international agreements such as 
climate change and human rights treaties; and how to deal with the credibility problem of 
national governments when they commit themselves to international agreements. 
2.2 Background 
2.2.1 Time inconsistency problems and compliance with international agreements 
Governments are less likely to comply with international agreements that a previous 
government has signed. A rational, forward-looking government will adjust policy decisions 
made in an earlier period because of restrictions the government now faces related to the 
expectations of optimizing agents (Kydland and Prescott 1977). Policies are likely to be time 
inconsistent and sticking to the initial policy would not yield an optimal outcome for a nation 
(see also Barro and Gordon 1983). A government that decides whether to comply with a non-
binding agreement such as the NATO two percent target considers decisions of optimizing 
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agents both in the international (e.g. compliance of other governments) and in the domestic 
domain (e.g. voting behavior of the electorate). A government that does not agree with the 
international agreement is therefore inclined not to comply with the two percent target to which 
the country committed itself years ago. The risk of non-compliance is, thus, higher when 
government has changed after an agreement has been signed. In case of a change of 
government, the time inconsistency problem refers to the nation rather than to the policymaker 
who has been replaced. In any event, policymakers sign international agreements in the name 
of their nation, rather than in the name of themselves; a new government is equally tied to 
international agreements as the previous government was. 
Scholars have examined compliance in the fields of climate policy, anti-pollution 
standards, monetary law and human rights treaties. International climate policy faces the same 
problems of free-riding associated with a public good as the NATO does with defense burden 
sharing. International climate change agreements attempt to deal with free-riding, but 
compliance is not certain: the complexity of domestic political processes and the challenge of 
design and enforcement of agreements in the international domain give rise to commitment 
problems, which induce governments to time inconsistent policies and non-compliance with 
earlier commitments (Hovi et al. 2009). Countries are also more likely to comply with climate 
change agreements the less cost-effective the measures necessary to comply with the 
agreements are (Barrett and Stavins 2003). Incentives play another important role for 
participation in and compliance with agreements to avoid free-riding behavior (Barrett and 
Stavins 2003). It is therefore important to investigate incentives in the context of the two percent 
target and to infer whether, and to what extent, NATO countries will be expected to comply 
with an agreement. 
The design and acceptance of international treaties influence compliance. Treaties to 
prevent intentional oil pollution by tankers reveal that compliance with the requirement of 
rather costly additional equipment for tankers to reduce oil pollution is even higher than 
 17 
compliance with a less cost-effective limit on oil discharge at sea. These differences in 
compliance are not substantiated in differences in cost-effectiveness. They are rather 
substantiated in both the design of such standards, which need to be transparent and verifiable, 
and in differences in the acceptance of these standards at the time they were introduced 
(Mitchell 1994).  
Peer pressure and reputational concerns are other reasons for countries to comply with 
international treaties. An empirical study on Article VIII of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, 
which forbids restrictions on current international transactions, shows that peer pressure among 
countries located within the same region leads countries to comply with international monetary 
law. The probability of compliance with Article VIII is even higher in the first years after 
monetary restrictions have been abandoned since countries try to regain their international 
reputation (Simmons 2000). Both peer and reputational effects, as well as cost-effectiveness, 
influence compliance with international laws against human trafficking. Countries favor 
prevention measures against human trafficking over protection and prosecution measures 
because prevention satisfies those countries that are most affected by human trafficking inflows 
on the one hand, and induces less cost and effort on the other (Cho and Vadlamannati 2012). 
Ratification of international treaties on human rights, however, has not been shown to increase 
the respect of human rights in a country. An effect of ratification, however, is found for 
countries the more democratic they are and the stronger their civil society is (Keith 1999, 
Hathaway 2002, Neumayer 2005).  
2.2.2 NATO’s two percent target 
NATO countries have committed themselves to the two percent target at the NATO summit in 
September 2014 to counteract free-riding. NATO countries contribute to collective security, a 
public good within NATO, since it is nonrival and no NATO country can be excluded (Olson 
and Zeckhauser 1966). Countries are therefore inclined to free-ride at the expense of those allies 
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which contribute a disproportionally larger share to the collective good.1 NATO countries 
discuss defense burden sharing since the early years of NATO, and the United States have often 
criticized NATO allies for free-riding. NATO members discussed a target of 2% military 
expenditure relative to GDP as a prerequisite for candidate countries to join NATO at its summit 
in Prague in November 2002. Because many NATO countries had decreased military 
expenditure themselves, a target of 2% military expenditure relative to GDP has also been 
discussed for NATO countries. However, this target was non-binding for candidate countries 
and for NATO members. The figure of 2% was probably inspired by the level of military 
expenditure relative to GDP of candidate countries and new members at that time. The 2% 
figure may also reflect the experience that NATO allies fulfilled NATO obligations at the end 
of the Cold War when most of them spent at least a share of 2% of their GDP on defense. NATO 
countries agreed on a target of 2% military expenditure relative to GDP in 2006.2 At the NATO 
summit in Riga in November 2006, however, it was not included in the final declaration by the 
heads of state and government. The NATO summit in Wales in September 2014 was heavily 
influenced by Russia’s actions against Ukraine: Russia’s increasingly aggressive behavior and 
its geopolitical actions in the last decade—including the annexation of Crimea in March 2014—
have been a new challenge for NATO, making it important to counteract free-riding within the 
alliance. All 28 NATO countries at that time attended the NATO summit in September 2014 
and the heads of state and government for the first time committed themselves to the two percent 
target: allies with military expenditure relative to GDP above 2% committed themselves to 
maintain military expenditure above this level. Allies with military expenditure relative to GDP 
 
1 By contrast, elements of military expenditure are at least private to some extent and defense burdens among 
countries have therefore been described as Hicksian complements rather than substitutes (Murdoch and Sandler 
1984). Empirical studies arrive at manifold conclusions regarding free-riding within NATO (Murdoch and Sandler 
1984, Oneal 1990, Sandler 1993, Hartley and Sandler 1999, Sandler and Murdoch 2000, Plümper and Neumayer 
2015, George and Sandler 2018). 
2 See https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm (accessed July 2, 2018). 
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below 2% committed themselves to no longer decrease defense spending and to reach the two 
percent target within the next ten years, i.e. by 2024.3 
The official commitment to the two percent target in 2014 is legally not binding and 
sanctions in case of non-compliance with this agreement have not been defined. The same holds 
for the 2% target levels discussed at the NATO summits 2002 and 2006. The two percent target 
is therefore said to be more of a political commitment by the NATO countries.4 
The two percent target is a quantitative indicator and military expenditure relative to 
GDP is tracked on a yearly basis. Compliance with this target is thus verifiable and transparent 
for all NATO countries. The two percent target is, however, often criticized within NATO: it 
expresses defense spending in terms of GDP, which implies that compliance with this target 
also depends on business cycles, leaving members shooting at a moving target in their efforts 
to comply.5 NATO allies maintain that the capabilities needed to fulfill NATO obligations 
cannot simply be expressed by a spending target. Just meeting the two percent target might thus 
not give rise to an efficient outcome. The target does not reflect that larger countries have higher 
military expenditure—even as a share of GDP—than smaller ones because they also pursue 
interests outside of the NATO area. A considerable share of US military expenditure, for 
example, is attributed to the Pacific region. 
2.2.3 Compliance with the NATO two percent target and changes of government 
Though compliance with the two percent target is verifiable and transparent, compliance with 
it remains uncertain. Firstly, acceptance of the two percent target is mixed among NATO allies. 
 
3 “Allies currently meeting the NATO guideline to spend a minimum of 2% of their Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) on defence will aim to continue to do so. […] Allies whose current proportion of GDP spent on defence is 
below this level will: (i) halt any decline in defence expenditure, (ii) aim to increase defence expenditures in real 
terms as GDP grows, (iii) aim to move toward the 2% guideline within a decade with a view to meeting their 
NATO Capability Targets and filling NATO’s capability shortfalls.” Wales Summit Declaration 
https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm (accessed July 2, 2018).  
4 See “Kurzinformation: Zur Entstehungsgeschichte und rechtlichen Bindungswirkung der Zwei-Prozent-
Zielvorgabe der NATO für den Anteil der nationalen Verteidigungsausgaben am jeweiligen 
Bruttoinlandsprodukt”, Wissenschaftliche Dienste, Deutscher Bundestag, March 21, 2017.  
5 See Lunn, S., and N. Williams. 2017. “NATO Defence Spending: The Irrationality of 2%.” European Leadership 
Network. 
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Secondly, the two percent target is a solely cost-effective policy measure and compliance with 
it is likely to be at the expense of spending on civilian public goods. The marginal “political” 
cost of spending on the military instead of on civilian public goods is thus increasing. Countries 
below the two percent target will be less inclined to further increase military expenditure as 
they get closer to 2% military expenditure relative to GDP. Thirdly, incentives to comply are 
limited because no credible sanctioning or penalties exist if countries fail to reach the two 
percent target.  
Fourthly, changes of government are likely to influence compliance. A new government 
is likely to have a political platform that deviates from the platform of the previous government 
that was in power during the 2014 NATO summit. Even in cases where the new government 
favors higher military expenditure than the previous government, the new government may 
have concerns with an agreement signed by the previous government because the new and the 
previous governments are domestic competitors. A new government is inclined to keep its 
costly pre-election promises at the expense of military spending, following the “guns vs. butter” 
trade-off (see also Bove et al. 2017). Peer pressure and reputational cost are, moreover, strong 
incentives to comply with international agreements, which are reduced for new governments. 
Peer pressure and reputational cost in case of non-compliance are high since NATO allies 
represent a fairly homogeneous group of countries, which collaborate in numerous fields other 
than defense policy. Maintaining reputation in the international domain is important for future 
collaboration with allied countries in other policy fields. However, reputational costs for not 
complying with the two percent target will be lower for a new government than for a 
government that signed the agreement in 2014. The credibility problem for new governments 
is reduced since it is not their own word they break.  
 Theory on the determinants of compliance does not clearly indicate whether NATO 
countries will comply with the two percent target; or whether incentives to free-ride prevail. 
We expect, however, that changes of government will have a negative effect on compliance. 
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For countries below the two percent target, we expect lower growth rates of military 
expenditure relative to GDP when these countries experienced a change of government after 
the NATO summit in 2014. In turn, we expect higher growth rates when the same government 
is still in power. We expect the effect of a change of government on compliance to be stronger 
the larger the change of government is. 
 The direction of a change in government ideology, i.e. whether the change occurs from 
leftwing to rightwing or from rightwing to leftwing, is also likely to influence compliance with 
the two percent target. Rightwing governments are expected to increase military expenditure 
because they endorse security and support the hierarchies and discipline that are associated with 
armed forces. Leftwing governments are expected to increase military expenditure because they 
favor a large government and increasing military expenditure may well increase public 
employment.6 Empirical evidence on ideology-induced military expenditure for OECD 
countries is, however, mixed (Potrafke 2011, Whitten and Williams 2011, Kauder and Potrafke 
2016, Bove et al. 2017, Nordvang 2018; on ideology-induced policies in OECD countries see 
also Potrafke 2017 and 2018). We examine whether compliance with the two percent target is 
higher when a rightwing government replaces a leftwing government than when a leftwing 
government replaces a rightwing government.  
2.3 Empirical analysis 
2.3.1 Data and descriptive statistics 
Our dataset includes 27 NATO countries from 2010 to 2018. Two NATO countries are not 
included: Iceland because lack of data (Iceland has no own defense forces) and Montenegro, 
which joined NATO not before June 2017. Albania and Croatia joined NATO in 2009. By using 
data for the period 2010-2018, our sample includes countries that have been NATO members 
for the entire observation period. We use NATO data for military expenditure, which is the 
 
6 Scholars discuss the extent to which leftwing governments are pro-labor (see Vadlamannati and Tamazian 2017). 
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official data source on defense spending within NATO; figures for 2017 and 2018 are estimates. 
We use SIPRI data on military expenditure for a robustness test to confirm our inferences. By 
the time of the NATO summit in September 2014, military expenditure was at a historic low: 
the United States, Greece and the United Kingdom were the only NATO countries with military 
expenditure relative to GDP above 2% at that time. Figure 2.1 shows that the United States, 
Greece and the United Kingdom had military expenditure relative to GDP above 2%. The 
United States, however, has continuously decreased its military expenditure since 2011 after 
considerable increases in the years before.  
 
FIGURE 2.1: COUNTRIES CONTINUOUSLY ABOVE 2% 
Figure 2.2 shows that Poland and Estonia increased military expenditure relative to GDP prior 
to the 2014 NATO summit and both reached the two percent target in 2015. Estonia maintained 
military expenditure relative to GDP above 2%, while Poland decreased military expenditure 
relative to GDP again in 2016 and 2017 and is estimated to be closely below the two percent 
target in 2018. Figure 2.3 shows countries with strong efforts towards the two percent target.  
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FIGURE 2.2: COUNTRIES OSCILLATING AROUND 2% 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.3: COUNTRIES WITH STRONG EFFORTS TOWARDS 2% 
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Lithuania and Latvia drastically increased military expenditure relative to GDP since 2013 and 
2014. The increasing defense efforts made by the Baltic countries, however, are influenced by 
the annexation of Crimea by Russia rather than by the two percent target. Latvia is estimated to 
have reached exactly 2% military expenditure relative to GDP in 2018, while Lithuania and 
Romania are closely below. Only the United States, Greece, the United Kingdom, Estonia and 
Latvia thus managed to comply with the two percent target in 2018; Poland, Romania and 
Lithuania were closely below. 
Figure 2.4 shows growth rates of military expenditure relative to GDP for the individual 
years. Both mean and median growth rates have increased since 2014 and turned positive in 
2015 and 2016. Increasing growth rates since 2014 reflect NATO countries’ efforts to comply 
with the two percent target. Growth rates in military expenditure relative to GDP after the 
NATO summit in 2014 reveal a clear pattern: in 2015, 13 NATO countries increased military 
expenditure relative to GDP compared to the previous year and 13 countries decreased military 
expenditure relative to GDP compared to the previous year. Germany neither increased nor 
decreased military expenditure relative to GDP. In 2016, the ratio of countries increasing 
military expenditure to countries decreasing military expenditure was 14 to 10, while three 
countries neither increased nor decreased military expenditure relative to GDP. This ratio was 
17 to 10 for 2017 and 21 to 4 (with two countries neither increasing nor decreasing military 
expenditure relative to GDP) for 2018. The four countries that reduced military expenditure in 
2018 compared to 2017 are Canada, Greece, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 
which—except of Canada—all complied with the two percent target the year before.  
We use growth rates in military expenditure relative to GDP for the years after the 
NATO summit, i.e. 2015-2018, to show differences between countries that had military 
expenditure relative to GDP of above or below 2% in the previous year. For countries below 
2% military expenditure relative to GDP, we distinguish between countries that experienced a  
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FIGURE 2.4: GROWTH RATES 2010-2018 
change of government after the NATO summit in 2014 and those that did not. We consider two 
types of changes of government, which also include changes of the political platform: firstly, a 
small change of government describes a new personnel composition of the cabinet including a 
small change in government ideology, i.e. a change in the ideology score of one.7 We measure 
government ideology by the index of Potrafke (2009), which is based on Budge et al. (1993) 
and update it for non-OECD NATO member countries. The index assumes values from 1 
(rightwing) to 5 (leftwing). Changes in the government ideology index from year t to year  
t + 1, thus, describe a change in government ideology. A small change of government occurs 
when government changes and the government ideology index changes by one point, such as 
from a center to a leftwing government. Out of the 27 NATO countries considered, ten countries 
have experienced such a small change of government since the NATO summit in September 
2014. Nine of these ten countries had military expenditure relative to GDP of below 2% in at 
 
7 We ignore changes of government without changes in government ideology, i.e. when members of the cabinet 
are replaced but the government party or coalition stays in power.  
 26 
least one of the years from 2014 to 2016;8 Greece was continuously above 2%. Secondly, large 
changes of government describe substantial changes in government ideology, i.e. changes in 
the ideology score of at least two. The large changes are almost exclusively changes from a 
leftwing to a rightwing government or vice versa. Seven countries experienced such a large 
change in government ideology since the NATO summit in September 2014: Canada, Portugal 
and Spain changed from a rightwing to a leftwing government and Croatia, Denmark, and the 
United States changed from a leftwing to a rightwing government. In Italy, Guiseppe Conte 
replaced the center-government of Paolo Gentiloni in June 2018. Though the Conte Cabinet 
and the government parties can hardly be described by rightwing-leftwing-schemes, this change 
of government was substantial and we indicate it as a large change too. Six of these seven 
countries which experienced a large change of government had military expenditure relative to 
GDP continuously below 2%; the United States were continuously above 2%. 
A large change of government and a small change of government are mutually 
exclusive. We indicate both types of changes of government for years in which the change of 
government occurred in the first half of the calendar year and otherwise one year later. This 
time lag of at least half a year implies that changes in the defense budget by a new government 
become effective at earliest half a year after this new government assumed office. 
Figure 2.5 shows that after the NATO summit in 2014, countries above 2% military 
expenditure relative to GDP in the previous year had growth rates of around 0%; and both the 
mean and median growth rate for these countries were even negative (mean: –0.8%; median:  
–0.8%). Low growth rates in military expenditure relative to GDP for countries above the two 
percent target mirror the course of military expenditure relative to GDP for the countries shown 
in Figure 2.1 from 2014 onwards. By contrast, many countries with military expenditure relative 
to GDP below 2% in the previous year had positive growth rates in military expenditure relative 
 
8 Governments might decide to increase military expenditure relative to GDP after the NATO summit in 2014, i.e. 
for the years 2015-2018, considering the level of military expenditure relative to GDP they observed for the 
respective previous year.  
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to GDP in the years from 2015 to 2018. Countries below 2% military expenditure relative to 
GDP that did not (yet) experience neither a small nor a large change of government after the 
NATO summit in 2014 had considerably larger growth rates (mean: 6.1%; median: 4.1%) than 
countries that already met the two percent target. In contrast, countries below 2% military 
expenditure relative to GDP that experienced a small change of government had growth rates 
(mean: 3.8%; median: 1.2%) that were smaller than those of countries without a small change 
of government.9 The pattern is even clearer for countries below 2% military expenditure relative 
to GDP, which experienced a large change of government after the NATO summit in 2014: 
these countries had smaller growth rates (mean: 0.9%; median: 0%). Latvia and Norway, for 
 
FIGURE 2.5: GROWTH RATES 2015-2018 FOR COUNTRIES ABOVE AND BELOW 
THE TWO PERCENT TARGET AND WITH AND WITHOUT A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT 
 
example, experienced no change of government in the years after the NATO summit in 2014 
and increased military expenditure relative to GDP until 2018. By contrast, Croatia experienced 
 
9 Means in growth rates are not weighted according to the GDP of each country, i.e. this mean does not equal the 
growth rate of all countries’ military expenditure relative to all countries’ GDP. 
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a change from a leftwing to a rightwing government, i.e. a large change of government, in 
January 2016 and decreased military expenditure relative to GDP in 2016 by more than 10%. 
Portugal decreased military expenditure relative to GDP after the change from a rightwing to a 
leftwing government in November 2015. The growth rates in military expenditure relative to 
GDP for Canada and Portugal, which both changed from a rightwing to a leftwing government, 
and Croatia and Denmark, which both changed from a leftwing to a rightwing government, 
however, do not indicate that the direction of the government ideology change influences 
compliance with the two percent target differently.  
The descriptive statistics indicate that a change of government is related to compliance 
with the two percent target depending on how strong the change of government is. Changes of 
government that include changes in government ideology, or even a change from a rightwing 
to a leftwing government or vice versa, corroborate that new national governments are less 
likely to comply with international agreements signed by previous national governments. We 
elaborate on conditional correlations between changes of government and compliance with the 
two percent target by estimating panel data models in the next sections. 
2.3.2 Empirical strategy  
The baseline panel data model has the following form: 
 
Military expenditure relative to GDP (Growth rate)it =  
αj Two percent targetit + βj Change of government since ‘14ijt +  
γj Two percent targetit * Change of government since ‘14ijt +  
Σn ζjn xint + ηi + τt + uijt 
 
with i = 1, …, 27; t = 1, …, 9; j = 1, 2; n = 1, ..., 8                    (1) 
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The dependent variable Military expenditure relative to GDP (Growth rate)it describes the 
growth rate in military expenditure relative to GDP for country i in year t. The dummy variable 
Two percent targetit assumes the value 1 for the years after the NATO summit in 2014, i.e. for 
the years 2015-2018, if military expenditure relative to GDP was below the two percent target 
the year before, and value 0 otherwise. The variable Two percent targetit reflects that a country 
which intends to comply with the two percent target is expected to increase military expenditure 
disproportionally compared to expected GDP growth when this country did not (yet) meet the 
two percent target in the previous year. The variable Change of government since ‘14ijt indicates 
small and large changes of government (j = 2) after the NATO summit in September 2014 in 
country i in year t (t ≥ 2015), as described in Section 2.3.1. The dummy variables assume the 
value 1 when a change of government occurred after the NATO summit in September 2014 (as 
described in Section 2.3.1, the change of government needs to have occurred within the first 
half of the calendar year; otherwise the dummy variables indicate the change of government 
one year later). The variables for changes of government thus assume the value 1 in years in 
which the government that agreed to the two percent target in September 2014 has no longer 
been in office. We include the interaction term between the Two percent targetit and the Change 
of government since ‘14ijt variable to examine whether countries below 2% military expenditure 
relative to GDP that experienced a change of government after the NATO summit in 2014 
increased growth in military expenditure to a smaller extent than countries that did not (yet) 
experience a change of government.  
 We include eight control variables (n = 8). Firstly, we add variables measuring 
government ideology and parliamentary elections. Rightwingit is a dummy variable based on 
the government ideology index of Potrafke (2009) and assumes the value 1 for rightwing 
governments, i.e. a government ideology index with values 1 or 2, and value 0 otherwise. We 
control for government ideology because rightwing governments are likely to have higher 
military expenditure than leftwing governments have (Whitten and Williams 2011, Bove et al. 
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2017). The election dummy variable Election (t + 1)it is 1 in years which precede parliamentary 
elections. We control for elections because governments in times of elections are likely to shift 
public spending from military expenditure to social welfare to compete for votes (Bove et al. 
2017). Secondly, we include variables describing conflicts, as well as internal and external 
threats. The dummy variable War (t – 1)it indicates whether a country has been involved in an 
interstate war (i.e. a war with another country) or an internal war (i.e. a war between a 
government and internal conflict groups) in year t – 1 with at least 25 battle-related deaths. We 
consider wars in period t – 1 because military expenditure is likely to increase with a time lag 
once a country gets involved in a conflict; in turn, military expenditure is likely to also decrease 
with a time lag once a conflict has ended because it takes time to demobilize and military 
resources need to be replenished. The data for armed conflicts is taken from the “UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflict Dataset” (Version 17.2) and defined according to Gleditsch et al. (2002). The 
variable Internal threatit proxies domestic conflict probability and a country’s internal stability. 
The variable is defined as the average of an eleven-point index for internal violence over the 
past ten years. This index is taken from the “Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and 
Conflict Regions, 1946-2016” dataset by the Center for Systemic Peace. The definition of both 
variables War (t – 1)it and Internal threatit has been shown to explain variance in military 
expenditure relative to GDP (Blum 2018, 2020). Countries like Latvia, Lithuania, and Norway 
most probably increased military expenditure because of Russia’s aggressions—peaking in the 
annexation of the Crimean peninsula in March 2014—rather than because of the two percent 
target. We therefore add a dummy variable Crimeait which assumes the value 1 for countries 
with a common border with Russia for the years 2014-2018, and value 0 otherwise.10 This 
variable (jointly with fixed year effects) ensures that effects of the change in the security 
environment and effects of the two percent target are disentangled. Thirdly, we add three 
 
10 Poland and Lithuania are also labeled as having a common border with Russia because they are adjacent to the 
Russian exclave Kaliningrad. 
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socioeconomic variables: the growth rate of GDP in constant (2010) US dollars, the growth rate 
of population and the growth rate in government debt relative to GDP. The growth rates of GDP 
and population are included to investigate substitution effects when GDP and population 
increase (Dunne et al. 2008, Albalate et al. 2012, Blum 2018, Pamp et al. 2018, Langlotz and 
Potrafke 2019). The growth rate in the debt-to-GDP ratio accounts for a country’s fiscal 
capacity; fiscal capacity and other macroeconomic factors have been shown to influence 
military expenditure in European countries and NATO countries (Odehnal and Neubauer 2018, 
Christie 2019). Data for GDP and population are taken from the World Bank; data for 
government debt to GDP are taken from the IMF. We include fixed country, ηi, and also fixed 
time effects, τt, and estimate the fixed effects model with ordinary least squares and standard 
errors robust to heteroskedasticity (Huber/White/sandwich standard errors; see Huber 1967 and 
White 1980).  
Tables A2.1 and A2.2 in the Appendix show summary statistics and correlations of the 
variables. Data for the three socioeconomic variables are available for the period from 2010 to 
2017 only. We therefore estimate balanced panels for the periods 2010-2018 and 2010-2017 
and include the three socioeconomic variables in the panel for the period 2010-2017 only.  
2.4 Empirical results 
2.4.1 Baseline results 
Table 2.1 shows the baseline results. Columns (4) and (5) relate to the period 2010-2017 and 
thus exclude the large changes of government in Italy and Spain and the small change of 
government in Hungary (the Fidesz party regained the two-third-majority in parliament) in 
2018 but consider the three socioeconomic variables which are not yet available for 2018. We 
examine whether inferences regarding changes of government in countries that do not (yet) 
meet the two percent target change when individual control variables are included or excluded. 
The coefficient of the Two percent targetit variable (countries which had military expenditure 
 32 
relative to GDP after the NATO summit of below 2% in the previous year) is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The numerical meaning of the coefficient is that after the NATO 
summit in 2014, countries which had military expenditure relative to GDP of below 2% in the 
previous year and did not experience a change of government increased the growth rate in 
military expenditure relative to GDP by 9.8 percentage points. This estimate corroborates that 
countries below the two percent target increased military expenditure relative to GDP, while 
countries that already comply with the two percent target did not further increase military 
expenditure relative to GDP. The estimate is quite large: the mean growth rate of military 
expenditure relative to GDP until the 2014 NATO summit was –3.8% (median: –3.7%; see 
Figure 2.4) and the coefficient estimate, thus, indicates that countries below the two percent 
target and without a change of government on average managed to turn growth rates for military 
expenditure relative to GDP into positive values. The coefficient estimates of the interaction 
term between countries below the two percent target and with a small change of government 
are negative in columns (1) to (5), but lack statistical significance.  
The variable measuring a large change of government after the NATO summit in 2014 
has a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (1) to (4) and at the 
10% level when year fixed effects are added in column (5). The positive estimate for the large 
change of government is attributed to the United States because it is the only country that 
experienced a large change of government without being below the two percent target. This 
estimate thus reflects that the United States’ average growth rate of military expenditure relative 
to GDP was on average lower in the years before Donald Trump assumed office than after the 
Trump administration was in office.11 The coefficient estimate of the interaction term between 
countries below the two percent target and with a large change of government is negative and 
 
11 No standard error of the estimate for the large change of government is reported in column (1) because the 
coefficient perfectly predicts the growth rate in military expenditure relative to GDP for the United States after the 
large change of government in 2017. Prediction is no longer perfect and standard errors are computed when the 
dummy variable for rightwing governments is added in column (2).  
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statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (1) to (4) and at the 5% significance level in 
column (5) when year fixed effects are added.  
TABLE 2.1: BASELINE ESTIMATION RESULTS 
NATO Military expenditure to GDPa (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 2010-18 2010-18 2010-18 2010-17 2010-17 
Two percent target 0.098*** 0.096*** 0.082*** 0.075*** 0.075** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.020) (0.030) 
      
Small change since '14 0.021 0.024 0.014 0.012 0.005 
 (0.052) (0.049) (0.058) (0.072) (0.075) 
Two percent target*Small  -0.040 -0.039 -0.024 -0.033 -0.036 
change since '14 (0.049) (0.048) (0.054) (0.068) (0.069) 
      
Large change since '14 0.046*** 0.055*** 0.064*** 0.077*** 0.057* 
 (0.000) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.032) 
Two percent target*Large  -0.094*** -0.103*** -0.101*** -0.114*** -0.102** 
change since '14 (0.018) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.043) 
      
Rightwing  -0.008 -0.017 -0.017 -0.014 
  (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Election (t + 1)  0.003 0.003 0.009 0.010 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
War (t – 1)   0.101*** 0.084*** 0.067*** 
   (0.007) (0.010) (0.015) 
Internal threat   0.109*** 0.100*** 0.084** 
   (0.017) (0.027) (0.039) 
Crimea   0.072 0.081* 0.083 
   (0.047) (0.047) (0.053) 
GDPa    0.159 0.359 
    (0.380) (0.406) 
Populationa    0.348 0.034 
    (2.341) (2.248) 
Debt to GDPa    0.018 0.031 
    (0.116) (0.112) 
      
      
Marginal effect of  -0.048*** -0.048** -0.037** -0.037* -0.045** 
Large change since ’14  (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) 
(if Two percent target=1)      
      
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects no no no no yes 
Observations 243 243 243 216 216 
Countries 27 27 27 27 27 
R2 Overall  0.222 0.224 0.101 0.093 0.141 
R2 Within 0.246 0.247 0.285 0.260 0.287 
R2 Between 0.071 0.077 0.002 0.002 0.017 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. All regressions 
apply standard errors clustered at the country level. a denotes variables which are expressed in year-on-year growth rates. 
The marginal effect of a large change of government for countries below the two percent target 
(shown below the coefficient estimates in Table 2.1) is negative and statistically significant at 
the 1% level in column (1), at the 5% level in columns (2) and (3), at the 10% level in column 
(4) and again at the 5% level when year fixed effects are added in column (5). The size of the 
marginal effect indicates that countries below the two percent target in the previous year that 
experienced a large change of government decreased growth rates by up to 4.8 percentage 
points. The effect of 4.8 percentage points is quite large. It is almost half the size of the 9.8 
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percentage points increase for NATO countries which had military expenditure relative to GDP 
of below 2% in the previous year and did not experience a change in government ideology. And 
it is larger than the 3.8% average growth rate of military expenditure relative to GDP (median: 
2.3%; see Figure 2.4) for all NATO countries in the years after the NATO summit.  
The coefficient for rightwing governments, Rightwingit, and the coefficient for an 
upcoming election, Election (t + 1)it, do not turn out to be statistically significant in columns 
(3) to (5). The coefficients for War (t – 1)it, i.e. an armed conflict in the previous year, and 
Internal threatit are statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (3) to (5), except for the 
coefficient for Internal threatit which is significant at the 5% significance level in column (5). 
A war in the previous year is associated with an increase in the growth rate of military 
expenditure relative to GDP by up to 10.1 percentage points. The positive relationship of both 
previous war and internal threat and the growth rate of military expenditure relative to GDP is 
in line with earlier findings (Collier and Hoeffler 2007, Dunne et al. 2008, Blum 2018, 2020). 
The coefficient of the dummy variable Crimeait is positive and statistically significant at the 
10% level in column (4). The coefficients for the growth rates of GDP, population and 
government debt relative to GDP added in column (4) do not turn out to be statistically 
significant. These results do not support the findings of previous studies using military 
expenditure as the dependent variable. Studies which control for GDP and population use larger 
samples and include developing countries or both developing and developed countries (Dunne 
et al. 2008, Albalate et al. 2012, Blum 2018, Pamp et al. 2018). We focus, however, on the 
rather homogeneous group of NATO countries. Samples of studies which control for 
government debt include European countries or NATO members, i.e. rather homogeneous 
groups of countries. However, these empirical models are estimated in levels or first differences 
rather than in growth rates (Odehnal and Neubauer 2018, Christie 2019). Column (5) also 
includes fixed year effects but the results hardly differ from those in column (4). The year fixed 
effects in column (5) do not turn out to be statistically significant except for the years 2012 and 
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2013, for which the fixed effect is positive and significant at the 5% and the 10% level (not 
reported). An F-Test on the joint significance of the fixed year effects shows that the year fixed 
effects are jointly significant at the 10% level.  
Estimation results for changes of government which distinguish between changes from 
leftwing to rightwing and changes from rightwing to leftwing do not indicate that the direction 
of the government ideology change influences compliance with the two percent target (results 
not shown).  
2.4.2 Robustness tests 
We examine the robustness of our results for large changes of government. Firstly, data on 
military expenditure published by NATO differ from data collected by SIPRI for some 
countries. The SIPRI data suggest that the United Kingdom did not comply with the two percent 
target in any of the years of the observation period, while France did comply with the two 
percent target in all years of the observation period. Turkey did comply with the two percent 
target in 2016 and 2017 and Poland did not comply with the two percent target in 2016 
according to SIPRI data. Differences in figures for military expenditure between SIPRI, NATO 
and other data sources give rise to disagreements on compliance and non-compliance with the 
two percent target among NATO countries because countries will claim figures on own military 
expenditure that are favorable for them. When we use SIPRI instead of NATO data on military 
expenditure, inferences regarding changes of government for countries below the two percent 
target do not change (see Table A2.3 in the Appendix).12 The coefficient for rightwing 
governments is negative and statistically significant at the 5% and 10% level in columns (3) to 
(5). This result is not in line with the findings of Bove et al. (2017), but it reflects the changes 
in growth rates of military expenditure relative to GDP for two countries: Canada had higher 
 
12 Out of the 216 observations in the panel, 13 observations are SIPRI estimates and one observation is described 
to be “highly uncertain”.  
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average growth rates for military expenditure relative to GDP after the leftwing government of 
Justin Trudeau replaced the rightwing government of Stephen Harper in 2015. Poland also had 
on average lower growth rates for military expenditure relative to GDP after the rightwing 
government replaced the center government in 2015. The coefficient of the dummy variable 
Crimeait is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in columns (3) to (5). Countries 
with a common border to Russia perceived a higher level of threat originating from Russia after 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and, therefore, increased military expenditure 
relative to GDP. On average, these countries increased growth rates in military expenditure 
relative to GDP by up to 12.7 percentage points in response to the annexation of Crimea.  
Secondly, we apply a spatial lag model to account for spatial dependences in military 
expenditure among NATO allies. Following the Security Web concept of Rosh (1988), growth 
rates in military expenditure relative to GDP are likely to be influenced by neighboring 
countries with which a country shares a common border (Blum 2018). We therefore estimate a 
spatial autoregressive model (SAR) following Anselin (1988), which controls for growth rates 
in military expenditure relative to GDP of countries with a common land or sea border using 
maximum likelihood estimation.13 Table A2.4 in the Appendix shows that the results hardly 
differ from the baseline estimation results. The coefficient estimate of the spatial lag of military 
expenditure relative to GDP is statistically significant at the 5% level in columns (1), (2) and 
(4) and indicates that countries increase the growth rate in military expenditure relative to GDP 
by almost 0.2 percentage points when a neighboring country increases its growth rate of military 
expenditure relative to GDP by 1.0 percentage points. The coefficient estimate of the spatial 
lag is statistically significant only at the 10% level in column (3) and does not turn out to be 
statistically significant in column (5). 
 
13 The binary contiguity matrix is row-standardized. 
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One may well want to control for time-invariant variables that are likely to be correlated 
with the growth in military expenditure relative to GDP: the geographical distance to Russia 
and the initial level of military expenditure relative to GDP. It is conceivable that the growth in 
military expenditure is larger, the closer a country is located to Russia. The growth in military 
expenditure is also likely to be smaller, the larger military expenditure relative to GDP in 2010 
was. We include the inverse distance between capitals of NATO countries and Moscow and 
military expenditure relative to GDP in 2010 and exclude fixed country effects. Geographical 
closeness to Russia has the expected positive sign but lacks statistical significance. Military 
expenditure relative to GDP in 2010 has the expected negative sign and is statistically 
significant in individual specifications. Including the geographical closeness to Russia and 
military expenditure relative to GDP in 2010 does not change the inferences regarding effects 
of large changes of government on the growth in military expenditure (results not shown).  
2.5 Conclusion 
We have examined whether changes of government influence compliance with international 
agreements by means of the NATO two percent target. Whether countries reduce their efforts 
to increase military expenditure relative to GDP after a change of government has important 
implications for compliance with the two percent target in 2024 because many NATO countries 
are likely to experience changes of government within this ten-year period. We have used panel 
data for 27 NATO countries for the period 2010-2018 and found that countries that experienced 
a large change of government, e.g. a change of government from leftwing to rightwing or vice 
versa, are less likely to comply with the two percent target than countries that did not experience 
such a change of government after the NATO summit in 2014. Changes of government, 
however, do not turn out to be statistically significant when changes in government ideology 
are rather small, e.g. changes to or away from a center government.    
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The sample size with 27 NATO countries we observed from 2010-2018 is small and 
only a few countries experienced a large change of government after the NATO summit in 2014 
for which we found the negative effect on growth rates in military expenditure relative to GDP. 
Investigating whether changes of government influence compliance with international 
agreements, however, is a worthwhile endeavor, even when samples are small. 
We propose that international treaties and agreements need to be designed in a way that 
encourages compliance even when a government that has signed the treaty or agreement is no 
longer in power. In an intergovernmental organization such as the NATO alliance, member 
states might not commit themselves to binding agreements with impending sanctions in case of 
non-compliance. Agreement design should therefore consider positive incentives for 
governments to comply, irrespective of whether the incumbent or his or her predecessor 
committed to the agreement.  
 Future research should examine what determines compliance with international treaties 
and agreements in policy fields other than defense policy. Findings on the determinants of 
compliance should help to deal with the credibility problem of national governments when 
committing to international agreements and how to design future international treaties and 
agreements.  
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Appendix 
TABLE A2.1: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min p25 p75 Max 
NATO Mil. exp. to GDPa 243 -0.004 0.087 -0.195 -0.054 0.033 0.404 
SIPRI Mil. exp. to GDPa 216 -0.008 0.087 -0.229 -0.054 0.025 0.409 
Two percent target 243 0.379 0.486 0 0 1 1 
Small change since '14 243 0.119 0.325 0 0 0 1 
Large change since '14 243 0.070 0.256 0 0 0 1 
Rightwing 243 0.428 0.496 0 0 1 1 
Election (t + 1) 243 0.272 0.446 0 0 1 1 
War (t – 1) 243 0.070 0.256 0 0 0 1 
Internal threat 243 0.066 0.341 0 0 0 2 
Crimea 243 0.103 0.304 0 0 0 1 
GDPa 216 0.019 0.024 -0.091 0.010 0.031 0.111 
Populationa 216 0.002 0.009 -0.031 -0.003 0.007 0.030 
Debt to GDPa 216 0.029 0.098 -0.318 -0.025 0.059 0.604 
Notes:  a denotes variables which are expressed in year-on-year growth rates. 
 
 
 
TABLE A2.2: CORRELATIONS 
 NATO 
Mil. exp. 
to GDPa 
SIPRI 
Mil. exp. 
to GDPa 
Two 
percent 
target 
Small 
change 
since '14 
Large 
change 
since '14 
Rightwing Election  
(t + 1) 
War  
(t – 1) 
Internal 
threat 
Crimea GDPa Popul-
ationa 
Debt to 
GDPa 
NATO Mil. exp. to GDPa 1.000             
SIPRI Mil. exp. to GDPa 0.910 1.000            
Two percent target 0.450 0.439 1.000           
Small change since '14 0.139 0.144 0.341 1.000          
Large change since '14 0.033 0.018 0.285 -0.101 1.000         
Rightwing -0.065 -0.077 -0.024 -0.011 0.056 1.000        
Election (t + 1) 0.005 0.005 -0.038 -0.082 -0.059 0.014 1.000       
War (t – 1) -0.087 -0.073 -0.114 -0.101 0.051 0.089 0.014 1.000      
Internal threat -0.018 -0.000 0.048 -0.071 -0.053 0.224 0.023 0.611 1.000     
Crimea 0.370 0.396 0.183 0.084 -0.093 0.063 0.006 -0.093 -0.066 1.000    
GDPa 0.157 0.183 0.263 0.113 0.030 0.076 -0.012 0.280 0.377 0.116 1.000   
Populationa -0.038 -0.056 0.014 -0.117 0.030 -0.050 -0.018 0.303 0.315 -0.147 0.136 1.000  
Debt to GDPa -0.110 -0.105 -0.315 -0.141 -0.146 -0.074 0.051 -0.115 -0.152 -0.087 -0.372 -0.134 1.000 
Notes:  a denotes variables which are expressed in year-on-year growth rates. 
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TABLE A2.3: ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH SIPRI DATA 
SIPRI Military expenditure to GDPa (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 2010-17 2010-17 2010-17 2010-17 2010-17 
Two percent target 0.087*** 0.085*** 0.065*** 0.063*** 0.062** 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.016) (0.018) (0.028) 
      
Small change since '14 0.016 0.019 0.005 -0.006 -0.021 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.055) (0.050) (0.054) 
Two percent target*Small  -0.007 -0.004 0.021 0.033 0.038 
change since '14 (0.058) (0.057) (0.061) (0.061) (0.059) 
      
Large change since '14 0.027*** 0.041*** 0.055*** 0.057*** 0.045 
 (0.000) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.027) 
Two percent target*Large  -0.078*** -0.090*** -0.086*** -0.089*** -0.087** 
change since '14 (0.021) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.038) 
      
Rightwing  -0.013 -0.026** -0.026* -0.027** 
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Election (t + 1)  0.003 0.003 0.003 0.005 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
War (t – 1)   0.111*** 0.112*** 0.089*** 
   (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) 
Internal threat   0.152*** 0.168*** 0.168*** 
   (0.007) (0.023) (0.031) 
Crimea   0.112** 0.115** 0.126** 
   (0.046) (0.042) (0.048) 
GDPa    0.454 0.784 
    (0.465) (0.470) 
Populationa    0.428 0.113 
    (2.329) (2.247) 
Debt to GDPa    0.066 0.075 
    (0.117) (0.111) 
      
      
Marginal effect of  -0.051** -0.049** -0.031* -0.032 -0.042* 
Large change since ’14  (0.021) (0.023) (0.018) (0.019) (0.023) 
(if Two percent target=1)      
      
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects no no no no yes 
Observations 216 216 216 216 216 
Countries 27 27 27 27 27 
R2 Overall  0.193 0.199 0.095 0.084 0.112 
R2 Within 0.213 0.216 0.303 0.311 0.346 
R2 Between 0.053 0.072 0.007 0.009 0.026 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. All regressions 
apply standard errors clustered at the country level. a denotes variables which are expressed in year-on-year growth rates. 
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TABLE A2.4: SPATIAL AUTOREGRESSIVE MODEL (SAR) ESTIMATION RESULTS 
NATO Military expenditure to GDPa (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 2010-18 2010-18 2010-18 2010-17 2010-17 
Two percent target 0.088*** 0.087*** 0.078*** 0.071*** 0.081*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019) (0.031) 
      
Small change since '14 0.009 0.012 0.008 0.008 0.011 
 (0.053) (0.050) (0.057) (0.070) (0.072) 
Two percent target*Small  -0.031 -0.030 -0.020 -0.030 -0.043 
change since '14 (0.049) (0.047) (0.052) (0.067) (0.067) 
      
Large change since '14 0.036*** 0.044*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.048 
 (0.004) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.031) 
Two percent target*Large  -0.084*** -0.092*** -0.095*** -0.094*** -0.093** 
change since '14 (0.015) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.041) 
      
Rightwing  -0.008 -0.016 -0.016 -0.014 
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
Election (t + 1)  0.003 0.003 0.009 0.010 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
War (t – 1)   0.098*** 0.082*** 0.065*** 
   (0.007) (0.009) (0.014) 
Internal threat   0.095*** 0.088*** 0.075* 
   (0.019) (0.028) (0.039) 
Crimea   0.061 0.071 0.076 
   (0.045) (0.046) (0.051) 
GDPa    0.175 0.353 
    (0.366) (0.387) 
Populationa    0.213 -0.062 
    (2.228) (2.107) 
Debt to GDPa    0.029 0.037 
    (0.112) (0.107) 
      
Spatial 𝜌 0.159** 0.159** 0.102* 0.098** 0.078 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.053) (0.043) (0.051) 
Error variance 𝜎2 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
      
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects no no no no yes 
Observations 243 243 243 216 216 
Countries 27 27 27 27 27 
R2 Overall  0.223 0.225 0.116 0.109 0.158 
R2 Within 0.243 0.245 0.287 0.263 0.290 
R2 Between 0.086 0.091 0.003 0.004 0.025 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. All regressions 
apply standard errors clustered at the country level. a denotes variables which are expressed in year-on-year growth rates. 
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3. Democracy’s Third Wave and National Defense 
Spending 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract* 
I investigate how the third wave of democracy influenced national defense spending by using 
a panel of 110 countries for the period 1972-2013. I use new SIPRI data on military expenditure, 
which has been extended to years prior to 1988, and four democracy measures to address 
differences among democracy indices. The results from a dynamic panel data model suggest 
that democracy’s third wave decreased defense spending relative to GDP by about 10% within 
countries that experienced democratization. This result does not show to be heterogeneous 
across world regions which the third wave reached in different sub-waves. I exploit the regional 
diffusion of democracy in the context of the third wave of democratizations as an instrumental 
variable (IV) for democracy in order to overcome endogeneity problems. The IV estimates 
indicate that democracy decreased national defense spending relative to GDP by about 20% 
within countries, demonstrating that OLS results underestimate the effect of democracy on 
national defense spending. The cumulative long-run effect of democratization resulting from 
the dynamics in defense spending is almost three times higher for both OLS and IV estimates. 
 
* I thank Christian Bjørnskov, Klaus Gründler, Niklas Potrafke, the participants of the annual meeting of the 
European Public Choice Society (EPCS) 2019, the participants of the 3rd International Conference on the Political 
Economy of Democracy and Dictatorship (PEDD) 2019, and two anonymous referees for valuable comments and 
Philippa Carr for proofreading. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Defense spending follows budget decisions taken by national governments and has been shown 
to be influenced by political institutions (e.g. Dunne and Perlo-Freeman 2003a, Collier and 
Hoeffler 2007, Albalate et al. 2012, Blum 2018). Against the backdrop of the worldwide 
decrease in popularity for democracy, and drastically reduced defense budgets in Western 
democracies since the end of the Cold War (which NATO’s two percent target for defense 
spending relative to GDP is supposed to counteract), patterns of defense spending and the 
underlying policy decisions in democracies and autocracies are relevant for scholars and 
political decision-makers. On the one hand, defense spending describes—among others—one 
measure for the military capabilities of a nation state. Defense spending thus indicates how 
militarily powerful a country is. If democratization decreases national defense spending, 
democracies might also be less threatening, and democratization may alleviate arms races and 
help to solve security dilemmas. On the other hand, defense spending is one element of 
government spending and reveals different preferences for public spending between 
democracies and autocracies. National defense spending is, in turn, likely to give rise to indirect 
effects because it has been shown that defense spending affects other economic variables like 
economic growth (Dunne et al. 2005, Alptekin and Levine 2012), debt (Dunne et al. 2004) or 
productivity (Caruso and Francesco 2012) as well as national arms production (Blum 2019).  
This chapter contributes to the literature on how political institutions influence national 
defense spending. The third wave of democratizations as defined by Huntington (1991a) 
provides a unique setting to investigate how the spread of democracy influenced national 
defense spending.1 Democracy’s third wave doubled the number of democracies until 1990 and 
proceeded in regional sub-waves: it describes the democratizations in Southern Europe in the 
 
1 Huntington (1991a, 1991b: 13-26) defines three waves of democratization to describe the global expansion of 
democracy: the introduction of male suffrage in the United States and in European countries describes the first 
wave lasting from the 1820s until 1926. The second wave accounts for democratizations after the Second World 
War until the 1960s in the former fascist European countries, countries like Japan, Korea and Turkey as well as in 
some Latin American countries which, however, quickly relapsed into autocratic regimes. 
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mid-1970s, in Latin America in the 1980s, in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s and in some 
African and Asian-Pacific countries. I investigate how political institutions in the context of the 
third wave of democratization influenced national defense spending for 110 countries over the 
period 1972-2013. I use new data on military expenditure by the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI), which has been extended to years prior to 1988, and estimate the 
impact of democracy’s third wave by means of four democracy measures. I apply a dynamic 
panel data model and an instrumental variable (IV) approach in order to deal with endogeneity 
problems associated with the relationship between political institutions and defense spending. 
I find that democracy’s third wave decreased national defense spending within countries that 
experienced democratization by about 10% according to OLS and by about 20% according to 
IV estimates. 
Democracies are supposed to spend a smaller share of their GDP for defense than 
autocracies as a result of their government spending policies and their role within the 
international community. National defense spending represents a budget decision on the 
spending of public funds: a government chooses how much public funds it spends for defense 
and for civilian public goods—the so-called “guns versus butter” trade-off. In a democracy, an 
electorate votes the government and the median voter as the representative in a majority voting 
with single-peaked preferences is decisive for the outcome. The party or candidate that most 
closely reflects the preferences of the median voter takes over the government. The median 
voter in a democracy prefers spending on civilian public goods to defense spending; he regards 
defense spending as a necessity to ensure national security, while levels above the necessary 
level do not further increase his utility. Civilian public goods, in contrast, have a higher 
probability to further increase the median voter’s utility. The median voter prefers “butter” to 
“guns”. Civilian public goods spending, thus, crowds out defense spending because a 
government wants to ensure the support from the electorate (Dudley and Montmarquette 1981, 
Blum 2018). In an autocracy, in contrast, the government depends on the loyalty of the elites. 
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Governments in autocratic regimes must therefore allow these elites to extract rents to ensure 
political support. Rents for the military elite are particularly decisive in autocratic regimes: the 
lack of legitimation by an electorate requires financially well-endowed military personnel 
(including paramilitary forces upon which autocrats often rely) to ensure loyalty towards the 
government and avoid military coups (Kimenyi and Mbaku 1995, Bove and Brauner 2016). 
Moreover, strong armed forces are required if the autocratic leader has to use military force 
against an opposition to stay in power and preserve the regime (Geddes et al. 2018, Blum 2018). 
Scholars have found empirical evidence for high levels of government spending in perfect 
democracies and perfect autocracies to finance either public goods for the electorate, or rents 
for the elite (Plümper and Martin 2003, Hausken et al. 2004). Democracies thus sustain high 
levels of civilian public goods spending at the expense of defense spending to ensure political 
support by the electorate, while non-democratic regimes finance rents for the (military) elites 
to ensure loyalty among the (military) elite.2 
 Apart from the differences in the government spending policies of democracies and 
autocracies, scholars in the field of International Relations have extensively discussed whether 
democracies are more peaceful and, thus, the perceived threat originating from democracies—
especially towards other democracies—is reduced compared to autocracies. Immanuel Kant’s 
(1795) work “Perpetual Peace” represents an early political and philosophical reasoning that 
the spread of liberalism fosters peace and lowers the relevance of armed forces. According to 
the Democratic Peace paradigm, democracies do not go to war against each other. Empirical 
evidence for this theory exists (Doyle 1983a, 1983b, Maoz and Russett 1993, Russett and 
O’Neal 2001); the relationship between democracy and conflict is more complex, however (see 
the reviews of Hegre 2014 and Gates et al. 1996).  
 
2 See also Wintrobe (1998) on the economics of autocratic regimes. 
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Scholars have estimated demand functions for national defense spending and found that 
strategic, political and socio-economic factors determine a country’s demand for defense 
spending (Dunne and Perlo-Freeman 2003a, 2003b, Dunne et al. 2008, 2009, Fordham and 
Walker 2005, Collier and Hoeffler 2007, Goldsmith 2007, Rota 2011, Albalate et al. 2012, 
Brauner 2015, Töngür et al. 2015, Skogstad 2016, Yesilyurt and Elhorst 2017, George and 
Sandler 2018, Blum 2018).3 Many of those studies control for democracy by means of the Polity 
IV index, and find a negative and statistically significant correlation between a country’s Polity 
IV score and defense spending relative to GDP. 
I estimate static and dynamic panel data models for a rich sample of 110 countries for 
the period 1972-2013, thus including the entire third wave of democratization. Democracy is 
hard to quantify, and different measures are not simply interchangeable and may well give rise 
to changing empirical results. I therefore apply four democracy measures to provide a 
comprehensive view on how political institutions influence national defense spending: the 
dichotomous democracy measure by Bjørnskov and Rode (2019), the Polity IV index by 
Marshall et al. (2018) and the dichotomous and continuous democracy measure by Gründler 
and Krieger (2016, 2018). The coefficient estimates for all four democracy measures indicate a 
significant negative impact of democracy on defense spending relative to GDP. The 
dichotomous democracy measures indicate that democracy’s third wave decreased national 
defense spending relative to GDP by about 10% within countries that experienced 
democratization. Region-specific estimation results accounting for the sub-waves which 
reached different regions at different points in time, do not indicate that the impact of 
democracy’s third wave on national defense spending relative to GDP has been heterogeneous 
across world regions. In a further step, I apply an IV strategy that exploits the regional diffusion 
of democracy in the context of the third wave of democratizations to overcome endogeneity 
 
3 See Blum (2018) for a detailed discussion of the cited studies. 
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problems. Apart from internal instruments applied in a GMM model (Dunne and Perlo-Freeman 
2003b), this is the first IV approach estimating the effect of democracy on national defense 
spending. The IV estimates indicate an effect of democracy on national defense spending of 
about 20%. The OLS estimates resulting from non-instrumented democracy measures thus 
underestimate the effect of democracy on national defense spending. The results for the lagged 
values of the dependent variable in the dynamic panel data model yield a multiplier for the 
cumulative long-run effect of democracy which is 2.9. This long-run multiplier indicates that 
established democracies have about 30% less defense spending relative to GDP according to 
OLS results and more than 50% less defense spending relative to GDP according to IV results 
than if the respective nations were under autocratic rule.  
In line with previous studies, I estimate the demand for national defense spending as a 
share of GDP to measure the financial endowment and capabilities of the armed forces relative 
to the size of a country. This measure does not account for differences in total government 
spending and budget composition between democracies and autocracies. Data on defense 
spending as a share of total government spending has, however, not been extended by SIPRI to 
years prior to 1988. If democratization increases total government spending (see Aidt and 
Jensen 2013) and simultaneously reduces defense spending relative to GDP, it is likely that the 
impact of democracy on defense spending relative to total government spending exceeds the 
impact of democracy on defense spending relative to GDP.  
3.2 Data and descriptive findings 
3.2.1 SIRPI data for defense spending 1972-2013 
Data for military expenditure relative to GDP is provided by the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI). The figures are defined for calendar years. SIPRI has extended data 
on military expenditure to years prior to 1988 for a large number of countries. The within-
variation of the data is much more reliable than the between-variation due to differences among 
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countries in accounting rules and items included in the calculation of the figures. A large share 
of these new observations for years prior to 1988 are, however, SIPRI estimates. SIPRI states 
that these estimates are constructed to match official data to the SIPRI definition if necessary, 
and “to combine overlapping sources of data that do not agree with each other”. To construct 
more consistent time series, “one series is generally raised or lowered by a fixed percentage so 
as to make it consistent with the other in the year at which they are joined. In a few cases, 
estimates of the whole series are made, usually based on expert analyses, to obtain a series more 
consistent with SIPRI’s definition.”4 Therefore, estimated data is not fully reliable for the 
empirical analysis. Countries for which data on military expenditure are estimates for more than 
half of the observation period, i.e. for more than 21 years, are therefore excluded from the 
sample, which halves the share of estimates. Observations that are labeled as being “highly 
uncertain” are excluded from the analysis.5 The sample includes all countries from the first year 
onwards for which continuous data for military expenditure relative to GDP and continuous 
data for the explanatory variables is available. A total of 110 countries for the period 1972-2013 
are thus included in the empirical analysis, resulting in 2,978 observations. The sample includes 
the United States, Canada, and Western European countries, which all experienced almost no 
variation in democracy, but decreased defense spending after the end of the Cold War, as a 
control group. 
 
4 See https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex/sources-and-methods and 
https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex/frequently-asked-questions, both accessed November 9, 2019.  
5 Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Nigeria, Nepal, Jordan and Ghana are main troop contributors to 
UN peacekeeping missions as of 2013. UN peacekeeping missions represent important sources of income for these 
countries and increase defense expenditure as described by SIPRI data. Since no data on troop contributions by 
country is available for the period 1972-2013 to explain peacekeeping-induced variation in defense spending, these 
countries are excluded. Furthermore, India and Pakistan became nuclear powers at some unobserved point in time 
during the observation period, which might have caused these countries to considerably decrease defense spending 
relative to GDP. 
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3.2.2 Democracy measures 
I apply four democracy measures in the empirical analysis to address differences among 
democracy indices. First, the dichotomous democracy measure by Bjørnskov and Rode (2019), 
which is an update of the Democracy-Dictatorship dataset by Cheibub et al. (2010). Second, 
the Polity IV index by Marshall et al. (2018), which is an update of the Polity III dataset by 
Jaggers and Gurr (1995). Third, the Dichotomous Support Vector Machines Democracy Index 
(DSVMDI) and, fourth, the Continuous Support Vector Machines Democracy Index 
(CSVMDI) by Gründler and Krieger (2016, 2018), which are both based on machine learning 
techniques. The dichotomous democracy measure by Bjørnskov and Rode (2019) classifies a 
country as a democracy if both chief executive and legislature are popularly elected, more than 
one party competes in the elections, and the power has alternated under identical electoral rules 
to those when the predecessor assumed office (Cheibub et al. 2010: 69-71). Bjørnskov and Rode 
(2019) label regime changes to democracy or dictatorship for the respective year in case the 
change occurred in the first half of the year, and for the subsequent year otherwise. The Polity 
IV index by Marshall et al. (2018) is a composite index measuring autocracy and democracy 
on a scale ranging from –10 to +10. It combines two composite indices for autocracy and 
democracy, both ranging between zero and ten and both consisting of sub-indices. These sub-
indices account for the competitiveness and openness of executive recruiting, the constraints 
on the chief executive and the competitiveness and regulation of political participation. The 
Polity IV index and its components are coded as of the end of the year. The dichotomous and 
the continuous democracy measures by Gründler and Krieger (2016, 2018) both range within 
an interval of zero and one. The two democracy measures are calculated by means of machine 
learning algorithms for pattern recognition, which learn from example inputs without being 
explicitly programmed. The underlying input attributes to describe democracy are political 
participation and political competition as core elements of democracy, as well as independence 
of the judiciary and freedom of the press (Gründler and Krieger 2016).  
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Democracy is difficult to quantify because of challenges in “conceptualization, 
measurement, and aggregation” (Munck and Verkuilen 2002), i.e. democracy measures are 
different in the elements they regard as crucial to describe a democracy, the way of measuring 
these elements and the way of aggregating them to one quantitative measure. Democracy 
measures are not simply interchangeable, and the choice of democracy measure can 
considerably affect empirical results (Cheibub et al. 2010).6 Selecting the right democracy 
measure for a quantitative analysis is therefore of essential methodological interest. Huntington 
(1991b: 11) prefers a dichotomous approach to describe the third wave of democracy. A 
dichotomous democracy measure provides a clear-cut definition and is easy to interpret in the 
empirical analysis. A continuous democracy measure, in turn, may be more precise in 
measuring democracy, and accounts for the process in which political institutions develop and 
democracies emerge. In terms of measurement error in democracy measures, a continuous 
measure implies many small errors, while a dichotomous measure implies few large errors 
(Alvarez et al. 1996).  
Measurement error gives rise to biased estimates and if the bias is caused by a 
systematic, non-random measurement error, it cannot be solved by instrumental variables 
(Gründler and Krieger 2018, 2019). Such systematic measurement error is supposed to be ruled 
out if machine learning algorithms are applied for measuring democracy as stated by Gründler 
and Krieger (2016, 2018). The alternation rule in the measurement of democracy by Bjørnskov 
and Rode (2019) (i.e. that the power needs to have alternated in accordance with democratic 
rules before a country is described as a democracy) implies a non-random measurement error 
rooted in the conceptualization of democracy. The strength of political institutions is 
 
6 The differences among the four democracy measures are tangible: a comparison between the dichotomous 
democracy measure by Bjørnskov and Rode (2019) and the dichotomous democracy measure by Gründler and 
Krieger (2016, 2018) shows considerable deviations especially for African and Asian-Pacific countries. Contingent 
on a threshold Polity IV score above which a country is indicated as a democracy, about 10% of the information 
from the Polity IV measure disagrees with the dichotomous democracy measure by Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). 
See Potrafke (2012, 2013) on how using the measure by Cheibub et al. (2010) changes established results and 
Gründler and Krieger (2016) on how machine learning based democracy measures resolve ambiguity about the 
relationship between democracy and economic growth.  
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underestimated for young democracies that did not yet experience a change of government, thus 
leading to an underestimation of the effect of democracy (Knutsen and Wig 2015). The most 
common source of a systematic, non-random measurement error lies in the aggregation of 
additive sub-components of democracy, particularly if the sub-components receive equal 
weights. Hence, most measurement errors lead to an underestimation of changes in political 
institutions and to an overestimation of the effect of democracy (Gründler and Krieger 2016, 
2018, 2019). This systematic measurement error applies to the Polity IV index by Marshall et 
al. (2018). The reliability of the Polity IV index is, however, also contested for other reasons: 
the index is neither continuous nor cardinal, and owing to its composite nature, identical scores 
can result from numerous different combinations of the democracy and the autocracy index and 
their sub-indices. The bimodal distribution of the Polity IV index with peaks at very high and 
very low levels, moreover, casts doubt on whether this index contains more information than a 
dichotomous index (Vreeland 2008, Cheibub et al. 2010).7 A threshold value for the Polity IV 
index above which a country is described as a democracy is, in turn, always arbitrary. Most 
studies estimating demand functions for national defense spending apply the Polity IV index to 
control for political institutions. I therefore apply the Polity IV index as a measure of democracy 
to ensure that the empirical results can be compared with previous research.  
3.2.3 Descriptive findings on democracy’s third wave and defense spending 
The third wave of democracy started with the democratization of Portugal after the Carnation 
Revolution in 1974, and with Spain and Greece becoming democracies in the mid-1970s. It 
continued in Latin America in the 1980s with the democratization of countries like Argentina 
and Chile. The fall of the Iron Curtain triggered democratization in Eastern European countries 
such as Hungary and Poland in the early 1990s. Democratizations in African countries like 
 
7 Following the findings of Vreeland (2008) that sub-indices of the Polity IV index are closely related to civil war, 
the Polity IV index might even confound the effect of democracy on defense spending with the effect of civil war 
on defense spending. 
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Kenya and Senegal as well as in Asian-Pacific countries like the Philippines and South Korea 
are also attributed to the third wave (Huntington 1991a, 1991b). Figure A3.1 in Appendix I 
shows two maps which indicate how the spread of democracy during the third wave changed 
the world’s political landscape between 1972 and 2013. Reverse transitions during which some 
democracies relapsed into autocratic regimes marked the end of the first and second wave of 
democratization. However, by the time Huntington defined the three waves of democracy, the 
third wave was at its peak and it was not possible to foresee reverse transitions to mark the end 
of this third wave. The relapses of democracies such as Turkey and Venezuela into autocratic 
regimes in the mid-2010s might also mark the end of this third wave. The observation period 
from 1972 to 2013 thus ensures that the entire third wave of democracy is covered in the 
empirical analysis. 
Figure 3.1 shows national defense spending relative to GDP, the dichotomous 
democracy measure by Bjørnskov and Rode (2019) and the Polity IV index for selected 
countries. Portugal remarkably decreased defense spending relative to GDP after the coup d’état 
and the subsequent transition to democracy from about 5% to less than 3%. Argentina reached 
defense spending relative to GDP of almost 5% during the rule of Perón and the subsequent 
military regime which lasted until 1983; defense spending decreased following 
democratization. The negative impact of democracy on defense spending is also visible for 
Chile following the end of the military dictatorship of Pinochet and for Uruguay after 1985; 
during the military regime in both countries, defense spending relative to GDP had reached 
values above 5% with a maximum of almost 9% for Chile in 1982. Albania, Hungary and 
Romania decreased defense spending relative to GDP after becoming democracies. Indonesia 
already decreased defense spending in the run-up to democratic transition and retained low 
levels after becoming a democracy. Malawi retained low levels of defense spending relative to 
GDP after democratic transition, too. For the discussed countries, periods of democratic regime  
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FIGURE 3.1: NATIONAL DEFENSE SPENDING AND DEMOCRACY IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
according to the dichotomous democracy measure are accompanied with considerably high 
levels of the Polity IV index and vice versa. South Africa is, however, not classified as a 
democracy according to the dichotomous measure despite the increase to a Polity IV score of 
+9 which coincided with a decrease in defense spending. Figures for North American and 
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Western European countries as well as for countries in the Middle East are not shown because 
these countries experienced almost no variation in the two democracy measures. 
Table A3.1 in Appendix I lists the 110 countries in the sample, shows the first and last 
year of the continuous time series for each country and indicates whether a country experienced 
variation in the four democracy measures during the observation period.  
3.3 Empirical analysis 
3.3.1 Dynamic panel data model 
I estimate a dynamic panel data model to examine how national defense spending is influenced 
by democracy. Persistence in defense spending and potential correlation between democracy 
and national defense spending prior to democratic transition require a panel model which 
includes dynamics of the dependent variable and thus accounts for pre-transition dynamics.8 
For instance, the denominator of the dependent variable, GDP, has been shown to experience a 
dip prior to democratization (Brückner and Ciccone 2011), which might give rise to pre-
transition correlation between democracy and defense spending relative to GDP. The baseline 
model looks as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗  𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑗
𝑗=5
𝑗=2
+  𝜇 𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝒙𝒊𝒕−𝟏𝜹 +  𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                              (1) 
 
The dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡 describes the natural logarithm of national defense spending relative 
to GDP for country 𝑖 in year 𝑡. Using the natural logarithm of defense spending relative to GDP 
as the dependent variable allows to interpret the estimated coefficients as elasticities. The model 
follows Hamilton (2018) and Acemoglu et al. (2019) and includes four lags of the dependent 
 
8 Acemoglu et al. (2019) employs a similar dynamic panel data model to estimate the effect of democracy on 
economic growth. 
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variable before regime transition. These four lags describe national defense spending relative 
to GDP for the period from 𝑡 –  5 to 𝑡 –  2 before regime transition. The lag structure of the 
dependent variable starts with the second instead of the first lag because the four democracy 
measures are all lagged by one year. An equivalent one year time lag of the dependent variable 
as a regressor would otherwise (depending on the timing of the transition within the year and 
the adjustment duration of the defense budget) be likely to correlate with the one year time lag 
of regime transition. The dynamic panel data model includes four lags of the dependent variable 
for two reasons: First, sequential exogeneity—the standard assumption for linear dynamic panel 
data models—needs to be fulfilled. This assumption is less demanding than strict exogeneity, 
which is violated once a lagged dependent variable is included in the regression. Sequential 
exogeneity requires that democracy and past levels of defense spending are orthogonal to 
current and future shocks to national defense spending as well as that the error term 𝑖𝑡 is not 
serially correlated. A lag structure of national defense spending that includes a sufficiently long 
pre-transition period accounts for dynamics in national defense spending which may influence 
the likelihood of regime transition. A sufficiently large lag structure of the dependent variable, 
moreover, rules out serial correlation in the error term. Second, consistent estimates require that 
conditional on fixed effects and control variables, national defense spending relative to GDP 
and each of the democracy measures follow stationary processes. National defense budgets are 
likely to be persistent and scholars have shown that past values of defense spending relative to 
GDP explain their current values (Dunne and Perlo-Freeman 2003b, Rota 2011). Including four 
lags of the dependent variable creates stationary time series with high probability (Hamilton 
2018). The inclusion of lagged dependent variables gives rise to biased within-estimates with 
an asymptotic bias of order 1/𝑇 since the strict exogeneity assumption does not hold in dynamic 
panel data models (Nickell 1981). However, with an average of 31 year-observations per 
country estimated in the dynamic panel data model, this bias is supposed to be rather small.  
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I separately include four democracy measures 𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 in the dynamic panel data model: 
the Bjørnskov and Rode (2019) dichotomous democracy measure Democracyit-1, the Polity IV 
index Polity IVit-1 by Marshall et al. (2018), the Dichotomous Support Vector Machines 
Democracy Index DSVMDIit-1 and the Continuous Support Vector Machines Democracy Index 
CSVMDIit-1—both by Gründler and Krieger (2016, 2018).
9 Each of the democracy measures 
enters the regression with a one year time lag to take account of a reaction time until budgetary 
adjustments become effective, as well as to mitigate possible problems of reverse causality 
between democracy and national defense spending. Given the coding rule of the dichotomous 
democracy measure by Bjørnskov and Rode (2019), this one year time lag effectively allows 
for a transition phase between more than half a year and less than one and a half years after the 
regime change until defense spending is adjusted. The time lag of the Polity IV variable 
effectively codes the Polity IV index as of the beginning of the year, and allows for at least one 
calendar year after a change in the Polity IV score until budgetary adjustments become 
effective. 
The dynamic panel data model includes both country fixed effects 𝑖 and year fixed 
effects 𝛾𝑡. The empirical model thus exploits the within variation in national defense spending. 
The within-analysis is favorable because, as mentioned earlier, SIPRI data is more reliable over 
time than across countries. Year fixed effects account for global trends in defense spending 
which are particularly pronounced from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era. The standard 
errors εit are clustered at the country level and robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity 
(Huber/White/sandwich standard errors; see Huber 1967 and White 1980). 
The 1 ×  𝐾 vector 𝒙𝒊𝒕−𝟏 contains five control variables, which are all lagged by one 
year. The parameters of the control variables are included in the 𝐾 ×  1 vector 𝜹. The set of 
control variables includes two strategic and three socio-economic variables: Warit-1 is a dummy 
 
9 I apply the variable “Polity2” from the Polity IV dataset which prorates the Polity IV index for the duration of 
interregnum periods.  
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variable which indicates whether a country has been involved in an interstate war (i.e. a war 
with another country), or an internal war (i.e. a war between a government and internal conflict 
groups) in year 𝑡 –  1 with at least 25 battle-related deaths. The time lag for measuring the 
impact of war reflects that national defense spending increases with a time lag once a country 
is involved in a violent conflict, and decreases with a time lag once a conflict has ended because 
the country then needs to demobilize and replenish military resources. Data for armed conflicts 
is taken from the “UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset” by Gleditsch et al. (2002) (Version 
17.2). Internal threatit-1 describes a country’s internal stability and the probability of a domestic 
conflict, which is proxied by means of an eleven-point index for internal violence that is lagged 
by one year. Data on internal violence is taken from the “Major Episodes of Political Violence 
(MEPV) and Conflict Regions, 1946-2016” dataset (Version July 25, 2017). Few studies have 
controlled for internal threat but both variables Warit-1 and Internal threatit-1 have shown to 
explain variance in national defense spending relative to GDP (Blum 2018, Blum and Potrafke 
2019). GDPit-1 describes the natural logarithm of GDP in constant (2010) US dollars in year 
𝑡 –  1 to investigate possible income or substitution effects (Dunne et al. 2008, Albalate et al. 
2012, Blum 2018). GDP also needs to be controlled for because transitions to democracy can 
cause or at least be accompanied by higher economic growth (Acemoglu et al. 2019, 
Papaioannou and Siourounis 2008). Populationit-1 describes the natural logarithm of a country’s 
population in year 𝑡 –  1. The data for GDP and Population is taken from the World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank.10 Scholars have controlled for trade to detect 
peaceful effects of economic integration or increased defense spending to protect trade routes. 
The results on trade are, however, mixed (Dunne and Perlo-Freeman 2003b, Dunne et al. 2008, 
Blum 2018). Trade globalizationit-1 controls for the level of trade in year 𝑡 –  1 to detect possible 
 
10 Data for GDP is not available for the entire observation period for Hungary, Poland and Romania. SIPRI data 
for military expenditure in levels and in shares of GDP have therefore been used to construct GDP figures for 
those countries. This procedure is intended to accurately capture variation in GDP over time for those countries. 
GDP data from the World Bank should, however, not be compared with GDP data compiled from SIPRI figures; 
this issue is, however, mitigated because the fixed effects model exploits the within-variation of countries only.  
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attenuation effects of trade on national defense spending. This variable measures the de facto 
globalization in terms of international trade and considers trade in goods, trade in services and 
trade partners’ diversification. The data on trade globalization is taken from the KOF 
Globalization Index (Dreher 2006, Gygli et al. 2019). Table A3.2 and A3.3 in Appendix I show 
summary statistics and correlations for all variables applied in the estimation. 
3.3.2 Estimation results 
I estimate the panel model in three steps. First, I estimate equation (1) without lags of the 
dependent variable, i.e. a static panel data model, and without control variables. The static panel 
data model allows to include 110 countries with a total of 2,978 observations. Panel A of Table 
3.1 shows estimation results for the four democracy measures with country and year fixed 
effects only. The correlation of the four democracy measures conditioned on country and year 
fixed effects yields negative estimates for all democracy measures. The Bjørnskov and Rode 
(2019) dichotomous democracy measure (Democracy) in column (1) is statistically significant 
at the 5% level and indicates that democracy decreases national defense spending relative to 
GDP by 18% within countries.11 The three other democracy measures in columns (2) to (4) are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. A one-point change in a country’s Polity IV score is 
associated with a decrease in national defense spending relative to GDP by 2.2%. The impact 
of democracy is 22% for the Dichotomous Support Vector Machines Democracy Index 
(DSVMDI) and—assuming a hypothetical change from zero to one—30% for the Continuous 
Support Vector Machines Democracy Index (CSVMDI). 
Second, I add control variables to the static panel data model in panel B of Table 3.1. 
The coefficient estimates for the four democracy measures do hardly change in both size and 
statistical significance. A war turns out with a positive coefficient estimate which is significant 
 
11 Note that the percentage impact of democracy, i.e. when the democracy dummy switches to one, is calculated 
as 100[exp(–0.196) – 1] = –17.8. 
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at the 1% level in columns (1) through (4). The increase in defense spending relative to GDP 
during wartime—an impact of 26% according to the coefficient estimate in column (1)—shows 
the economic significance of the impact of democracy: the negative impact of democracy on 
national defense spending relative to GDP according to the two dichotomous democracy 
measures in columns (1) and (3) is almost as large as the positive impact of a war. The impact 
of war on national defense spending further illustrates the “peace dividend”, i.e. the decreased 
level of defense spending during the absence of armed conflicts. Internal threat and the 
coefficients of the three socio-economic variables for GDP, population and trade globalization  
TABLE 3.1: ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE STATIC PANEL DATA MODEL 
National defense spending (in % of GDP)a (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Panel A: Without control variables     
     
Democracy (t – 1) -0.196**    
 (0.095)    
Polity IV (t – 1)  -0.022***   
  (0.007)   
DSVMDI (t – 1)   -0.250***  
   (0.069)  
CSVMDI (t – 1)    -0.350*** 
    (0.098) 
     
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 2,978 2,978 2,978 2,978 
Countries 110 110 110 110 
R2 Overall 0.125 0.158 0.134 0.143 
R2 Within 0.197 0.210 0.207 0.206 
R2 Between 0.061 0.098 0.113 0.121 
Panel B: With control variables     
     
Democracy (t – 1) -0.216**    
 (0.098)    
Polity IV (t – 1)  -0.023***   
  (0.007)   
DSVMDI (t – 1)   -0.240***  
   (0.071)  
CSVMDI (t – 1)    -0.358*** 
    (0.098) 
War (t – 1) 0.235*** 0.233*** 0.211*** 0.229*** 
 (0.062) (0.066) (0.060) (0.063) 
Internal threat (t – 1) 0.021 0.013 0.018 0.016 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) 
GDPa (t – 1) -0.136 -0.164 -0.152 -0.166 
 (0.163) (0.162) (0.160) (0.164) 
Populationa (t – 1) 0.138 0.193 0.196 0.210 
 (0.272) (0.272) (0.271) (0.274) 
Trade globalization (t – 1) 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
     
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 2,978 2,978 2,978 2,978 
Countries 110 110 110 110 
R2 Overall 0.060 0.064 0.063 0.060 
R2 Within 0.217 0.227 0.223 0.224 
R2 Between 0.002 0.005 0.009 0.008 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. All regressions 
apply standard errors clustered at the country level. a denotes variables which are expressed in their natural logarithm. 
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do not turn out to be statistically significant. The lack of statistical significance for GDP and 
population contradicts earlier findings (Collier and Hoeffler 2007, Dunne et al. 2008, Blum 
2018). The result for GDP suggests that no substitution effect exists when GDP increases, which 
means that defense spending increases in proportion to GDP.  
Third, I include the four lags of the dependent variable and thus estimate the dynamic 
panel data model as described by equation (1). The lag structure reduces the number of countries 
from 110 to 95 (the number of countries is reduced by those countries with too short observation 
periods) and the total number of observations from 2,978 to 2,455. Table 3.2 shows that 
compared to Table 3.1, the coefficient estimates of all democracy measures are about half the 
size, but still statistically significant at the same levels once dynamics of the dependent variable 
are included in the model. The impact of democracy on national defense spending relative to 
GDP is reduced to 9% (Democracy), 1.1% (for a one-point increase in Polity IV), 12% 
(DSVMDI) and 16% (CSVMDI; for a hypothetical change from zero to one). Likewise, the 
coefficient estimates for a war are approximately halved in size. A Wald test does not reject the 
null hypothesis of equality of the two dichotomous democracy measures (columns 1 and 3). In 
columns (1) through (4), the second lag of the dependent variable is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level and the fourth and fifth lag of the dependent variable are statistically 
significant at the 5% level; however, the fourth lag has a negative sign. The results for the 
second lag of the dependent variable—a coefficient of 0.672 in column (1)—indicate 
considerable persistence in national defense spending relative to GDP and show that empirical 
models estimating demand functions for national defense spending should account for the 
dynamics in national defense spending. The results for the lag structure of the dependent 
variable yield a multiplier for the cumulative long-run effect of democracy of 2.9.12 The implied 
 
12 Note that the cumulative long-run effect of democracy is calculated as ?̂? ∗ (1 − ∑ 𝛽?̂?
5
𝑗=2 )
−1 with ?̂? being the 
parameter estimate for the democracy measure, ?̂?𝑗 being the parameter estimate for the j
th lag of the dependent 
variable and (1 − ∑ 𝛽?̂?
5
𝑗=2 )
−1 describing the long-run multiplier for parameter estimates in a dynamic panel data 
model (see Acemoglu et al. 2019). The long-run multiplier according to column (1) is thus calculated  
as (1 – (0.672 – 0.011 – 0.029 + 0.027)) – 1 = 2.9 
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long-run effect of democracy in the dynamic panel data model of about 30% according to the 
two dichotomous democracy measures thus even exceeds the coefficient estimates for 
democracy in the static panel data model (Table 3.1).13 
TABLE 3.2: ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODEL 
National defense spending (in % of GDP)a (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Democracy (t – 1) -0.097**    
 (0.047)    
Polity IV (t – 1)  -0.011***   
  (0.003)   
DSVMDI (t – 1)   -0.123***  
   (0.033)  
CSVMDI (t – 1)    -0.175*** 
    (0.038) 
War (t – 1) 0.123*** 0.125*** 0.115*** 0.124*** 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.034) (0.035) 
Internal threat (t – 1) 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
GDPa (t – 1) 0.066 0.050 0.054 0.046 
 (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) 
Populationa (t – 1) -0.025 0.010 0.008 0.018 
 (0.134) (0.132) (0.134) (0.135) 
Trade globalization (t – 1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
National defense spending (% of GDP)a (t – 2) 0.672*** 0.660*** 0.661*** 0.660*** 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) 
National defense spending (% of GDP)a (t – 3) -0.011 -0.013 -0.008 -0.009 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) 
National defense spending (% of GDP)a (t – 4) -0.029** -0.030** -0.030** -0.030** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
National defense spending (% of GDP)a (t – 5) 0.027** 0.028** 0.028** 0.028** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
     
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 2,455 2,455 2,455 2,455 
Countries 95 95 95 95 
R2 Overall 0.856 0.854 0.849 0.850 
R2 Within 0.643 0.647 0.647 0.646 
R2 Between 0.932 0.928 0.922 0.924 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. All regressions 
apply standard errors clustered at the country level. a denotes variables which are expressed in their natural logarithm. 
3.3.3 Robustness tests 
Several robustness tests confirm the empirical results on democracy and national defense 
spending. First, the lags of the dependent variable from 𝑡 –  5 to 𝑡 –  2 reduce the number of 
observations per country, and eliminate countries with too short observation periods in the 
dynamic panel data model. I therefore replicate Table 3.1 with the same 95 countries employed 
 
13 A Hausman test for a fixed effects versus a random effects model confirms that the fixed effects model is the 
proper model of choice as opposed to a random effects model. 
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in the dynamic panel data model in Table 3.2. Table A3.4 in Appendix II shows that the 
estimation results are almost unchanged.14  
Second, the observation period includes the period after the 2007/2008 financial crisis, 
which has shown to considerably influence empirical results (Eberhardt 2019). I therefore 
estimate the dynamic panel data model for years until 2006, i.e. exclude years after 2006, to 
rule out that the empirical results are sensitive to sample selection. Table A3.5 in Appendix II 
shows that the empirical results for the dynamic panel data model hardly change though the 
number of observations is considerably reduced from 2,455 to 1,828.  
Third, countries did not exclusively experience transition from autocracy to democracy; 
they also experienced transition from democracy to autocracy or even several transitions from 
and to democracy and autocracy. I therefore exclude countries with reverse transitions, i.e. 
transition from democracy to autocracy. For countries with multiple transitions which later 
turned to a democracy, I exclude the period of the reverse transition and only include the period 
from the last autocratic regime onwards. This sample with fewer countries and observations 
allows to confirm that the effect of democracy on defense spending is indeed an effect of 
transition towards democracy, rather than an effect of increased defense spending after 
transition to autocracy. Table A3.6 in Appendix II shows that the estimation results for the 
dynamic panel data model hardly change. 
Fourth, the type of autocratic regime prior to democratization might influence the 
estimation results because of considerable differences among different types of autocratic 
regimes. Two kinds of autocratic regimes need to be examined in more detail because most 
countries during the third wave experienced transition towards democracy initiating from these 
regime types: military regimes and communist regimes. Military dictatorships have shown to 
voluntarily hand over their power to civilian governments and—unlike civilian autocracies—
 
14 The number of observations in Table A3.4 in Appendix II is larger than in Table 3.2 because the absence of 
lagged dependent variables allows to include more year observations for each country.  
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may have even planned democratization (Wintrobe 1990, Bjørnskov 2019). Military regimes 
may well influence the development of political institutions on the road towards democracy and 
ensure that the military elite maintains its rents and privileges. The impact of democratization 
on national defense spending is thus likely to be reduced for military autocracies compared to 
civilian autocracies which experience democratization. I therefore estimate the dynamic panel 
data model excluding all countries that have ever been military dictatorships during the 
observation period. Table A3.7 in Appendix II shows that the dichotomous democracy measure 
by Bjørnskov and Rode (2019) does no longer turn out to be statistically significant. The 
coefficient estimates for the other three democracy measures are larger compared to the baseline 
results in Table 3.2 and confirm that military dictatorships which turn into a democracy 
decrease national defense spending to a lesser extent than civilian autocracies experiencing 
democratization. Communist regimes might have higher government spending in general 
compared to other autocratic regimes because of a larger government size and the government’s 
interference with the economy. The effect of democracy on defense spending relative to GDP 
might therefore be driven by a decline in government spending in general. I therefore estimate 
the dynamic panel data model excluding all countries that have ever been communist 
autocracies during the observation period. Table A3.8 in Appendix II shows that the 
dichotomous democracy measure by Bjørnskov and Rode (2019) is statistically significant at 
the 10% level only, however, the coefficient estimates for the other three democracy measures 
do hardly change.15 This result complies with the finding that government size in communist 
countries is not likely to differ considerably from other autocratic regimes (Kammas and 
Sarantides 2019).16 
 
15 Note that military dictatorships and communist regimes are not mutually exclusive. Countries like Albania, 
Poland and Laos were military and communist regimes at the same time according to Bjørnskov and Rode (2019).  
16 Government ideology has been shown to influence defense spending (Whitten and Williams 2011, Bove et al. 
2017, Potrafke 2020). Government ideology of the chief executive (taken from the Database of Political 
Institutions) as an additional control variable does, however, not turn out to be statistically significant and does 
not change the results on democracy. Controlling for government ideology implies a considerably limited sample 
since many governments cannot be categorized by means of leftwing-rightwing patterns (results not reported).  
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Fifth, the dynamic panel data model includes four lags of the dependent variable, thus 
following Acemoglu et al. (2019) and Hamilton (2018), to account for possible pre-transition 
correlation between democracy and defense spending. The time horizon of such pre-transition 
correlation might, however, be differently specified with regard to defense spending dynamics. 
I therefore examine whether the estimation results change once dynamics of defense spending 
relative to GDP are increased or reduced. The estimation results for the four democracy 
measures hardly change for extended dynamics in defense spending up to the tenth lag. When 
the lag structure is reduced to one, two, or three lags, the dichotomous democracy measure by 
Bjørnskov and Rode (2019) no longer turns out to be statistically significant, while the results 
for the remaining democracy measures remain robust. This result also holds once the lag 
structure of defense spending starts with the first instead of the second lag (results not reported).  
3.3.4 Regional effect heterogeneity 
Section 3.3.3 shows that military regimes and communist regimes experiencing transition 
towards democracy only slightly differ from other pre-transition regime types regarding how 
democratization affects national defense spending. The impact of democracy on national 
defense spending has, however, been shown to be heterogeneous across countries (Blum 2018). 
With regard to the third wave, the effect of democracy on defense spending might be 
heterogeneous across the sub-waves that reached different regions at different points in time. I 
estimate interaction terms of the four democracy measures with seven geopolitical world 
regions in the dynamic panel data model jointly with the respective non-interacted democracy 
measure for all countries. The results thus allow to infer whether the effect of democracy for 
one of the seven regions deviates from the democracy effect estimated across all countries in 
the sample, i.e. whether region-specific heterogeneity exists. 
Table A3.9 in Appendix II shows the estimation results. The dynamic panel data models 
estimated in panels A through G include all 95 countries that can be included in the dynamic 
 68 
analysis. In each panel, the interaction between one world region with the four democracy 
measures is estimated. The coefficient estimates for the non-interacted four democracy 
measures in panels A through G are similar to the results shown in Table 3.2. For countries in 
Latin America and Eastern Europe, however, the Bjørnskov and Rode (2019) dichotomous 
democracy measure does no longer turn out to be statistically significant (column 1 of panels 
C and D). This result indicates that the statistical significance of this democracy measure shown 
in Table 3.2 is partially attributed to democratizations in Latin American and Eastern European 
countries. The negative though not statistically significant interaction terms for all four 
democracy measures in panel D, moreover, indicate that the negative impact of democracy on 
national defense spending is somewhat more pronounced for Eastern European countries. The 
positive though only weakly statistically significant interaction terms for the democracy 
measures in panel E, in turn, indicate that the negative impact of democracy is somewhat less 
pronounced for Southern European countries.17 For the other world regions, however, the 
interaction terms of the four democracy measures with each region have both positive and 
negative signs (panels A, B, C, and G) from columns (1) to (4). Yet the interaction terms almost 
never reach statistical significance. The results do not show a distinct pattern in region-specific 
deviations from the estimated general effect of democracy shown in Table 3.2. Considerable 
region-specific heterogeneity in the effect of democracy on national defense spending is, 
therefore, unlikely to exist for the third wave of democratization. 
 
17 The positive and statistically significant interaction terms for countries in Western Europe and North America 
in columns (2) and (4) of panel F are attributed to minor changes in the Polity IV score for Belgium and the United 
States, and minor changes in the continuous democracy measure by Gründler and Krieger (2016, 2018). No 
coefficient estimates for the dichotomous democracy measures are estimated for countries in Western Europe and 
North America (columns 1 and 3 of panel F), because these countries did not experience any variation in these two 
democracy measures between 1972 and 2013.  
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3.4 Instrumental variable (IV) approach 
3.4.1 IV strategy and exclusion restriction 
The results for all four democracy measures in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 corroborate the considerations 
from Section 3.1 that the third wave of democratizations decreased national defense spending 
relative to GDP within countries that experienced democratization. The estimated impact of 
democracy on national defense spending might, however, be biased if democracy is 
endogenous. First, unobserved developments prior to democratic transition might drive both 
democratization and defense spending cuts within a country and give rise to omitted variable 
bias. Second, reverse causality might further give rise to endogeneity if the size of the military 
sector influences the chances for a regime change. The dynamic panel data model which 
includes country fixed effects and dynamics of the dependent variable accounts for time-
invariant country characteristics and possible pre-transition correlation between democracy and 
defense spending. However, a remaining source of endogeneity bias that the dynamic panel 
data model cannot rule out relates to time-variant unobservables. Third, measurement error in 
democracy indices is likely because—as discussed in Section 3.2.2—democracy is difficult to 
quantify. To overcome these endogeneity concerns and yield consistent estimates for the effect 
of democracy, I apply an IV strategy that exploits regional sub-waves in the context of 
democracy’s third wave as an instrumental variable for democracy. This IV strategy alleviates 
concerns regarding omitted variable bias and reverse causality as well as biases resulting from 
random measurement error. Nonetheless, biases resulting from systematic, non-random 
measurement error are not remedied by means of an instrumental variable. 
The third wave of democracy offers a suitable setting for this IV strategy because the 
third wave proceeded in regional waves from Southern Europe in the mid-1970s via Latin 
America in the 1980s to Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, also hitting countries in Africa and 
Asia in cohesive patterns. Acemoglu et al. (2019) use this IV strategy to estimate the causal 
effect of democracy on growth and argue that “this regional pattern reflects the diffusion of the 
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demand for democracy […] across countries within a region, which tend to have similar 
histories, political cultures, practical problems, and close informational ties.” I therefore treat 
the regional sub-waves of democracy’s third wave as a “source of exogenous variation in 
democracy” (Acemoglu et al. 2019). I construct jackknifed democracy scores for the four 
democracy measures in order to describe democracy’s regional diffusion. Each country 𝑖 is 
therefore allocated to a geopolitical region 𝑅𝑖 together with other countries 𝑖̃ which are in 
geographic proximity and share similar cultures and histories. For each country 𝑖, the set 𝐿𝑖 =
{𝑖̃ ∶  𝑖̃ ≠ 𝑖, 𝑅?̃? = 𝑅𝑖} describes all other countries 𝑖̃ in the same region whose democracy is likely 
to influence democracy in country 𝑖. The jackknifed democracy instrument 𝐽𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 for country 𝑖 
in year 𝑡 is calculated as the average democracy score of the countries in set 𝐿𝑖, i.e. of all other 
countries 𝑖̃ in country 𝑖’s region 𝑅𝑖 except the democracy score of country 𝑖 itself (“jackknifed” 
averages): 
 
𝐽𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 =  
1
|𝐿𝑖|
∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑡
?̃? ∈ 𝐿𝑖
                                                            (2) 
 
The just-identified two-stage-least-squared (2SLS) model follows the dynamic panel data 
model and applies the jackknifed democracy score as an instrument for democracy: 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 = ∑ 𝜆𝑗 𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑗
𝑗=5
𝑗=2
+   𝐽𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝒙𝒊𝒕−𝟏𝝅 +  𝜎𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡                          (3) 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗  𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑗
𝑗=5
𝑗=2
+  𝜇 ?̂?𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝒙𝒊𝒕−𝟏𝜹 +  𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡                              (4) 
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Equation (3) describes the first-stage regression which applies the jackknifed democracy score 
of one of the four democracy measures as an instrumental variable for the respective democracy 
score. The jackknifed democracy instrument is lagged by one year behind the democracy 
measure which is instrumented (i.e. democracy in 𝑡 –  1 is predicted by means of jackknifed 
democracy in 𝑡 –  2) because an increase in the regional diffusion of democracy is unlikely to 
instantly translate into an increased demand for democracy in a nearby located autocracy. 
Equation (4) describes the second stage that employs the instrumented democracy measure. 
A valid instrumental variable needs to be relevant for describing the instrumented 
variable and has to fulfill the exclusion restriction. Though the relevance of the instrumental 
variable can be confirmed in the first-stage regression, the exclusion restriction cannot be 
empirically tested. The exclusion restriction is not fulfilled if the jackknifed democracy 
instrument influences national defense spending in country 𝑖 through channels other than 
democracy in country 𝑖. In the following, I address two channels which are the most severe 
threats to the exclusion restriction: direct effects on defense spending stemming from 
democracy’s regional diffusion and spatial dependence in defense spending.  
The most obvious threat to the excludability of the instrumental variable is that the 
regional average level of democracy directly influences a country’s defense spending relative 
to GDP because the perceived threat originating from democracies in the neighborhood is lower 
than the perceived threat originating from autocracies. According to the Democratic Peace 
paradigm, however, democracies are only less likely to wage war against each other—not 
against autocracies. The Democratic Peace paradigm does therefore not apply to autocracies 
prior to their democratic transition even if they are surrounded by democracies. The effect of 
democratic peace is a downstream effect after democratization and does—from a theoretical 
viewpoint—not violate the exclusion restriction. Once included in the dynamic panel data 
model, the jackknifed democracy scores for each democracy measure do not turn out to be 
statistically significant (results not reported). 
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Spatial dependences in defense spending would furthermore clearly violate the 
exclusion restriction as the regional diffusion of democracy would influence defense spending 
in country 𝑖 not exclusively via the channel of democracy in country 𝑖 itself, but also via 
decreased defense spending within the respective region. Scholars have shown that defense 
spending of neighboring countries or countries located in the same region as well as the defense 
spending of rivals influence a country’s own level of defense spending (Dunne and Perlo-
Freeman 2003a, 2003b, Dunne et al. 2008, 2009, Collier and Hoeffler 2007, Albalate et al. 
2012).18 This largely spatial relationship motivated the use of spatial lag models for estimating 
demand functions for defense spending. Scholars found empirical evidence for spatial 
dependence of national defense spending relative to GDP among countries both in cross-
country analyses (Goldsmith 2007) and panel data models (Skogstad 2016, Yesilyurt and 
Elhorst 2017, George and Sandler 2018, Blum 2018). Though spatial dependence has been 
found in spatial panel data models, the model specifications in these studies differ from the 
model applied in my analysis: except of the analysis by Yesilyurt and Elhorst (2017), the 
empirical models neither include dynamics of the dependent variable to account for persistence 
in defense spending, nor fixed year effects to absorb common shocks. I therefore augment my 
dynamic panel data model by spatial dependences among countries and examine whether 
spatial correlation in national defense spending exists in a dynamic panel data model with both 
country and year fixed effects, and conditioned on strategic and socio-economic control 
variables. I apply a spatial autoregressive (SAR) model, which in a Bayesian model comparison 
has shown to be superior to other spatial lag models when demand functions for national 
defense spending are estimated (Yesilyurt and Elhorst 2017). The SAR model has also been 
applied in most previous studies in this field (Goldsmith 2007, Skogstad 2016, George and 
Sandler 2018). Unlike the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM), the SAR model assumes that the 
 
18 These findings go back to the security web concept of Rosh (1988). 
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spatial lags of the explanatory variables do not turn out to be jointly significant.19 Previous 
research corroborates this assumption because spatial lags of the determinants of defense 
spending have shown to be hardly significant (Blum 2018). Since a spatial panel model requires 
a strongly balanced panel, I employ two balanced panels: one for 40 countries for the entire 
observation period 1972-2013 and one for the period 1981-2013, which allows to include 53 
countries. The 13 additional countries include further Eastern European countries since only 
data for Hungary is available from 1972 onwards. Due to the limited number of countries 
included in the spatial analysis, I apply an inverse distance matrix for the spatial weighting of 
observations. This matrix describes the inverse distance between the capitals of all countries 
included in the sample. The matrix, thus, relates all countries to one another according to their 
distance from each other, and carries more spatial information than a binary contiguity matrix 
would. The weighting matrix is row-standardized, i.e. each row sums up to one, and the model 
is estimated using maximum likelihood.20 Clustered standard errors turn maximum likelihood 
into a pseudo maximum likelihood because the computation of clustered standard errors follows 
a corrected assumption about the sample distribution (Cameron and Trivedi 2009: 316-317). 
Likelihood-ratio tests to compare among specifications are therefore unfeasible. Table A3.10 
in Appendix II shows the estimation results. Democracy is measured by means of the Bjørnskov 
and Rode (2019) dichotomous democracy measure and all columns include the full set of 
control variables. Columns (1) and (5) neither include country nor year fixed effects and 
columns (2) and (6) include country fixed effects only. The spatial autoregressive coefficient ρ 
is significant at the 1% level in columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) and indicates spatial dependence 
in defense spending relative to GDP among the countries in the sample. The spatial 
autoregressive coefficient does, however, no longer turn out to be statistically significant at any 
significance level once year fixed effects are included in columns (3) and (7); including lags of 
 
19 LeSage and Pace (2009, 32-33 and 155-158) provide an overview of different spatial lag models. 
20 LeSage and Pace (2009, chapter 3) discuss maximum likelihood estimation in spatial lag models. 
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the dependent variable in columns (4) and (8) does not change this result. Once the spatial panel 
data model is fully specified and accounts for worldwide trends in defense spending from the 
Cold War to the post-Cold War period, spatial correlation does not further explain variance in 
defense spending among countries. Spatial dependences are thus unlikely to violate the 
exclusion restriction of the instrumental variable. The results support that the regional diffusion 
of democracy—measured by means of the jackknifed democracy instrument—influences 
national defense spending through the channel of political institutions rather than directly or 
through spatial dependences. 
3.4.2 2SLS and first-stage estimation results 
Table 3.3 shows 2SLS estimation results in panel A and first-stage results of the jackknifed 
democracy instrument for each of the four democracy measures in panel B. The jackknifed 
democracy scores for all democracy measures in panel B are statistically significant at the 1% 
level and the Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistics for the excluded instrument are above the 10%-
critical value suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005). The first-stage results thus indicate that the 
jackknifed democracy scores serve as a highly relevant instrument for the respective democracy 
measures.21 The 2SLS results show negative IV estimates for all four democracy measures. The 
Bjørnskov and Rode (2019) dichotomous democracy measure and the Gründler and Krieger 
(2016, 2018) dichotomous and continuous democracy measures are statistically significant at 
the 5% level; the Polity IV index is statistically significant at the 1% level. The IV estimates 
for all four democracy measures are larger and in a closer range to each other compared with 
the OLS estimates from the baseline dynamic panel data model. The IV estimates indicate an 
effect of democracy on national defense spending relative to GDP of 21% (Democracy), 1.4% 
(for a one-point increase in Polity IV), 17% (DSVMDI) and 17% (CSVMDI; for a hypothetical 
 
21 Further lags of the jackknifed democracy instruments did not turn out to be statistically significant in the first-
stage regression. 
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change from zero to one). A Wald test does not reject the null hypothesis of equality of the 
parameter estimates for the dichotomous democracy measure by Bjørnskov and Rode (2019) 
and the two democracy measures by Gründler and Krieger (2016, 2018). The virtually identical 
effect size of the dichotomous and the continuous democracy measure by Gründler and Krieger 
(2016, 2018) supports their credibility because both indicators are “conceptually equivalent” 
and supposed to yield similar estimation results (Gründler and Krieger 2018).  
The larger size of the IV estimates compared to the OLS estimates shown in Table 3.2 
indicates that OLS estimation results for the non-instrumented democracy measures 
underestimate the effect of democracy on national defense spending. The downward bias is 
likely to be attributed to the development of political institutions in the run-up of a 
democratization which influences national defense spending before a country is described as a 
democracy. Since dichotomous democracy measures are a rather rough measure of democracy, 
this bias is larger for the two dichotomous democracy measures (columns 1 and 3) than for the 
Polity IV index and the continuous democracy measure (columns 2 and 4). A second source of 
this downward bias is measurement error in democracy measures. The downward bias of the 
OLS estimates is consistent with the findings of Acemoglu et al. (2019), whose IV estimates 
for the effect of democracy on growth also exceed the OLS estimates.  
The results for the control variables and the lags of the dependent variable hardly differ 
from the estimation results shown in Table 3.2. Again, according to the multiplier for the 
cumulative long-run effect of democracy, the estimated impact of democracy on national 
defense spending is almost three times higher in the long run. Given the IV estimates for the 
Bjørnskov and Rode (2019) dichotomous democracy measure and the Gründler and Krieger 
(2016, 2018) dichotomous and continuous democracy measures shown in Table 3.3, the implied 
long-run effect of more than 50% indicates that defense spending relative to GDP in established 
democracies is less than half as high as if the respective nations were under autocratic rule. The 
selected examples shown in Figure 3.1 indicate that such a long-run effect size is well plausible. 
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TABLE 3.3: TWO-STAGE-LEAST-SQUARES AND FIRST-STAGE ESTIMATION RESULTS 
National defense spending (in % of GDP)a (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Panel A: Two-stage-least-squares estimates     
     
Democracy (t – 1) -0.234**    
 (0.104)    
Polity IV (t – 1)  -0.014***   
  (0.005)   
DSVMDI (t – 1)   -0.183**  
   (0.090)  
CSVMDI (t – 1)    -0.192** 
    (0.095) 
War (t – 1) 0.130*** 0.126*** 0.113*** 0.125*** 
 (0.033) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) 
Internal threat (t – 1) -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
GDPa (t – 1) 0.034 0.038 0.037 0.042 
 (0.055) (0.054) (0.053) (0.057) 
Populationa (t – 1) 0.007 0.027 0.035 0.025 
 (0.128) (0.131) (0.131) (0.138) 
Trade globalization (t – 1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
National defense spending (% of GDP)a (t – 2) 0.659*** 0.654*** 0.651*** 0.658*** 
 (0.059) (0.057) (0.059) (0.059) 
National defense spending (% of GDP)a (t – 3) -0.008 -0.013 -0.005 -0.008 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.056) 
National defense spending (% of GDP)a (t – 4) -0.030** -0.030** -0.030** -0.030** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
National defense spending (% of GDP)a (t – 5) 0.026** 0.027** 0.028** 0.028** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
     
Panel B: First-stage estimates (excluded instruments only)     
     
Jackknifed democracy measure (t – 2)  0.779*** 1.138*** 0.636*** 0.801*** 
 (0.147) (0.180) (0.126) (0.096) 
     
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 2,455 2,455 2,455 2,455 
Countries 95 95 95 95 
R2 0.639 0.646 0.646 0.646 
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 27.98 40.05 25.44 68.95 
Stock-Yogo (10% rel. bias) 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. All regressions 
apply standard errors clustered at the country level. a denotes variables which are expressed in their natural logarithm. 
3.5 Conclusion 
I investigated how political institutions in the context of the third wave of democratization 
influenced national defense spending. New SIPRI data on military expenditure for years prior 
to 1988 allowed to examine the impact of democracy’s third wave for the period 1972-2013 for 
110 countries, thus including the entire third wave of democratization. Since democracy is hard 
to quantify and different democracy measures can yield different results, I applied four 
democracy measures: the dichotomous democracy measure by Bjørnskov and Rode (2019), the 
Polity IV index by Marshall et al. (2018) and the dichotomous and continuous democracy 
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measure by Gründler and Krieger (2016, 2018). The coefficient estimates for all four 
democracy measures in the dynamic panel data model indicated a significant negative impact 
of democracy on defense spending relative to GDP, which is about 10% according to the two 
dichotomous democracy measures. Region-specific estimation results accounting for the sub-
waves that reached different regions at different points in time did not provide evidence for 
effect heterogeneity across world regions. I applied an IV strategy that exploits the regional 
diffusion of democracy in the context of the third wave of democratizations to overcome 
endogeneity problems. The IV estimates indicated an effect of democracy on national defense 
spending of about 20%. The OLS estimates resulting from non-instrumented democracy 
measures thus underestimate the effect of democracy on national defense spending. For both 
OLS and IV estimates, the cumulative long-run effect of democratization is almost three times 
higher according to the dynamics in defense spending. Differences in government spending 
policies between democracies and autocracies and a decrease in mutually perceived threat 
among democratic conspecifics might lead countries to decrease defense spending after 
transition to democracy. The results are in line with other studies that estimate demand 
functions for national defense spending.  
It remains open as to whether the first and second wave of democracy reduced defense 
spending as was the case with the third wave of democracy. The first wave took place in the era 
of imperialism, industrialization and the rise of the nation state in the Western world, i.e. under 
conditions of rivalry. The second wave occurred parallel with the onset of the Cold War, an era 
of system competition. Both world powers struggled for spheres of influence in a divided 
Europe as well as in Latin America, Africa and Asia, where they fought proxy wars (e.g. in 
Vietnam, Afghanistan, Angola and Ethiopia). The third wave, however, incorporates the 
decline and end of this bipolar system, which allowed countries to develop political institutions 
and liberal societies without external compulsions. The emerging democracies could reduce 
defense spending and avoid rent-seeking within the armed forces. Apart from its intensity and 
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regional diffusion, the state of the world during the third wave of democratization further makes 
the third wave unique compared to the first and second wave. Investigating whether and to 
which extent democratizations in the context of the first and the second wave of democracy 
decreased national defense spending would therefore be a useful starting point for future 
research. 
 The measurement of democracy remains a challenge for scholars. Political institutions 
are too diverse to be easily compared both among countries and over time by means of a single 
numeric measure. The conceptualization, i.e. the institutions defined as critical for a democratic 
regime, the measurement of these institutions, and the aggregation to one single measure, e.g. 
dichotomous or continuous, determine whether a country is described as a democracy or 
autocracy and often give rise to measurement error in democracy indices. Future empirical 
research should therefore continue to apply various democracy measures. 
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Appendix I 
 
 
 
FIGURE A3.1: DEMOCRACIES 1972 AND 2013 ACCORDING TO THE DICHOTOMOUS DEMOCRACY 
MEASURE BY BJØRNSKOV AND RODE (2019) 
 
Notes: The 1972 map is a contemporaneous political map and does not reflect countries and borders as of 1972. The entire territory of Germany, 
for example, is therefore labeled as a democracy in 1972.
1972
Democracy Autocracy
2013
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TABLE A3.1: LIST OF COUNTRIES 
 
 
 
ID Country First year Last year
Democracy Polity IV DSVMDI CSVMDI
1 Albania 1981 2013 yes yes yes yes
2 Algeria 1972 2013 no yes yes yes
3 Angola 1985 2013 no yes yes yes
4 Argentina 1972 2013 yes yes yes yes
5 Armenia 1995 2013 no yes no yes
6 Azerbaijan 1992 2013 no yes yes yes
7 Belarus 1992 2013 no yes yes yes
8 Belgium 1972 2013 no yes no yes
9 Benin 2012 2013 no no no yes
10 Botswana 1977 2013 no yes no yes
11 Bulgaria 1989 2013 yes yes yes yes
12 Burkina Faso 1972 2013 no yes yes yes
13 Burundi 2012 2013 no no no yes
14 Cambodia 1994 2013 no yes yes yes
15 Cameroon 1972 2013 no yes yes yes
16 Canada 1972 2013 no no no yes
17 Central African Republic 2007 2013 no no yes yes
18 Chad 2013 2013 no no no no
19 Chile 1972 2013 yes yes yes yes
20 Colombia 1972 2013 no yes no yes
21 Croatia 1996 2013 no yes no yes
22 Cuba 2009 2013 no no no yes
23 Cyprus 1985 2013 no no no yes
24 Czech Republic 1994 2013 no yes no yes
25 Denmark 1972 2013 no no no yes
26 Dominican Republic 1972 2013 no yes yes yes
27 East Timor 2005 2013 no yes no yes
28 Ecuador 1972 2013 yes yes yes yes
29 Egypt 1972 2013 no yes yes yes
30 Equatorial Guinea 2007 2009 no no no yes
31 Eritrea 1994 2003 no yes no yes
32 Estonia 1996 2013 no yes no yes
33 Fiji 1972 2013 yes yes yes yes
34 Finland 1972 2013 no no no yes
35 France 1972 2013 no yes no yes
36 Gabon 2010 2013 no no no yes
37 Gambia 2012 2013 no no no yes
38 Georgia 1996 2013 yes yes yes yes
39 Germany 1972 2013 no no no yes
40 Greece 1972 2013 yes yes yes yes
41 Guatemala 1972 2013 yes yes yes yes
42 Guinea 2012 2013 no no no yes
43 Guinea-Bissau 2009 2013 yes yes yes yes
44 Guyana 2000 2013 yes no no yes
45 Haiti 2013 2013 no no no no
46 Honduras 2000 2013 no no yes yes
47 Hungary 1973 2013 yes yes yes yes
48 Indonesia 1974 2013 yes yes yes yes
49 Iran 1980 2013 no yes yes yes
50 Ireland 1972 2013 no no no yes
51 Israel 1972 2013 no yes no yes
52 Italy 1972 2013 no no no yes
53 Jamaica 1981 2013 no yes yes yes
54 Japan 1972 2013 no no no yes
55 Kenya 1972 2013 yes yes yes yes
56 Kuwait 1996 2013 no no no yes
57 Kyrgyzstan 1992 2013 yes yes yes yes
58 Laos 1992 2013 no no no yes
59 Latvia 1996 2013 no no no yes
60 Lesotho 1976 2013 yes yes yes yes
61 Liberia 2004 2013 yes yes yes yes
62 Libya 2012 2013 no no yes yes
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TABLE A3.1 CONTINUED: LIST OF COUNTRIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country First year Last year
Democracy Polity IV DSVMDI CSVMDI
63 Lithuania 1996 2013 no no no yes
64 Luxembourg 1972 2013 no no no yes
65 Macedonia 1996 2013 no yes no yes
66 Malawi 1972 2013 yes yes yes yes
67 Malaysia 1972 2013 yes yes yes yes
68 Mali 1993 2013 yes yes yes yes
69 Mauritania 2012 2013 no no no yes
70 Mauritius 1977 2013 no yes no yes
71 Moldova 1996 2013 no yes no yes
72 Mongolia 1987 2013 yes yes yes yes
73 Montenegro 2007 2013 no no no yes
74 Morocco 1972 2013 no yes yes yes
75 Mozambique 1981 2013 no yes yes yes
76 Namibia 1991 2013 no no no yes
77 Netherlands 1972 2013 no no no yes
78 Nicaragua 1991 2013 no yes no yes
79 Niger 2008 2013 yes yes yes yes
80 Norway 1972 2013 no no no yes
81 Oman 1972 2013 no yes no no
82 Panama 1987 1999 yes yes yes yes
83 Papua New Guinea 1985 2013 no yes no yes
84 Poland 1981 2013 yes yes yes yes
85 Portugal 1972 2013 yes yes yes yes
86 Qatar 2002 2010 no no no no
87 Romania 1981 2013 yes yes yes yes
88 Saudi Arabia 1987 2013 no no no yes
89 Senegal 1979 2013 yes yes yes yes
90 Sierra Leone 2000 2013 no yes yes yes
91 Singapore 1972 2013 no no no yes
92 Slovak Republic 1994 2013 no yes no yes
93 Slovenia 1996 2013 no no no yes
94 South Africa 1972 2013 no yes yes yes
95 Spain 1972 2013 yes yes yes yes
96 Sudan 1990 2009 no yes no yes
97 Sweden 1972 2013 no no no yes
98 Switzerland 1981 2013 no no no yes
99 Tajikistan 2008 2012 no no no yes
100 Tunisia 1972 2013 yes yes yes yes
101 Turkey 1972 2013 yes yes yes yes
102 Turkmenistan 1994 1999 no no no yes
103 UAE 1997 2013 no no no no
104 UK 1972 2013 no no no yes
105 USA 1972 2013 no yes no yes
106 Uganda 1983 2013 yes yes yes yes
107 Ukraine 1993 2013 no yes no yes
108 Uruguay 1972 2013 yes yes yes yes
109 Yemen 1992 2013 no yes yes yes
110 Zambia 2004 2013 yes yes no yes
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TABLE A3.2: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min p25 p75 Max 
National defense spending (in % of GDP) 2978 0.029125 0.033041 1.72e-07 0.013710 0.032367 0.343764 
Democracy (t – 1) 2978 0.607790 0.488325 0 0 1 1 
Polity IV (t – 1) 2978 3.810947 6.919581 -10 -3 10 10 
DSVMDI (t – 1) 2978 0.691404 0.461992 0 0 1 1 
CSVMDI (t – 1) 2978 0.664054 0.358472 0.005817 0.346033 0.949886 0.973161 
War (t – 1) 2978 0.156817 0.363689 0 0 0 1 
Internal threat (t – 1) 2978 0.503358 1.429624 0 0 0 9 
GDP (t – 1) 2939 4.42e+11 1.40e+12 4.57e+08 1.07e+10 2.43e+11 1.55e+13 
Population (t – 1) 2978 2.37e+07 4.11e+07 342421 3960612 2.57e+07 3.14e+08 
Trade globalization (t – 1) 2978 49.73571 20.54514 8.55423 32.94455 66.17088 99.55211 
Notes: National Defense Spending in % of GDP, GDP (t – 1) and Population (t – 1) are expressed in their absolute values. 
 
 
 
TABLE A3.3: CORRELATIONS 
 National 
defense 
spending  
Democracy  
(t – 1) 
Polity IV  
(t – 1) 
DSVMDI  
(t – 1) 
CSVMDI  
(t – 1) 
War  
(t – 1) 
Internal  
threat  
(t – 1) 
GDPa  
(t – 1) 
Populationa  
(t – 1) 
Trade globali-
zation (t – 1) 
 (in % of 
GDP)a 
         
National defense spending (in % of GDP)a 1.000          
Democracy (t – 1) -0.282 1.000         
Polity IV (t – 1) -0.344 0.831 1.000        
DSVMDI (t – 1) -0.317 0.769 0.854 1.000       
CSVMDI (t – 1) -0.338 0.821 0.915 0.936 1.000      
War (t – 1) 0.228 -0.123 -0.172 -0.162 -0.165 1.000     
Internal threat (t – 1) 0.143 -0.166 -0.233 -0.202 -0.226 0.694 1.000    
GDPa (t – 1) 0.127 0.341 0.335 0.242 0.308 0.054 0.007 1.000   
Populationa (t – 1) 0.114 0.011 -0.009 -0.020 0.011 0.269 0.243 0.689 1.000  
Trade globalization (t – 1) -0.104 0.005 0.092 0.063 0.070 -0.268 -0.271 -0.259 -0.543 1.000 
Notes:  a denotes variables which are expressed in their natural logarithms. 
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Appendix II 
TABLE A3.4: ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE STATIC PANEL DATA MODEL FOR 95 COUNTRIES 
National defense spending (in % of GDP)a (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Panel A: Without control variables     
     
Democracy (t – 1) -0.196**    
 (0.096)    
Polity IV (t – 1)  -0.023***   
  (0.007)   
DSVMDI (t – 1)   -0.254***  
   (0.069)  
CSVMDI (t – 1)    -0.356*** 
    (0.099) 
     
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 2,930 2,930 2,930 2,930 
Countries 95 95 95 95 
R2 Overall 0.129 0.163 0.138 0.146 
R2 Within 0.198 0.211 0.208 0.207 
R2 Between 0.132 0.198 0.147 0.169 
Panel B: With control variables     
     
Democracy (t – 1) -0.217**    
 (0.099)    
Polity IV (t – 1)  -0.023***   
  (0.007)   
DSVMDI (t – 1)   -0.245***  
   (0.072)  
CSVMDI (t – 1)    -0.365*** 
    (0.099) 
War (t – 1) 0.244*** 0.242*** 0.220*** 0.239*** 
 (0.063) (0.067) (0.061) (0.064) 
Internal threat (t – 1) 0.021 0.012 0.018 0.016 
 (0.024) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) 
GDPa (t – 1) -0.139 -0.167 -0.158 -0.173 
 (0.164) (0.162) (0.161) (0.165) 
Populationa (t – 1) 0.139 0.194 0.200 0.214 
 (0.273) (0.273) (0.271) (0.275) 
Trade globalization (t – 1) 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
     
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 2,930 2,930 2,930 2,930 
Countries 95 95 95 95 
R2 Overall 0.062 0.066 0.063 0.060 
R2 Within 0.218 0.229 0.225 0.226 
R2 Between 0.018 0.029 0.022 0.023 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. All regressions 
apply standard errors clustered at the country level. a denotes variables which are expressed in their natural logarithm. 
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TABLE A3.5: ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODEL UNTIL THE 
2007/2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
National defense spending (in % of GDP)a (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Democracy (t – 1) -0.086*    
 (0.046)    
Polity IV (t – 1)  -0.010***   
  (0.003)   
DSVMDI (t – 1)   -0.106***  
   (0.032)  
CSVMDI (t – 1)    -0.159*** 
    (0.038) 
War (t – 1) 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.118*** 0.127*** 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) 
Internal threat (t – 1) 0.014 0.010 0.012 0.012 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
GDPa (t – 1) 0.139** 0.107 0.122* 0.107 
 (0.069) (0.068) (0.065) (0.067) 
Populationa (t – 1) -0.147 -0.100 -0.099 -0.087 
 (0.133) (0.136) (0.131) (0.134) 
Trade globalization (t – 1) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
National defense spending (% of GDP)a (t – 2) 0.602*** 0.591*** 0.593*** 0.592*** 
 (0.053) (0.052) (0.053) (0.054) 
National defense spending (% of GDP)a (t – 3) -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) 
National defense spending (% of GDP)a (t – 4) -0.029** -0.028** -0.028** -0.029** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
National defense spending (% of GDP)a (t – 5) 0.029*** 0.029** 0.030*** 0.029** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
     
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1,828 1,828 1,828 1,828 
Countries 89 89 89 89 
R2 Overall 0.802 0.844 0.807 0.830 
R2 Within 0.692 0.696 0.695 0.695 
R2 Between 0.828 0.876 0.833 0.859 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. All regressions 
apply standard errors clustered at the country level. a denotes variables which are expressed in their natural logarithm. 
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TABLE A3.6: ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODEL EXCLUDING 
REVERSE TRANSITIONS 
National defense spending (in % of GDP)a (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Democracy (t – 1) -0.111**    
 (0.055)    
Polity IV (t – 1)  -0.011***   
  (0.003)   
DSVMDI (t – 1)   -0.126***  
   (0.039)  
CSVMDI (t – 1)    -0.178*** 
    (0.043) 
War (t – 1) 0.126*** 0.127*** 0.114*** 0.126*** 
 (0.038) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039) 
Internal threat (t – 1) 0.000 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
GDPa (t – 1) 0.076 0.059 0.062 0.052 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.056) (0.057) 
Populationa (t – 1) -0.057 -0.027 -0.035 -0.019 
 (0.142) (0.141) (0.142) (0.144) 
Trade globalization (t – 1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
National defense spending (% of GDP)a (t – 2) 0.679*** 0.671*** 0.669*** 0.669*** 
 (0.063) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) 
National defense spending (% of GDP)a (t – 3) -0.028 -0.028 -0.023 -0.024 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) 
National defense spending (% of GDP)a (t – 4) -0.031** -0.031** -0.031** -0.031** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
National defense spending (% of GDP)a (t – 5) 0.024* 0.026** 0.025* 0.025** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
     
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 2,326 2,326 2,326 2,326 
Countries 91 91 91 91 
R2 Overall 0.860 0.866 0.862 0.865 
R2 Within 0.652 0.654 0.655 0.654 
R2 Between 0.935 0.940 0.939 0.942 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. All regressions 
apply standard errors clustered at the country level. a denotes variables which are expressed in their natural logarithm. 
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TABLE A3.7: ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODEL EXCLUDING 
MILITARY DICTATORSHIPS 
National defense spending (in % of GDP)a (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Democracy (t – 1) -0.088    
 (0.085)    
Polity IV (t – 1)  -0.017***   
  (0.006)   
DSVMDI (t – 1)   -0.159***  
   (0.060)  
CSVMDI (t – 1)    -0.265*** 
    (0.071) 
War (t – 1) 0.107*** 0.101*** 0.083** 0.099*** 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.032) (0.025) 
Internal threat (t – 1) -0.005 -0.011 -0.007 -0.010 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) 
GDPa (t – 1) 0.076 0.027 0.041 0.014 
 (0.065) (0.067) (0.066) (0.069) 
Populationa (t – 1) -0.046 0.024 0.003 0.033 
 (0.163) (0.152) (0.162) (0.162) 
Trade globalization (t – 1) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
     
National defense spending (% of GDP)a (t – 2) 0.648*** 0.631*** 0.629*** 0.627*** 
 (0.075) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) 
National defense spending (% of GDP)a (t – 3) 0.000 -0.005 0.005 0.003 
 (0.071) (0.070) (0.068) (0.070) 
National defense spending (% of GDP)a (t – 4) -0.031** -0.031** -0.032** -0.032** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
National defense spending (% of GDP)a (t – 5) 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.016 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
     
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1,712 1,712 1,712 1,712 
Countries 70 70 70 70 
R2 Overall 0.854 0.870 0.868 0.871 
R2 Within 0.589 0.596 0.596 0.595 
R2 Between 0.928 0.948 0.948 0.956 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. All regressions 
apply standard errors clustered at the country level. a denotes variables which are expressed in their natural logarithm. 
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TABLE A3.8: ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODEL EXCLUDING 
COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIPS 
National defense spending (in % of GDP)a (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Democracy (t – 1) -0.100*    
 (0.055)    
Polity IV (t – 1)  -0.011***   
  (0.003)   
DSVMDI (t – 1)   -0.113***  
   (0.040)  
CSVMDI (t – 1)    -0.153*** 
    (0.041) 
War (t – 1) 0.132*** 0.134*** 0.124*** 0.133*** 
 (0.037) (0.040) (0.038) (0.038) 
Internal threat (t – 1) -0.000 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
GDPa (t – 1) 0.026 0.009 0.019 0.010 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.070) 
Populationa (t – 1) -0.045 0.010 -0.008 0.007 
 (0.154) (0.150) (0.155) (0.156) 
Trade globalization (t – 1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
     
National defense spending (% of GDP)a (t – 2) 0.717*** 0.706*** 0.712*** 0.712*** 
 (0.065) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063) 
National defense spending (% of GDP)a (t – 3) -0.080 -0.078 -0.079 -0.079 
 (0.076) (0.075) (0.075) (0.076) 
National defense spending (% of GDP)a (t – 4) 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.014 
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) 
National defense spending (% of GDP)a (t – 5) 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.003 
 (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
     
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 2,143 2,143 2,143 2,143 
Countries 82 82 82 82 
R2 Overall 0.884 0.876 0.882 0.880 
R2 Within 0.623 0.626 0.626 0.625 
R2 Between 0.977 0.966 0.973 0.971 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. All regressions 
apply standard errors clustered at the country level. a denotes variables which are expressed in their natural logarithm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 92 
TABLE A3.9: ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODEL ALLOWING FOR 
REGION-SPECIFIC EFFECT HETEROGENEITY 
National defense spending (in % of GDP)a (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Democracy  
(t – 1) 
Polity IV  
(t – 1) 
DSVMDI  
(t – 1) 
CSVMDI  
(t – 1) 
Panel A     
     
Democracy measure  -0.085** -0.011*** -0.133*** -0.173*** 
 (0.038) (0.002) (0.045) (0.045) 
Democracy measure * Africa -0.045 0.002 0.023 -0.005 
 (0.132) (0.007) (0.069) (0.095) 
Panel B     
     
Democracy measure -0.137** -0.011*** -0.119*** -0.167*** 
 (0.057) (0.003) (0.032) (0.040) 
Democracy measure * Asia & Pacific 0.155* 0.001 -0.019 -0.050 
 (0.093) (0.005) (0.106) (0.103) 
Panel C     
     
Democracy measure -0.094 -0.010*** -0.125*** -0.190*** 
 (0.063) (0.004) (0.040) (0.050) 
Democracy measure * Latin America -0.010 -0.002 0.007 0.057 
 (0.073) (0.004) (0.056) (0.079) 
Panel D     
     
Democracy measure -0.077 -0.010*** -0.116*** -0.164*** 
 (0.050) (0.003) (0.036) (0.040) 
Democracy measure * Eastern Europe -0.116 -0.002 -0.058 -0.056 
 (0.093) (0.005) (0.083) (0.099) 
Panel E     
     
Democracy measure -0.098** -0.011*** -0.124*** -0.175*** 
 (0.047) (0.003) (0.034) (0.038) 
Democracy measure * Southern Europe 0.055 0.017* 0.079* 0.071 
 (0.048) (0.009) (0.042) (0.086) 
Panel F     
     
Democracy measure -0.097** -0.011*** -0.123*** -0.174*** 
 (0.047) (0.003) (0.033) (0.038) 
Democracy measure * Western Europe & North America - 0.039*** - 0.661*** 
  (0.011)  (0.058) 
Panel G     
     
Democracy measure -0.097** -0.011*** -0.126*** -0.177*** 
 (0.048) (0.003) (0.034) (0.039) 
Democracy measure * Middle East -0.026 0.005 0.068 0.079 
 (0.058) (0.006) (0.064) (0.100) 
     
Control Variables Included yes yes yes yes 
National Defense Spending (% of GDP)a (t – 2)…(t – 5) included yes yes yes yes 
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 2,455 2,455 2,455 2,455 
Countries 95 95 95 95 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. All regressions 
apply standard errors clustered at the country level. a denotes variables which are expressed in their natural logarithm. The dynamic panel data 
models estimated in panels A through G include all 95 countries which can be included in the dynamic analysis. In each panel, the interaction 
term of one world region and the four democracy measures is estimated. Regional dummy variables are dropped because of multicollinearity 
with the country fixed effects. All regressions include the full set of control variables, include four lags of the dependent variable and account 
for both country and year fixed effects.
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TABLE A3.10: ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE SPATIAL PANEL DATA MODEL 
National defense spending 1972-2013 for 40 countries  1981-2013 for 53 countries 
(in % of GDP)a (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
Democracy (t – 1) -0.230** -0.231** -0.243*** -0.130**  -0.291*** -0.301*** -0.279*** -0.084 
 (0.096) (0.094) (0.091) (0.055)  (0.089) (0.094) (0.090) (0.055) 
War (t – 1) 0.250*** 0.245*** 0.248*** 0.112***  0.235*** 0.229** 0.223** 0.108*** 
 (0.084) (0.087) (0.089) (0.035)  (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.041) 
Internal threat (t – 1) 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.046*** 0.008  0.050** 0.047** 0.047** -0.000 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.006)  (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.008) 
GDPa (t – 1) -0.194 -0.273** -0.314 -0.006  -0.130 -0.228** -0.185 0.000 
 (0.125) (0.134) (0.214) (0.064)  (0.089) (0.103) (0.127) (0.059) 
Populationa (t – 1) 0.073 0.134 0.159 -0.047  0.017 0.037 0.136 -0.001 
 (0.201) (0.252) (0.254) (0.148)  (0.177) (0.284) (0.287) (0.169) 
Trade globalization (t – 1) -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.001  -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
          
Nat. def. spend. (% of GDP)a (t – 2)    0.846***     0.728*** 
    (0.079)     (0.067) 
Nat. def. spend. (% of GDP)a (t – 3)    -0.146     -0.085 
    (0.137)     (0.106) 
Nat. def. spend. (% of GDP)a (t – 4)    0.002     0.052 
    (0.064)     (0.063) 
Nat. def. spend. (% of GDP)a (t – 5)    0.050     -0.030 
    (0.056)     (0.051) 
          
Spatial ρ 0.491*** 0.441*** 0.157 -0.062  0.533*** 0.452*** 0.070 0.036 
 (0.076) (0.086) (0.116) (0.083)  (0.067) (0.087) (0.138) (0.101) 
Error variance σ2 0.099*** 0.097*** 0.095*** 0.049  0.080*** 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.051* 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.032) (0.031)  (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.030) 
          
Country Fixed Effects no yes yes yes  no yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects no no yes yes  no no yes yes 
Observations 1,680 1,680 1,680 1,480  1,749 1,749 1,749 1,484 
Countries 40 40 40 40  53 53 53 53 
R2 Overall 0.037 0.023 0.020 0.866  0.058 0.022 0.069 0.875 
R2 Within 0.372 0.374 0.422 0.678  0.466 0.469 0.494 0.581 
R2 Between 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.956  0.008 0.000 0.007 0.985 
Log-Likelihood -568.3 -437.7 -405.6 126.1  -435.8 -264.2 -238.9 99.43 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. All regressions apply standard errors clustered at the country level. The model applies an 
inverse distance matrix as spatial weighting matrix. a denotes variables which are expressed in their natural logarithm.  
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Abstract* 
Scholars have estimated demand functions for national defense spending and investigated 
international arms trade for a long time. The relationship between supply and demand for 
military goods has, however, only been examined on aggregate level or in formal models yet. I 
investigate how the supply of military goods by arms-producing companies and the demand for 
military goods by both the national government and foreign governments are related by using 
a panel of up to 195 arms-producing companies in 21 countries for the period 2002-2016. The 
results show that if the demand for national defense spending increases by 1%, the arms sales 
by a country’s largest arms-producing companies increase by up to 1.2%. If exports of major 
conventional weapons increase by 1%, sales increase by up to 0.2%. Arms imports do not affect 
domestic arms sales because imported and domestically produced arms are complements, and 
countries mainly import those arms they do not produce themselves. Country-specific 
estimation results suggest that differences among countries in geopolitical conditions and 
international relations determine whether a country’s arms industry serves economic rather than 
security purposes. 
 
* I thank Aude Fleurant from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) for valuable advice 
regarding the SIPRI databases. I am grateful to Agnes Brender, Klaus Gründler, Niklas Potrafke, the participants 
of the 2019 Public Economics Workshop in Munich, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Scholars have estimated demand functions for national defense spending (Dunne and Perlo-
Freeman 2003a, 2003b, Collier and Hoeffler 2007, Albalate et al. 2012, Blum 2018, 2020, 
George and Sandler 2018, Blum and Potrafke 2019) and examined determinants of international 
arms trade (Smith and Tasiran 2005, Comola 2012, Akerman and Seim 2014, Kinne 2016, 
Brender 2018, Thurner et al. 2019) for a long time. The effect of arms trade on national defense 
spending has been investigated, too (Pamp and Thurner 2017, Pamp et al. 2018). Both national 
defense spending and arms trade express the demand for military goods by the national 
government and foreign governments while the supply of military goods is provided by the 
arms industry.1 The market for military goods with arms-producing companies on the supply 
side and domestic and foreign governments on the demand side has, however, only been 
considered in formal models yet (Glismann and Horn 1992, Levine et al. 1994, Levine and 
Smith 1997, Dunne et al. 2007).2 This chapter is original in establishing the link between supply 
and demand for military goods and estimates the effect of national defense spending and arms 
transfers on the sales of military goods by arms-producing companies.  
The empirical analysis applies three databases from the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI): the SIRPI Arms Industry Database containing the sales of arms and 
military services by the worlds’ top 100 arms-producing and military services companies, the 
SIPRI Arms Transfers Database containing trend indicator values (TIV) for the exports and 
imports of major conventional weapons and the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 
containing data on national defense spending. These three databases have not been linked to 
each other yet. Smith and Dunne (2018), however, provide a parsimonious model describing 
world arms sales as a function of world defense spending; they find an elasticity of arms sales 
 
1 Military goods include military equipment (both arms and other equipment) and military services.  
2 Scholars often have regarded arms exports as the supply of arms in the international arms market. This view, 
however, considers the country level only and ignores the company level (see, e.g., Smith et al. 1985). 
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with respect to defense spending of 1.5. The authors conclude that “it is surprising that there is 
not more quantitative work using arms industry data” and encourage scholars to investigate the 
economics of arms at the firm level (Smith and Dunne 2018). 
I examine how a country’s demand for defense spending and the foreign demand for 
military goods from that country relate to the sales of military goods by its arms-producing 
industry. The sample includes up to 195 arms-producing and military services companies in 21 
countries for the period 2002-2016. Arms orders for the own armed forces and arms exports 
determine the sales of military goods by arms-producing companies. In industrialized countries, 
arms orders are placed well in advance (especially larger procurement projects have long lead 
times) and exports previously need to be approved by the government. Companies thus produce 
“on demand” rather than stockpiling arms, and company sales describe the outcome of orders 
by the domestic government and by foreign governments. This chronological order between 
orders and production of military goods makes reverse causality in this supply-demand model 
less likely. I use panel data models with fixed effects and in first differences. The fixed effects 
results indicate that if national defense spending increases by 1%, arms sales by a country’s 
largest arms-producing and military services companies increase by up to 1.2%. If exports of 
major conventional weapons increase by 1%, arms sales for these companies increase by up to 
0.2%. Estimation results in first differences are similar for national defense spending, however, 
estimates for exports of major conventional weapons are considerably smaller. Arms imports 
are not shown to affect domestic arms sales, because countries mainly import arms they do not 
produce themselves. Imported and domestically produced arms are, thus, complements rather 
than substitutes. Country-specific estimation results suggest differences among countries in 
how the arms industry serves security or economic purposes. These differences are likely to be 
based on geopolitical conditions and international relations: the results suggest that, for 
instance, the United States’ arms-producing companies primarily serve security purposes, while 
arms-producing companies in Germany primarily serve the export market. 
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4.2 Supply and demand for military goods 
Supply and demand for military goods describe an imperfect market with few suppliers and few 
customers. The arms industry in most industrialized countries has an oligopolistic structure: the 
capital (including human capital) intensity in production, the high cost for military R&D, and 
strong confidentiality standards in procurement projects—which impair the diffusion of know-
how and enhance long-term dependencies from arms suppliers in terms of training, maintenance 
and possible reorders—give rise to a market structure in which a few large arms manufacturers 
develop and produce arms and, thus, dominate the market for military goods (Glismann and 
Horn 1992, Levine et al. 1994). Military arms are highly differentiated products and companies, 
thus, operate under monopolistic competition. The demand side in industrialized countries is 
described by a monopsony in which the domestic government is the only domestic customer 
and even decides on arms exports to other countries (Glismann and Horn 1992). In an open 
economy model, the output of arms by domestic suppliers in equilibrium equals domestic arms 
demand, i.e. the demand for a country’s own armed forces, plus arms exports less arms imports: 
 
Domestic arms supply = Domestic arms demand + Arms exports – Arms imports       (1) 
 
Equation (1) can be approached with data provided by the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI). SIPRI provides data on the sales of military goods by the world’s 
top 100 arms-producing companies, data on national defense spending and data on exports and 
imports of major conventional weapons (data is described in Section 4.3 in detail). Sales of 
military goods can thus be described as a function of national defense spending and 
international arms transfers. Reverse causality between the sales of military goods and national 
defense spending or arms transfers in such a supply-demand equation is unlikely because 
defense budgets in industrialized countries are commonly adopted before the beginning of a 
fiscal year (and include orders which have been placed well in advance or even long-term 
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procurement projects with long lead times) and arms exports undergo thorough approval 
processes in advance.3 Arms-producing companies thus produce arms “on demand” contingent 
to domestic orders and approved exports rather than stockpiling arms. National defense budgets 
and approved arms exports determine the output of military goods by arms-producing 
companies. Defense spending and arms exports are, in turn, also the outcome of demand 
functions, which describe, for example, increased defense spending during wartime or 
increased arms exports when an ally is involved in an armed conflict. Regarding arms imports, 
it is important to examine whether imported arms and domestically produced arms are 
complements or substitutes.  
Equation (1) allows to derive hypotheses on how supply and demand for military goods 
are related. Countries have built up domestic arms industries to provide their armed forces with 
military goods. Despite the increasing role of arms trade and joint procurement projects among 
allies, it is reasonable to assume that governments still source arms from their domestic arms-
producing companies if possible to ensure security of supply, which is particularly important 
during wartime. These companies are often even partly or fully owned by the national 
government and have privileged status with respect to take-overs and foreign ownership to 
ensure control over domestic arms production. Variation in national defense spending over time 
is often driven by equipment spending—even though national defense spending is not limited 
to cost elements related to the arms industry such as procurement and maintenance but also 
includes large cost elements like personnel cost.4 The first hypothesis to be examined is: 
 
 
3 Reverse causality might, however, arise if governments absorb cost-overruns for large-scale procurement 
projects. 
4 NATO figures show that the increase in national defense spending for NATO countries after NATO member 
states have committed themselves to the two percent spending target in 2014 disproportionately increased 
equipment expenditure compared to personnel expenditure (see “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2011-
2018).” NATO Press Release (2018)091).  
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Hypothesis 1: If national defense spending increases, the sales of arms and military services 
by a country’s largest arms-producing and military services companies increase. 
 
Military arms include small arms, major conventional weapons and weapons of mass 
destruction. Transfers of small arms are difficult to track and small arms do not exclusively 
serve military purposes. Transfers of weapons of mass destruction are strongly monitored and 
internationally heavily regulated. Exports of major conventional weapons are, however, likely 
to be positively related to the sales of military goods by domestic arms-producing companies. 
A country’s largest arms-producing and military services companies which belong to the 
world’s top 100 defense companies are likely to contribute disproportionately more to the 
production of major conventional weapons and disproportionately less to the production of 
small arms and weapons of mass destruction. Arms exports also include used major 
conventional weapons, though arms-producing companies are only involved in the production 
of new and the modernization of used arms. Export deals of used weapons, however, only 
represented 12% of the export deals of all major conventional weapons between 2002 and 2016 
(2% were export deals of used but modernized major conventional weapons and 86% were 
export deals of new major conventional weapons). The second hypothesis to be examined is: 
 
Hypothesis 2: If exports of major conventional weapons increase, the sales of arms and 
military services by a country’s largest arms-producing and military services companies 
increase. 
 
National defense spending includes—among other cost buckets—both domestically produced 
arms on the left-hand side of equation (1) and imported arms on the right-hand side of equation 
(1); arms imports therefore have a negative sign in equation (1). A negative relationship 
between the sales of military goods by domestic arms-producing companies and arms imports 
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would imply a “make or buy” decision by the government, i.e. that a government decides 
whether it buys a military good from a domestic arms-producing company or whether it imports 
such a good from abroad. In an environment of monopolistic competition with differentiated 
goods, however, domestically produced and imported military goods are likely not to be 
substitutes. Arms for military purposes are differentiated because of both product properties 
and origin: with regard to security of supply, domestically produced arms differ from imported 
arms because imported arms imply a strategic dependency from other countries. A country 
therefore seeks to be self-reliant in the production of military goods fundamental for national 
defense and restricts arms imports to those arms it does not produce itself (Glismann and Horn 
1992). The Berry Amendment, for example, requires the United States Department of Defense 
to prefer the procurement of domestically produced military goods.5,6 Countries therefore need 
to import only those military goods which are not produced by domestic arms-producing 
companies. Domestically produced arms and imported arms are, thus, complements rather than 
substitutes. Because of the complementarity between domestically produced and imported 
arms, increases in arms imports might even coincide with increases in arms sales by domestic 
arms-producing companies without any explicit causal link—for example, during large 
procurement activities. The complementarity might also give rise to reverse causality if 
components for domestically produced arms are sourced from foreign suppliers. The third 
hypothesis to be examined is: 
 
 
5 See Grasso, V.B. 2014. “The Berry Amendment: Requiring Defense Procurement to Come from Domestic 
Sources.” Congressional Research Service (RL31236).  
6 In 2017, Donald Trump took measures to enforce source restrictions by means of the Buy American Act and the 
Berry Amendment (see Gregg, A. 2017. “Pentagon moves to shut foreign firms out of its supply chain.” The 
Washington Post. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/pentagon-moves-to-
shut-foreign-firms-out-of-its-supply-chain/2017/07/06/37bc7498-60f6-11e7-8adc-fea80e32bf47_story.html?nore 
direct=on&utm_term=.443c0ac4e1c8, accessed January 9, 2019). 
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Hypothesis 3: If imports of major conventional weapons increase, the sales of arms and 
military services by a country’s largest arms-producing and military services companies do not 
decrease. Imports are rather unrelated or even positively related to sales. 
 
Scholars have described the trade-off between security considerations and economic returns in 
the context of arms trade (Levine et al. 1994, Thurner et al. 2019). This trade-off also applies 
to the importance governments attribute to the cost of defense spending and the returns from 
arms trade. A country’s geopolitical role and its position within the international community 
are, among others, likely to determine the extent to which the arms industry serves security or 
economic purposes: the United States, for example, act as a world power and have quite often 
been engaged in military activities within the last decades to pursue national interest or the 
interest of the Western world. This role is likely to support a strong domestic arms industry 
which provides the armed forces with military goods and guarantees security of supply. 
Germany, in contrast, has been much more reserved in engaging in international conflicts and 
continuously decreased defense spending after the Cold War. The strong German defense 
industry, however, exports arms to numerous countries around the world. The examples for the 
United States and Germany support the conjectures stated by Levine et al. (1994) that “there 
might be a Stackelberg leader, the US, who has world-wide security concerns, and a number of 
‘small’ followers (Britain and France) who are purely motivated by the economic return.” The 
fourth and last hypothesis to be examined is:  
 
Hypothesis 4: Countries differ in whether and to what extent national defense spending and 
arms transfers explain the sales of arms and military services by a country’s largest arms-
producing and military services companies. 
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4.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
Data on arms sales, national defense spending and arms trade is provided by means of different 
SIPRI databases. The SIRPI Arms Industry Database contains information on the sales of arms 
and military services of the top 100 arms-producing and military services companies of each 
year in OECD countries and developing countries (no data is available for Chinese firms). 
Military goods are supposed to explicitly serve military purposes and military services 
include—among others—IT, maintenance, repair, logistics, training, intelligence and armed 
security services. The sales of military goods include “both sales for domestic procurement and 
sales for exports.”7 The database covers the period 2002-2016 and indicates the country of each 
company. Sales figures are reported in million constant (2016) US dollars and reflect each 
company’s financial year.8 As companies drop out or enter the list of the top 100 companies 
over the years, the number of countries for which data is available from 2002 through 2016 is 
less than 100. The database is subject to noteworthy shortcomings which have not been 
improved yet: for instance, the definition of military goods and the information provided on 
arms sales is not standardized among companies, arms sales might be double-counted because 
of intra-industry trade in intermediate products and components, Chinese companies are not 
covered at all and information on merger and acquisition activities and divestments of 
companies are only selectively available for 2015 and 2016. Since quality and consistency of 
sales data are the better, the larger the companies considered are, the top 100 companies 
describe the most reliable data available. The companies included are, however, not 
representative for the entire arms industry.9  
 
7 See https://www.sipri.org/databases/armsindustry/sources-and-methods, accessed December 3, 2018. 
8 Data is collected in local currency and converted into constant (2016) US dollars using average exchange rates. 
Domestic sales of military goods are, however, more likely to be conducted in local currency whereas international 
sales are conducted in US dollars. As the data does not reflect a company’s domestic and international sales share 
and timing of these sales within a year, sales figures cannot be interpreted exactly if intra-annual exchange rate 
fluctuations are high. 
9 See Fleurant and Tian (2018) and Smith and Dunne (2018) for a discussion of the SIPRI Arms Industry Database. 
 103 
The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database includes trend indicator values (TIV) for a 
country’s exports and imports of major conventional weapons such as aircrafts, ships, tanks, or 
missiles. The TIV are supposed to describe “actual deliveries of major conventional weapons” 
per year in units which are comparable among countries and show trends in arms trade. The 
TIV constructed by SIPRI are therefore “based on the known unit production costs of a core set 
of weapons and is intended to represent the transfer of military resources rather than the 
financial value of the transfer.”10 Trend indicator values are expressed in millions. Used 
weapons are valued with 40% and used but modernized weapons are valued with two thirds of 
a weapon’s initial value.  
The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database provides data on national defense spending 
for a given calendar year. National defense spending is defined in million constant (2016) US 
dollars, i.e. in absolute terms. Defense spending in absolute terms better reflects the demand for 
security the arms industry must meet than defense spending as a share of GDP, which is the 
measure commonly applied when demand functions for national defense spending are estimated 
(see Dunne and Perlo-Freeman 2003a, 2003b, Blum 2018, 2020). Using defense spending in 
absolute terms is consistent with data on arms sales and TIV for arms trade, which are both also 
expressed in absolute terms. 
The SIRPI Arms Industry Database also considers large foreign subsidiaries of 
international defense corporations which as an independent company would rank among the 
top 100.11 Subsidiaries are specified by the country in which they are located. Since sales figures 
of subsidiaries are included in the sales figures of the parent company, including both 
subsidiaries and parent companies into one panel would result in double-counting.12 I therefore 
 
10 See https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/sources-and-methods, accessed December 3, 2018. 
11 E.g. subsidiaries of BAE Systems (United Kingdom) like BAE Systems Inc. (United States) and BAE Systems 
Australia, or other subsidiaries of international corporations such as Airbus and Thales.  
12 It is not possible to subtract subsidiary figures from parent company figures, because time series of both 
subsidiary and parent in most of the cases do not have the same length and would result in inconsistent time series 
of the parent companies. 
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employ three panel data sets: i) a balanced panel of arms-producing and military services 
companies, ii) an unbalanced panel of arms-producing and military services companies and iii) 
an unbalanced panel of large subsidiaries of arms-producing companies. The first two panels 
include the large international corporations but exclude subsidiaries as further elements of 
national arms production; the third panel, in turn, does not consider any independent company. 
Given the data availability for national defense spending and arms transfers, the balanced 
company panel contains 44 companies in nine countries during the period 2002-2016.13 These 
nine countries include the strongest arms industries like the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France and Germany and six of the top ten arms exporting countries. The unbalanced company 
panel (which the balanced company panel is a subset of) contains 195 companies in 21 countries 
and the unbalanced subsidiary panel contains 74 subsidiaries in 12 countries. Companies in the 
balanced company panel belonged to the top 100 arms-producing and military services 
companies from 2002 through 2016 while companies and subsidiaries in the unbalanced panels 
belonged to these top 100 according to their sales in at least one of the years from 2002 to 2016. 
Table A4.1 in Appendix I shows a list of countries with the number of companies by country 
included in each panel as well as country ranks in national defense spending, exports of major 
conventional weapons and imports of major conventional weapons as of 2016.  
 Tables A4.2 and A4.3 in Appendix I show summary statistics and correlations of arms 
sales, national defense spending and arms exports and imports for each of the three panels. 
Summary statistics and correlations for the sales of arms and military services are based on 
company-level data, thus including more observations than summary statistics and correlations 
for country-level data like national defense spending, exports and imports. The unconditional 
correlations of the sales of arms and military services with national defense spending and with 
exports of major conventional weapons are positive and of similar size: more than 30% in the 
 
13 In three cases, company names have been unified in the dataset after name changes: the Israeli aerospace 
company Israel Aircraft Industries changed name to Israel Aerospace Industries in 2006, EADS changed name to 
Airbus Group in 2014 and to Airbus SE in 2017 and Finmeccanica changed name to Leonardo in 2016. 
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balanced company panel and more than 20% in the unbalanced company panel. The correlation 
of imports with the sales of arms and military services is positive but only 5% in the unbalanced 
company panel. The high unconditional correlation between national defense spending and the 
exports of major conventional weapons of more than 60% in each of the three panels reflects 
that countries with high levels of national defense spending are also strong in arms exports, and 
vice versa. 
 
FIGURE 4.1: ARMS SALES BY THE TOP 10 ARMS-PRODUCING AND MILITARY SERVICES 
COMPANIES 
Figure 4.1 shows the sales of arms and military services by the ten largest arms-producing 
companies from the balanced company panel (i.e. with time series available from 2002 through 
2016). Seven of these companies are in the United States, one in France, one in the United 
Kingdom and another one—Airbus—is trans-European.14 The sales of arms and military 
 
14 The “main engineering and production facilities” of Airbus Defence and Space—the division for equipment and 
services in the fields of aerospace and defense—are in France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. For the 
further analysis, Airbus sales are allocated to France and Germany with a share of 40% each and to Spain and the 
United Kingdom with a share of 10% each, reflecting the employee shares of Airbus SE in these four countries 
(see: Airbus SE. 2017. “Annual Report 2017.” Available at https://www.airbus.com/investors/financial-results-
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services differ among companies over time: sales figures of Boing, United Technologies and 
Thales hardly varied over time while sales figures of Lockheed Martin, BAE Systems and 
Northrop Grumman have been rather volatile during the observation period. A considerable 
share of these ten companies, however, experienced peaks in sales during the late 2000s while 
sales decreased in the early 2010s; this development is concurrent with national defense 
spending in the United States, the United Kingdom and France. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show how 
time series of national defense spending and exports of major conventional weapons are related 
to the total arms sales by the largest arms-producing companies in the United States (Figure 
4.2) and in France, Germany, Israel and the United Kingdom (Figure 4.3; axes are removed and 
figures are not sized to scale to enhance readability). Companies do not drop out during the 
observation period because Figures 4.2 and 4.3 contain companies of the balanced company 
panel only; time series for total sales within one country thus describe the same set of companies 
from 2002 to 2016. For the United States and the United Kingdom, the similarity in time series 
for the sales of arms and military services and national defense spending is much more 
pronounced than for arms sales and the exports of major conventional weapons. For France and 
Germany, however, the sales of arms and military services and the exports of major 
conventional weapons show a pronounced similarity rather than arms sales and national defense 
spending do. The sales of arms and military services by Israeli companies have been rather 
constant since the late 2000s; national defense spending remarkably dropped in 2016 while the 
exports of major conventional weapons increased after 2014, thus allowing to hold arms sales 
at rather constant levels. The time series drawn for the five illustrated countries support the 
hypotheses stated in Section 4.2 that national defense spending and arms exports are positively 
 
and-annual-reports.html#annualreports). Almost all employees of MBDA—the second trans-European company 
in the sample—work in France (45%), the United Kingdom (31%), Italy (12%) and Germany (12%). For the 
further analysis, MBDA sales are allocated to these four countries according to the employee shares (see: MBDA. 
2016. “Corporate and Social Responsibility Report 2016.” Available at https://www.mbda-systems.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/csr_report_2016.pdf). Comparison of prorated sales data and sales data available for 
MBDA subsidiaries in France and Italy supports the approach of prorating sales figures according to employee 
shares. 
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FIGURE 4.2: UNITED STATES TOP COMPANIES’ ARMS SALES, NATIONAL DEFENSE 
SPENDING AND EXPORTS OF MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS 
 
 
FIGURE 4.3: TOP COMPANIES’ ARMS SALES, NATIONAL DEFENSE SPENDING AND 
EXPORTS OF MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS 
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correlated with the sales by arms-producing and military services companies and that country-
specific differences exist. 
4.4 Empirical strategy 
The baseline panel data model to estimate how national defense spending and arms transfers 
affect the sales of military goods by arms-producing companies has the following form: 
 
ln(Sales of arms and military services)ijt = β1 ln(National defense spending)jt + 
β2 ln(Arms exports)jt + β3 ln(Arms imports)jt + αij + uijt             (2) 
 
The dependent variable Sales of arms and military servicesijt describes the sales of arms and 
military services by company i in country j in year t. The considered companies belonged to the 
worlds’ top 100 arms-producing and military services companies in at least one of the years 
during the observation period (t = 2002,…, 2016). The number of companies i and countries j 
(in which these i companies are located) differs among the three assembled panels (see Section 
4.3). The variable National defense spendingjt describes national defense spending in country j 
in year t. The variables Arms exportsjt and Arms importsjt describe trend indicator values for the 
exports and the imports of major conventional weapons from and to country j in year t. Both 
dependent and explanatory variables are expressed in their natural logarithms, which allows to 
interpret estimated coefficients as elasticities. The coefficient αij describes company fixed 
effects to account for unobserved characteristics of individual companies. The empirical model 
thus exploits the within-variation of the variables for companies and countries and allows to 
investigate how trends in the sales by individual arms-producing companies are influenced by 
trends in national defense spending and arms transfers. The within-interpretation is, moreover, 
favorable because—due to differences in how the figures are collected for different companies 
and countries—SIPRI data for company sales and national defense spending is more reliable 
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over time than across companies and countries. The standard error uijt is clustered at the 
company level and robust to serial correlation and heteroskedasticity (Huber/White/sandwich 
standard errors; see Huber 1967 and White 1980).  
 Time series of the sales of arms and military services and the explanatory variables 
might be non-stationary for the period 2002-2016 and give rise to spurious estimation results. 
Temporary trends might exist in national defense spending for individual countries and in the 
total sales of arms and military services by arms-producing companies (see Figures 4.2 and 
4.3). I therefore also estimate the model in first differences (i.e. log-differences), thus 
eliminating company fixed effects αij, to alleviate possible problems resulting from non-
stationary time series. The panel model in first differences looks as follows: 
 
∆ln(Sales of arms and military services)ijt = δ1 ∆ln(National defense spending)jt + 
δ2 ∆ln(Arms exports)jt + δ3 ∆ln(Arms imports)jt + ɛijt             (3) 
 
Standard errors ɛijt are again clustered at the company level and robust to serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity. The fixed effects and the first differences log-log panel data models are both 
estimated with ordinary least squares. The estimated coefficients δ1, δ2, and δ3 are interpreted 
like the coefficients of the panel fixed effects model. Hypotheses 1 to 3 imply that the estimated 
coefficients yield β1 > 0, β2 > 0 and β3 ≥ 0 for the fixed effects model and δ1 > 0, δ2 > 0 and δ3 
≥ 0 for the first differences model.  
Since—as discussed in Section 4.2— companies produce arms “on demand” contingent 
to defense budgets which are adopted before the beginning of the fiscal year (and include orders 
which have been placed well in advance or even long-term procurement projects with long lead 
times) and arms exports which have been approved in advance, reverse causality is less likely 
in this empirical supply-demand model. Omitted variable bias cannot be ruled out though 
factors influencing the sales of arms and military services both directly and indirectly through 
 110 
the channels of defense spending and arms trade are unlikely to exist on a large scale and to 
substantially bias the results. In any event, I include further control variables on the country-
level in a robustness test. 
4.5 Empirical results 
4.5.1 Baseline results 
Table 4.1 shows the baseline estimation results for the fixed effects and the first differences 
model.15 The 44 and the 195 companies of the balanced and the unbalanced company panel 
reported in Table 4.1 indicate six companies more than included in the panels because sales 
figures for the two trans-European companies Airbus and MBDA have been allocated to 
individual countries according to employee shares (see footnote 14). The results for the fixed 
effects model indicate that if national defense spending increases by 1%, the sales by domestic 
arms-producing and military services companies increase by 1.1% for the balanced company 
panel and by 1.2% for the unbalanced company panel. The estimates of the first differences 
model are similar in size and statistically significant at the 1% level, too. An elasticity above 
one is plausible following the assumption stated in Section 4.2 that increases in national defense 
spending in the short run influence equipment expenditure more than they influence personnel 
expenditure. If total national defense spending increases by 1%, equipment spending is 
therefore likely to increase by more than 1%. If exports of major conventional weapons increase 
by 1%, the sales by domestic arms-producing and military services companies increase by 
almost 0.2% for the balanced company panel and by almost 0.1% for the unbalanced company 
panel; both estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. Estimation results in first 
differences are considerably smaller (0.05% and 0.03%), but statistically significant at the 1% 
level, too. Imports of major conventional weapons do not turn out to be statistically significant 
 
15 The number of observations and the number of companies and subsidiaries in the unbalanced panels is reduced 
in the first differences model because of the first differenced time series. 
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for both the balanced and the unbalanced company panel neither in the fixed effects model nor 
in the first differences model. The empirical results of both empirical models for the two 
company panels, i.e. that β1 > 0, β2 > 0, β3 ≥ 0 and δ1 > 0, δ2 > 0, δ3 ≥ 0, support hypotheses 1 
to 3. 
TABLE 4.1: BASELINE ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Fixed effects model (1) (2) (3) 
 Balanced Company  Unbalanced Company  Unbalanced Subsidiary  
Sales of arms and military servicesa Panel Panel Panel 
    
National defense spendinga 1.087*** 1.208*** 0.908** 
 (0.234) (0.137) (0.417) 
Exports of major conventional weaponsa 0.194*** 0.089*** -0.004 
 (0.048) (0.024) (0.064) 
Imports of major conventional weaponsa 0.014 0.016 -0.034* 
 (0.015) (0.011) (0.019) 
    
Company Fixed Effects yes yes yes 
Observations 660 1,460 252 
Companies (for column (3): Subsidiaries) 44 195 74 
R2 Overall 0.106 0.045 0.447 
R2 Within 0.203 0.234 0.094 
R2 Between 0.108 0.057 0.391 
    
First differences model (1) (2) (3) 
 Balanced Company  Unbalanced Company  Unbalanced Subsidiary  
Sales of arms and military servicesa Panel Panel Panel 
    
National defense spendinga 0.977*** 1.202*** 1.064** 
 (0.155) (0.123) (0.491) 
Exports of major conventional weaponsa 0.051*** 0.027*** -0.025 
 (0.015) (0.010) (0.051) 
Imports of major conventional weaponsa 0.008 0.002 -0.029* 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.015) 
    
Observations 616 1,238 170 
Companies (for column (3): Subsidiaries) 44 162 44 
R2 0.117 0.117 0.061 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. All regressions 
apply standard errors clustered at the country level. a denotes variables which are expressed in their natural logarithms.  
Results are different in column (3) which shows results for the unbalanced subsidiary panel. If 
national defense spending increases by 1%, the sales by subsidiaries located in this country 
increase by 0.9% according to the fixed effects model; the first differences estimate for national 
defense spending is slightly larger. Compared to columns (1) and (2), the coefficients are 
statistically significant only at the 5% level because, in terms of national defense, countries 
might rely less on arms produced by foreign subsidiaries than on arms produced by domestic 
companies. Exports of major conventional weapons do not turn out to be statistically significant 
neither in the fixed effects model nor in the first difference model, because foreign companies 
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might place their subsidiaries in countries which domestically absorb large shares of the 
subsidiaries’ production rather than producing military goods for export (e.g. the BAE 
subsidiary in the United States). Arms-producing companies are often blamed to circumvent 
arms export bans (e.g. to conflict countries or autocracies) by using foreign subsidiaries or 
licensed arms production abroad. The results on export effects for the unbalanced subsidiary 
panel, however, at least do not indicate that these are large-scale practices. Imports are negative 
and statistically significant at the 10% level for both empirical models because a government’s 
rationale not to import military goods which are also domestically produced (see Hypothesis 3) 
is likely to be reduced for military goods provided by a foreign company’s subsidiary. The 
results for the unbalanced subsidiary panel need to be interpreted with due caution because—
as the number of observations and the number of subsidiaries indicate—the average time series 
for subsidiaries are quite short.  
4.5.2 Robustness tests 
I examine the robustness of the empirical results in several ways. Given the market structure 
for military goods, national defense spending and arms exports describe the two channels 
national arms production flows into. It cannot, however, be ruled out that other factors at the 
country level contribute to both the sales by arms-producing and military services companies 
and to national defense spending or arms exports. I therefore include five control variables at 
the country level to reduce possible omitted variables bias: a war dummy for involvement in an 
internal or interstate war, a proxy variable for internal stability and domestic conflict 
probability, the natural logarithm of GDP in constant (2010) US dollars to capture business 
cycle effects and to account for the presumably positive relationship between defense spending 
and economic growth (see Alptekin and Levine 2012), an index for trade globalization 
accounting for the trade in goods and services and for trade partners diversification and a 
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continuous democracy measure describing political institutions.16 Including these control 
variables does not change the inferences from the baseline results (see Table A4.4 in Appendix 
II). Estimates of the added control variables are only rarely significant because these country-
level variables explain arms sales mainly via the channels of defense spending and arms trade 
rather than directly influencing arms sales. In column (2) of the fixed effects model, the war 
dummy is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. This result might indicate that 
after controlling for defense spending arms sales are lower during wartime when defense 
spending is commonly high, i.e. that the effect of national defense spending might otherwise 
overestimate arms sales in periods of armed conflict. War does, however, not turn out to be 
statistically significant neither in the other fixed effects nor in the first differences models. 
Internal threat does not turn out to be statistically significant in the unbalanced company panel, 
which is the only panel with within-country variation for this variable. GDP has positive but 
only rarely significant estimates in the fixed effects and the first differences model for the 
company panels and shows that economic growth positively influences arms sales by arms-
producing companies. Trade globalization is statistically significant in column (3) only and 
indicates that trade integration is positively related to the amount of military goods produced 
by subsidiaries of foreign firms. The continuous democracy measure is statistically significant 
only in column (2) for the fixed effects model.17 
Arms sales figures of one year might not exclusively contain sales volumes of military 
goods delivered in the respective year. It is likely that sales figures also include advance 
payments, especially for major orders which might be paid in several installments rather than 
 
16 Data for armed conflicts is taken from the “UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset” by Gleditsch et al. (2002). 
Data for the proxy variable for internal stability and domestic conflict probability is taken from the “Major 
Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflict Regions, 1946-2016” dataset. Data for GDP is taken from 
the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. The index for trade globalization is a subset of the KOF 
Globalization Index (Dreher 2006, Gygli et al. 2019, see Potrafke 2015 for a survey). The continuous democracy 
index (CSVMDI) is based on machine learning techniques and provided by Gründler and Krieger (2016, 2018).  
17 Controlling for government ideology (see Comola 2012 and Brender 2018) using data from the Database of 
Political Institutions does not change the inferences either, however, the number of observations is reduced for 
governments which cannot be categorized by means of leftwing-rightwing patterns (results not reported).  
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upon delivery. National defense spending may reflect such payment smoothing, however, 
export TIV for major conventional weapons reflect actual deliveries irrespective of the actual 
payment flow. I therefore estimate the model including lead values for the exports of major 
conventional weapons to allow for less contemporaneity in the payments for sold arms (i.e. the 
sales by arms-producing companies) and their actual delivery. Lead values for the exports of 
major conventional weapons are thus supposed to capture the effects of advance payments. 
Inferences from the baseline results in Table 4.1 do not change when lead values of up to three 
years for the exports of major conventional weapons are added to the regression (see Table 
A4.5 in Appendix II). An increase in approved exports of major conventional weapons in the 
subsequent year (t + 1) is significantly positively related to an increase in the arms sales by 
arms-producing companies according to both fixed effects and first differences results. Further 
lead values for the exports of major conventional weapons are only rarely statistically 
significant.18  
It is a worthwhile endeavor to more specifically delimit elements of domestic and 
foreign demand which determine the sales of military goods. First, NATO provides data on 
national defense spending and on the equipment spending share of total defense spending, 
which allows to construct figures for military equipment spending of NATO countries in 
million constant (2015) US dollars.19 Equipment spending (as a subset of overall defense 
spending) might more accurately approximate the domestic demand arms-producing companies 
have to meet. The fixed effects estimates for military equipment spending of NATO countries 
are less than half the size compared to the coefficients for overall defense spending (see Table 
A4.6 in Appendix II). The first differences estimates for military equipment spending are also 
considerably smaller and statistically significant only at the 5% level for the balanced and at 
 
18 The number of observations decreases from column to column because the latest year is dropped from the sample 
for each additional lead value of the export variable. The number of companies and subsidiaries is reduced by 
those companies and subsidiaries for which no further lead values are available. 
19 NATO reports do not include military expenditure in constant US dollars for years prior to 2010. I therefore 
deflated military expenditure in current US dollars by using the US GDP deflator from the World Bank. 
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the 10% level for the unbalanced company panel. It is reasonable that coefficients for overall 
defense spending are larger because—as mentioned earlier—increases in overall defense 
spending often imply that equipment spending increases disproportionately. Imports are now 
statistically highly significant according to fixed effects estimation results in columns (1) and 
(2) and have a positive sign. This result is in line with hypothesis 3 that arms sales by a country’s 
largest arms-producing companies do not decrease if arms imports increase. The positive sign 
for imports even confirms that imported and domestically produced arms are complements 
rather than substitutes: increasing arms imports might coincide with increasing national arms 
production because of, for example, larger procurement activities, and imported components 
for domestically produced arms might give rise to reverse causality which further explains the 
positive sign for arms imports. Equipment spending does not turn out to be statistically 
significant for subsidiaries in column (3)—neither for the fixed effects nor for the first 
differences model.  
Second, SIPRI provides data on arms transfers at the level of individual deals which 
allows to distinguish between new, used and used but modernized major conventional weapons. 
Excluding exports of used major conventional weapons from the estimation might more 
accurately approximate the foreign demand companies face because arms-producing companies 
are involved in the production of new arms or the modernization of used arms only. As 
described in Section 4.2, aggregated data for the exports of new and used but modernized 
weapons is similar to the data for the exports of all weapons: only 12% of the tracked arms 
export deals of all major conventional weapons between 2002 and 2016 have been exports of 
used weapons (2% were export deals of used but modernized weapons and 86% were export 
deals of new weapons) and used and used but modernized weapons, moreover, only receive 
40% and 66% of a new weapon’s trend indicator value. I do not distinguish between new and 
used imported weapons, because procurement projects for the armed forces can include both 
new and used imported weapons and both are able to substitute domestically produced weapons. 
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The results for approved exports of new and used but modernized major conventional weapons 
confirm the previous inferences from Table 4.1 regarding the effect of arms exports on 
companies’ sales of military goods (see Table A4.7 in Appendix II).20 
4.6 Country-specific results 
Differences in country-specific results might indicate the extent to which an arms industry 
serves security or economic purposes. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 showed that in the United States and 
the United Kingdom, sales figures follow national defense spending rather than exports of major 
conventional weapons; for Germany, however, sales figures seem to follow the exports of major 
conventional weapons rather than national defense spending. I estimate country-specific 
coefficients for the explanatory variables to examine this heterogeneity among countries. Figure 
4.4 illustrates coefficient estimates and their 95% confidence intervals according to the fixed 
effects and the first differences model for the balanced panel. Results for countries with at least 
three companies in the panel are shown, which includes those countries where the majority of 
the top 100 arms-producing and military services companies is located. National defense 
spending is significantly and positively related to the sales by arms-producing and military 
services companies in Israel, the United Kingdom and the United States (in Israel according to 
the fixed effects model only); this result reflects the baseline estimation results. For France, 
Germany and Italy, however, national defense spending does not turn out to be statistically 
significant. Arms exports surprisingly do not turn out to be statistically significant for France, 
one of the world’s largest arms-producing and arms-exporting countries. In Germany, Israel, 
Italy and the United Kingdom, in turn, exports of major conventional weapons are significantly 
positively related to the sales by arms-producing and military services companies (in Israel and 
Italy according to the fixed effects model only). Arms exports from the United States do not 
 
20 As a further robustness test, all three panels are estimated excluding the trans-European companies Airbus 
(former EADS) and MBDA, for which sales figures have been allocated according to the employee share in 
individual countries. Inferences from the baseline results do not change (results not reported). 
 117 
turn out to be significantly correlated with the sales by US arms-producing and military services 
companies. Imports of major conventional weapons do not turn out to be statistically significant 
according to both the fixed effects and the first differences model for any of the six countries.  
Figure 4.5 illustrates country-specific results of the fixed effects and the first differences 
model for the unbalanced company panel, thus including more countries. The results confirm 
 
FIGURE 4.4: COUNTRY-SPECIFIC COEFFICIENTS AND 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FROM 
FIXED EFFECTS AND FIRST DIFFERENCES ESTIMATION FOR THE BALANCED PANEL 
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FIGURE 4.5: COUNTRY-SPECIFIC COEFFICIENTS AND 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FROM 
FIXED EFFECTS AND FIRST DIFFERENCES ESTIMATION FOR THE UNBALANCED PANEL 
the inferences for the six countries shown in Figure 4.4. National defense spending in India, 
Russia, South Korea and Spain is significantly and positively related to the sales by arms-
producing and military services companies in these countries according to fixed effects results 
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(according to the results in first differences, this holds for South Korea and Spain only). Exports 
of major conventional weapons are significantly and positively related to the sales by arms-
producing and military services companies in Spain. 
The results support hypothesis 4 and suggest differences among countries in the extent 
to which the arms industry serves security or economic purposes. Arms-producing companies 
in the United States serve the superpower’s security concerns and develop and produce arms 
primarily for the country’s own armed forces. Arms exports by the United States are likely to 
be solely an externality of the strong domestic demand for military goods. The same holds for 
strong military powers like India, Israel, Russia and South Korea as well as for Spain and the 
United Kingdom. In Israel, Spain and the United Kingdom, however, arms exports significantly 
determine the sales of military goods by domestic arms-producing companies, too. In Germany, 
a country with low levels of defense spending, arms exports and the economic returns they 
generate primarily determine the sales of military goods by German defense companies; 
national defense spending only seems to subordinately contribute to the sales of military goods. 
The lack of statistical significance of national defense spending for the sales of military goods 
reflects that countries like Germany and France have—among other countries—often been 
criticized by the United States for free-riding on the United States’ defense burden within 
NATO. In times of low levels of defense spending and, thus, low domestic demand for arms, 
an orientation towards arms exports might ensure the survival of the domestic arms industry 
and its innovative capacity. Arms exports thus might work like a subsidy the government does 
not need to pay for, safeguard jobs and ensure that defense capacities can later be increased if 
necessary. Considering the tremendous R&D cost for new weapon systems and high cost of 
manufacturing, arms exports are often necessary to realize economies of scale and to reduce 
procurement cost, thus making national security even affordable. Export-oriented arms 
industries like Germany, however, might be less effective in meeting the requirements of the 
own armed forces when it comes to domestic orders.  
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Table 4.2 shows estimation results when the large share of US-companies and 
subsidiaries located in the United States is excluded from the three panels. Compared to the 
baseline estimation results of the fixed effects model, national defense spending does no longer 
turn out to be statistically significant in columns (1) and (3), however, inferences for the 
unbalanced company panel in column (2) are unchanged. Inferences regarding the estimation 
results of the first differences model are—apart from smaller estimates for national defense 
spending—unchanged for any of the three panels. 
TABLE 4.2: ESTIMATION RESULTS EXCLUDING COMPANIES AND SUBSIDIARIES IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
Fixed effects model (1) (2) (3) 
 Balanced Company  Unbalanced Company  Unbalanced Subsidiary  
Sales of arms and military servicesa Panel Panel Panel 
    
National defense spendinga 0.364 0.929*** 0.128 
 (0.514) (0.210) (0.325) 
Exports of major conventional weaponsa 0.157*** 0.076*** -0.015 
 (0.036) (0.022) (0.050) 
Imports of major conventional weaponsa 0.010 0.019 -0.011 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.014) 
    
Company Fixed Effects yes yes yes 
Observations 405 838 186 
Companies (for column (3): Subsidiaries) 27 110 58 
R2 Overall 0.045 0.068 0.132 
R2 Within 0.054 0.150 0.003 
R2 Between 0.045 0.066 0.149 
    
First differences model (1) (2) (3) 
 Balanced Company  Unbalanced Company  Unbalanced Subsidiary  
Sales of arms and military servicesa Panel Panel Panel 
    
National defense spendinga 0.619** 0.798*** 0.675** 
 (0.241) (0.153) (0.316) 
Exports of major conventional weaponsa 0.048*** 0.028*** -0.024 
 (0.016) (0.010) (0.052) 
Imports of major conventional weaponsa 0.008 0.005 -0.027* 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.016) 
    
Observations 378 710 120 
Companies (for column (3): Subsidiaries) 27 88 35 
R2 0.039 0.057 0.035 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. All regressions 
apply standard errors clustered at the country level. a denotes variables which are expressed in their natural logarithms.  
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter presented new empirical evidence on how supply and demand in the market for 
military goods are related. I examined how national defense spending and arms transfers relate 
to the sales of military goods by arms-producing companies. The sample included data for up 
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to 195 arms-producing and military services companies in 21 countries for the period 2002-
2016. The results of the fixed effects model indicated that if national defense spending increases 
by 1%, the arms sales by a country’s largest arms-producing and military services companies 
increase by up to 1.2%. If exports of major conventional weapons increase by 1%, arms sales 
by these companies increase by up to 0.2%. Estimation results in first differences were similar 
for national defense spending, however, the elasticity of companies’ arms sales with regard to 
the exports of major conventional weapons was considerably smaller. Arms imports were not 
shown to affect domestic arms sales, because countries mainly import arms they do not produce 
themselves. Imported arms and arms produced by domestic arms manufacturers are, thus, 
complements rather than substitutes.  
Country-specific estimation results suggest differences among countries in the extent to 
which an arms industry serves security or economic purposes. The differences allow to draw 
inferences regarding the structure of a country’s arms industry. In the United States and Russia, 
the arms industry’s purpose is to provide the own armed forces and to guarantee self-reliance 
in the production of military goods to maintain the role as independent world powers. In 
Germany, a NATO ally surrounded by closely aligned partners and under the security umbrella 
of the United States, the arms industry primarily served economic purposes during the 
observation period. The insights into supply and demand for military goods are derived from a 
positive analysis and do not describe a normative claim or policy recommendations. The 
findings contribute to the literature on the arms industry and have implications for scholars 
investigating into arms trade and defense spending: differences among arms industries, for 
example, reflect the long-lasting debate on burden sharing within NATO.  
Future research should examine the supply side of the market for military goods in more 
detail. Arms exports have shown to imply positive externalities and serve as substitutes for 
defense spending: democracies decrease national defense spending in response to increases in 
their arms exports to other democracies (Pamp and Thurner 2017, Pamp et al. 2018). 
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Investigating the extent to which arms-producing companies benefit or suffer from this shift 
from defense spending to arms exports is a worthwhile endeavor. Another related question is 
whether governments even balance out domestic arms orders and arms exports to smooth 
national arms production. Governments might, for instance, approve arms exports in times of 
decreased defense spending—meaning the relationship between defense spending and arms 
exports was reversed—to ensure the survival of the domestic arms industry. 
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Appendix I 
TABLE A4.1: LIST OF COUNTRIES, NUMBER OF COMPANIES AND SUBSIDIARIES AND COUNTRY RANKS IN DEFENSE SPENDING, EXPORTS AND IMPORTS 
 
 
 
 
Country Subsidiaries Rank: National defense 
spending (2016)
Rank: Exports of 
major conventional 
weapons (2016)
Rank: Imports of 
major conventional 
weapons (2016)
Balanced company panel Unbalanced company panel Unbalanced subsidiary panel
Australia  - 4 3 12 20 8
Brazil  - 1  - 13 22 44
Canada  - 1 2 14 19 34
Finland  - 1  - 47 26 37
France 5 14 9 5 4 62
Germany 5 8 5 9 3 59
India  - 4  - 6 30 1
Israel 3 6  - 16 6 15
Italy 3 5 14 11 8 13
Japan  - 4  - 8 - 23
Netherlands  -  - 1 25 12 47
Norway  - 1  - 30 18 42
Poland  - 2  - 24 43 49
Russia  - 20 9 3 2 41
South Korea  - 10 2 10 9 7
Spain 1 5 1 17 11 54
Sweden 1 3 3 33 14 55
Switzerland 1 2  - 37 15 57
Turkey  - 2  - 15 13 22
Ukraine  - 1  - 46 10 -
United Kingdom 8 16 9 7 7 30
United States 17 85 16 1 1 16
Total # of companies 44 195 74
Total # of countries 9 21 12
Companies
1
2
5
 
xx 
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TABLE A4.2: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min p25 p75 Max 
Balanced Company Panel        
Sales of arms and military services 660 6,291 8,871 328 1,345 6,125 40,830 
National defense spending 135 96,069 197,148 4,220 14,783 52,739 768,466 
Exports of major conventional weapons 135 1,676 2,333 16 422 1,697 10,304 
Imports of major conventional weapons 135 290 286 1 74 451 1,196 
        
Unbalanced Company Panel        
Sales of arms and military services 1,460 3,683 6,480 328 835 2,945 40,830 
National defense spending 333 83,444 179,179 3,063 15,030 51,763 768,466 
Exports of major conventional weapons 333 1,513 2368 2 175 1,474 10,304 
Imports of major conventional weapons 333 444 604 1 99 563 5,322 
        
Unbalanced Subsidiary Panel        
Sales of arms and military services 252 2,281 3,060 395 757 2,543 22,261 
National defense spending 89 139,987 231,175 4,882 26,383 55,922 768,466 
Exports of major conventional weapons 89 2,536 3,053 14 512 4,967 10,304 
Imports of major conventional weapons 89 410 374 2 104 572 1,574 
Notes: Sales of arms and military services and national defense spending are in million constant (2016) US dollars. Exports and imports of major 
conventional weapons are trend indicator values (TIV) in million. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A4.3: CORRELATIONS 
 Sales of arms and  
military servicesa 
National defense  
spendinga 
Exports of major  
conventional weaponsa 
Imports of major  
conventional weaponsa 
Balanced Company Panel     
Sales of arms and military servicesa 1.000    
National defense spendinga 0.326 1.000   
Exports of major conventional weaponsa 0.302 0.839 1.000  
Imports of major conventional weaponsa 0.193 0.494 0.292 1.000 
Observations 660 135 135 135 
     
Unbalanced Company Panel     
Sales of arms and military servicesa 1.000    
National defense spendinga 0.209 1.000   
Exports of major conventional weaponsa 0.223 0.619 1.000  
Imports of major conventional weaponsa 0.051 0.357 -0.180 1.000 
Observations 1,460 333 333 333 
     
Unbalanced Subsidiary Panel     
Sales of arms and military servicesa 1.000    
National defense spendinga 0.667 1.000   
Exports of major conventional weaponsa 0.457 0.743 1.000  
Imports of major conventional weaponsa 0.243 0.292 -0.166 1.000 
Observations 252 89 89 89 
Notes:  a denotes variables which are expressed in their natural logarithms. 
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Appendix II 
TABLE A4.4: ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH ADDITIONAL CONTROL VARIABLES AT THE COUNTRY-
LEVEL 
Fixed effects model (1) (2) (3) 
 Balanced Company  Unbalanced Company  Unbalanced Subsidiary  
Sales of arms and military servicesa Panel Panel Panel 
    
National defense spendinga 0.933*** 1.108*** 0.973** 
 (0.212) (0.133) (0.401) 
Exports of major conventional weaponsa 0.120*** 0.069*** 0.016 
 (0.040) (0.018) (0.053) 
Imports of major conventional weaponsa 0.024 0.014 -0.042* 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.023) 
    
War -0.094 -0.130** 0.042 
 (0.104) (0.066) (0.059) 
Internal threat - -0.040 - 
  (0.037)  
GDPa 0.558* 0.198 -0.195 
 (0.316) (0.254) (0.811) 
Trade globalization 0.008 0.007 0.029*** 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) 
Continuous democracy measure (CSVMDI) 2.477 1.574** -0.307 
 (1.874) (0.735) (1.551) 
Company Fixed Effects yes yes yes 
Observations 660 1,460 252 
Companies (for column (3): Subsidiaries) 44 195 74 
R2 Overall 0.109 0.050 0.419 
R2 Within 0.264 0.259 0.155 
R2 Between 0.110 0.064 0.360 
    
First differences model (1) (2) (3) 
 Balanced Company  Unbalanced Company  Unbalanced Subsidiary  
Sales of arms and military servicesa Panel Panel Panel 
    
National defense spendinga 0.943*** 1.078*** 1.083** 
 (0.167) (0.140) (0.482) 
Exports of major conventional weaponsa 0.046*** 0.021** -0.022 
 (0.017) (0.010) (0.051) 
Imports of major conventional weaponsa 0.008 0.000 -0.028 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.017) 
    
War 0.008 0.011 0.012 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.020) 
Internal threat - -0.030 - 
  (0.038)  
GDPa 0.399 0.518** -0.176 
 (0.340) (0.208) (0.860) 
Trade globalization 0.000 -0.003 0.011* 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) 
Continuous democracy measure (CSVMDI) 0.265 0.232 -0.855 
 (0.557) (0.259) (1.301) 
Observations 616 1,238 170 
Companies (for column (3): Subsidiaries) 44 162 44 
R2 0.125 0.129 0.076 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. All regressions 
apply standard errors clustered at the country level. a denotes variables which are expressed in their natural logarithms. 
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TABLE A4.5: ESTIMATION RESULTS INCLUDING LEADS FOR THE EXPORTS OF MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS 
Fixed effects model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Balanced 
Company  
Balanced 
Company  
Balanced 
Company  
Unbalanced 
Company  
Unbalanced 
Company  
Unbalanced 
Company  
Unbalanced 
Subsidiary  
Unbalanced 
Subsidiary  
Unbalanced 
Subsidiary  
Sales of arms and military servicesa Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel 
          
National defense spendinga 1.138*** 1.215*** 1.240*** 1.266*** 1.246*** 1.249*** 1.252** 1.322** 1.054* 
 (0.230) (0.226) (0.229) (0.144) (0.156) (0.162) (0.474) (0.533) (0.590) 
Exports of major conventional weaponsa 0.136*** 0.135*** 0.133*** 0.069*** 0.090*** 0.112*** 0.019 0.097 0.054 
 (0.040) (0.038) (0.040) (0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.067) (0.078) (0.161) 
Imports of major conventional weaponsa 0.004 0.001 -0.004 0.008 0.011 0.004 -0.061** -0.056** -0.043 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026) 
Exports of major conventional weaponsa (t + 1) 0.126*** 0.112*** 0.123*** 0.069*** 0.059*** 0.088*** 0.133 0.129 0.274* 
 (0.039) (0.034) (0.035) (0.021) (0.020) (0.025) (0.122) (0.138) (0.154) 
Exports of major conventional weaponsa (t + 2)  0.039 0.014  0.031 -0.003  0.036 0.006 
  (0.031) (0.026)  (0.022) (0.021)  (0.106) (0.104) 
Exports of major conventional weaponsa (t + 3)   0.055   0.052*   0.007 
   (0.044)   (0.028)   (0.173) 
Company Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 616 572 528 1,238 1,061 911 170 125 94 
Companies (for columns (7) - (9): Subsidiaries) 44 44 44 162 142 128 44 31 21 
R2 Overall 0.108 0.109 0.107 0.047 0.045 0.051 0.455 0.485 0.462 
R2 Within 0.239 0.272 0.305 0.259 0.274 0.303 0.173 0.201 0.209 
R2 Between 0.109 0.110 0.108 0.058 0.029 0.044 0.316 0.417 0.372 
          
First differences model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Balanced 
Company  
Balanced 
Company  
Balanced 
Company  
Unbalanced 
Company  
Unbalanced 
Company  
Unbalanced 
Company  
Unbalanced 
Subsidiary  
Unbalanced 
Subsidiary  
Unbalanced 
Subsidiary  
Sales of arms and military servicesa Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel 
          
National defense spendinga 1.045*** 1.043*** 1.016*** 1.224*** 1.248*** 1.164*** 1.346** 1.538* 1.278 
 (0.159) (0.161) (0.159) (0.131) (0.137) (0.134) (0.574) (0.758) (0.762) 
Exports of major conventional weaponsa 0.069*** 0.071*** 0.089*** 0.035** 0.034** 0.058*** 0.026 0.034 0.089 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.052) (0.064) (0.123) 
Imports of major conventional weaponsa 0.007 0.004 -0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.039* -0.035* -0.027 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023) 
Exports of major conventional weaponsa (t + 1) 0.063*** 0.070*** 0.088*** 0.032** 0.043*** 0.058*** 0.123 0.137 0.278* 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.023) (0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.081) (0.118) (0.133) 
Exports of major conventional weaponsa (t + 2)  0.009 0.025  0.026 0.025  0.028 0.119 
  (0.015) (0.020)  (0.017) (0.016)  (0.050) (0.088) 
Exports of major conventional weaponsa (t + 3)   0.034*   0.047***   0.180 
   (0.019)   (0.016)   (0.121) 
Observations 572 528 484 1,061 911 779 125 94 73 
Companies (for columns (7) - (9): Subsidiaries) 44 44 44 142 128 111 31 21 17 
R2 0.144 0.152 0.161 0.128 0.148 0.155 0.111 0.131 0.164 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. All regressions apply standard errors clustered at the country level. a denotes variables 
which are expressed in their natural logarithms. 
1
2
8
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TABLE A4.6: ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE EQUIPMENT SPENDING OF NATO COUNTRIES 
Fixed effects model (1) (2) (3) 
 Balanced Company  Unbalanced Company  Unbalanced Subsidiary  
Sales of arms and military servicesa Panel Panel Panel 
    
Equipment spendinga 0.380*** 0.413*** 0.180 
 (0.111) (0.084) (0.284) 
Exports of major conventional weaponsa 0.220*** 0.174*** 0.078 
 (0.050) (0.037) (0.099) 
Imports of major conventional weaponsa 0.042** 0.041*** -0.000 
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.024) 
    
Company Fixed Effects yes yes yes 
Observations 585 1,162 197 
Companies (for column (3): Subsidiaries) 39 139 57 
R2 Overall 0.043 0.013 0.398 
R2 Within 0.155 0.127 0.018 
R2 Between 0.041 0.008 0.353 
    
First differences model (1) (2) (3) 
 Balanced Company  Unbalanced Company  Unbalanced Subsidiary  
Sales of arms and military servicesa Panel Panel Panel 
    
Equipment spendinga 0.094** 0.093* -0.098 
 (0.038) (0.051) (0.162) 
Exports of major conventional weaponsa 0.057*** 0.060*** -0.023 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.055) 
Imports of major conventional weaponsa 0.014 0.010 -0.023 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.015) 
    
Observations 546 1,006 138 
Companies (for column (3): Subsidiaries) 39 124 36 
R2 0.030 0.018 0.016 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. All regressions 
apply standard errors clustered at the country level. a denotes variables which are expressed in their natural logarithms.  
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TABLE A4.7: ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE EXPORTS OF NEW AND USED BUT MODERNIZED 
MAJOR CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS 
Fixed effects model (1) (2) (3) 
 Balanced Company  Unbalanced Company  Unbalanced Subsidiary  
Sales of arms and military servicesa Panel Panel Panel 
    
National defense spendinga 1.064*** 1.194*** 0.913** 
 (0.232) (0.137) (0.416) 
    
Exports of new and modernized major  0.201*** 0.100*** -0.011 
conventional weaponsa (0.048) (0.026) (0.066) 
    
Imports of major conventional weaponsa 0.019 0.018 -0.035* 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.018) 
    
Company Fixed Effects yes yes yes 
Observations 660 1,453 252 
Companies (for column (3): Subsidiaries) 44 191 74 
R2 Overall 0.107 0.045 0.448 
R2 Within 0.215 0.239 0.094 
R2 Between 0.109 0.056 0.391 
    
First differences model (1) (2) (3) 
 Balanced Company  Unbalanced Company  Unbalanced Subsidiary  
Sales of arms and military servicesa Panel Panel Panel 
    
National defense spendinga 0.976*** 1.231*** 1.071** 
 (0.154) (0.123) (0.491) 
    
Exports of new and modernized major  0.048*** 0.027*** -0.038 
conventional weaponsa (0.014) (0.010) (0.049) 
    
Imports of major conventional weaponsa 0.008 0.002 -0.029* 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.015) 
    
Observations 616 1,232 170 
Companies (for column (3): Subsidiaries) 44 162 44 
R2 0.116 0.118 0.063 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. All regressions 
apply standard errors clustered at the country level. a denotes variables which are expressed in their natural logarithms.  
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5. Political Stability and Economic Prosperity: Are 
Coups Bad for Growth? 
 
 
 
This chapter is joint work with Klaus Gründler. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract* 
We examine how political instability influences economic growth. We use a novel dataset on 
coups d’état provided by Bjørnskov and Rode (2019) to model political instability (180 
countries, 1950-2017). Usage of coups helps to overcome identification problems in the study 
of the instability-growth nexus, as coups are difficult to anticipate. We employ panel difference-
in-differences and dynamic panel data models and find that coups depress economic growth by 
about 2-3 percentage points. To tackle endogeneity, we follow three paths. First, we document 
and discuss case studies using synthetic control methods. Second, we use spatial patterns to 
construct instrumental variables. Third, we geocode the Bjørnskov and Rode (2019) database 
and exploit the geospatial dimension of coup activity based on about 2,660 sub-national regions. 
We also examine the effect of coups on household level outcomes using micro data for about 
250,000 households in 85 countries. The results show that coups increase unemployment and 
have negative effects on the financial situation, health, and life satisfaction. The effects are 
stronger for women and for poorer households.
 
* We thank Christian Bjørnskov, Raphaël Franck, Clemens Fuest, Anselm Hager, Andreas Peichl, Niklas Potrafke, 
and Uwe Sunde for valuable comments and discussions. We also thank the participants of the 4th International 
Conference on the Political Economy of Democracy and Dictatorship (PEDD) as well as various seminar 
participants at the LMU Munich and the ifo Institute. 
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5.1 Introduction 
“In revolutions the occasions may be trifling but great interests are at stake.” 
Aristotle 
Do countries need a stable political environment to prosper? With the political turmoil caused 
by the rise of populist politics and the downfall of established parties in many Western 
countries, the question of how political stability influences economic growth has become 
increasingly popular in both academia and the public discourse. This discussion is fueled by the 
observation that many countries with low political stability scores are among the most fast-
growing economies on the globe, including China (rank 115 in the World Bank’s 2017 political 
stability ranking), Indonesia (135), India (160), and Bangladesh (174).1 First concerns are raised 
about the importance of stability for economic growth and development. In a 2014 World Bank 
column, for example, lead World Bank economist Hussain (2014) asks “can political stability 
hurt economic growth?”.  
In this chapter, we provide strong evidence against this view. Using panel data from 180 
countries and 2,660 sub-national regions, our results show that political instability has negative 
effects on economic growth. We use coups d’états as a source of exogenous variation in political 
instability and find that periods of instability reduce growth by 2-3 percentage points. This 
result is very stable across numerous empirical specifications and occurs both on the country 
level and the sub-national level. We start by examining panel difference-in-differences and 
dynamic panel data models on the country level and discuss our general findings in case studies 
for which we use synthetic control estimations. In the next step, we use spatial variation in coup 
occurrence to estimate a causal effect of political instability on growth. First, we construct 
instrumental variables based on geospatial correlations on the country-level and, second, we 
 
1 Data comes from the World Bank’s “Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism” index, which is 
measured annually and part of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) dataset. The country ranks are taken 
from the most recent version of the WGI at the time this paper is written. 
 133 
exploit a newly compiled georeferenced database on coup activity on the sub-national level. 
The sub-national strategy provides a powerful tool to identify the effect of political instability 
on economic growth because it allows us to estimate the effect of a coup in regions without 
direct coup activity. Thus, we separate the effect of political instability from that of coup-
induced violence. The parameter estimates for each of these models are very similar and support 
our baseline finding of a negative growth effect of 2-3 percentage points. To dig deeper into the 
consequences of political instability for the living conditions of individuals, we use micro data 
for roughly 250,000 individuals and find that instability has devastating effects on the economic 
situation of households. 
Estimating the effect of political instability on growth is afflicted with four key 
challenges. First, the term “political (in)stability” is not clearly defined. The seminal paper of 
Alesina et al. (1996) approximates political instability with the propensity of government 
changes. Other studies use composite measures such as the “Worldwide Governance 
Indicators” (WGI) dataset from the World Bank, which consolidates multiple data series on 
conflict, violence, protests and terrorism into a single index of political instability (Kaufmann 
et al. 2010). Drawing evidence based on such variables is difficult, as they mix several forms 
of government changes and political violence. The growth effect of government changes may 
depend on whether power is transferred regularly or irregularly, and it is unclear whether 
political violence is the cause or the result of political instability. Second, regular government 
changes and lasting periods of political violence are predictable by economic agents. It is 
therefore challenging to identify an effect on growth based on such variables, as economic 
agents account for predictable changes in the political environment in their decision making. 
Third, violence and conflicts have direct negative effects on economic growth, and it is difficult 
to separate these effects from an unstable political environment. Fourth, researchers estimating 
the effect of political instability on growth face an inevitable endogeneity problem, because 
political tensions may have their roots in unfavorable economic conditions. 
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To tackle these challenges, we use a new dataset on coups d’état from Bjørnskov and 
Rode (2019) to measure political instability. The dataset provides the largest and most detailed 
compilation of coups and coup attempts, including 208 countries for the period 1950-2018. We 
follow Powell and Thyne (2011) and define coups as illegal attempts by the military or other 
elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive. By using coups d’états as 
measures for political instability, we focus on a certain aspect of political instability that is 
straightforward to measure and to interpret. This strategy allows us to address important 
problems accompanied by the measurement of political instability. Specifically, the focus on 
coups (i) circumvents the problem of anticipation effects, as coups are extremely difficult to 
predict (Zolberg 1968, Bazzi and Blattman 2014, Gassebner et al. 2016), (ii) avoids problems 
afflicted with the selection and aggregation of country attributes into an index of political 
stability, (iii) enables a clear definition of political (in)stability, which facilitates the 
interpretation of empirical results, and (iv) allows us to distinguish between the effect of 
violence and the effect of instability. 
We use panel difference-in-differences models and dynamic panel data models to 
estimate the effect of coups d’états on economic growth. Although coups are difficult to predict 
with time-varying factors, our analysis shows that the ex ante probability of coups varies 
systematically across countries because of distinct time-invariant geospatial patterns in the 
occurrence of coups. We control for spatial dependency and other time-invariant factors that 
may confound the estimated relationship between coups and growth in a fixed effects model. 
To further alleviate concerns about endogenous selection into coups initiated by unfavorable 
economic conditions, we model pre-coup dynamics in GDP. To tackle the possibility that the 
relationship between coups and growth is confounded by time-varying unobservables, we use 
three strategies. First, we provide case study evidence using synthetic control methods. Second, 
we use the geospatial correlation of coups by constructing jackknifed spatial instruments that 
use coup occurrences in neighboring countries as instruments for domestic coups. Third, we 
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examine the growth effect of coups on a sub-national level, constructing a dataset of coup 
occurrence for 2,660 sub-national units between 1992 and 2012. We analyze each coup listed 
in the Bjørnskov and Rode (2019) database and geocode the coups based on multiple scholarly 
articles, books, and newspaper articles. To separate the effects of political instability from those 
of violence, we use our georeferenced coup dataset and estimate the effect of coups on growth 
for sub-national regions without direct coup involvement. In the last step, we estimate the effect 
of coups on household-level outcomes. We first provide a stylized theoretical model of labor 
supply in which political instability increases uncertainty about future wage payments. The 
model also suggests that labor supply depends on productivity, which can be affected by coups 
via a decrease in health and life satisfaction. We then use data from roughly 250,000 households 
in 85 countries (about 13,000 of which have experienced a coup d’état) to estimate the effect 
of coups on household-level outcomes. 
Our empirical results suggest that coups have drastic consequences for economic 
growth. Our estimates show that coup d’états decrease economic growth by 2-3 percentage 
points. These results are remarkably stable across various estimation techniques and model 
specifications. We examine the robustness of our empirical results, accounting for regime 
transitions in the aftermath of coups, political institutions and their dynamics prior to coups, 
potential confounding factors, and different sample compositions that focus on individual 
continents, countries with higher ex ante probability of coups, and coups experience. In each of 
these models, the effect of coups d’état on economic growth is negative, similar in size, and 
highly statistically significant. The estimated parameters of coups in our sub-national analysis 
are virtually identical to our country-level outcomes, even if we control for the spatial 
distribution of conflict and human capital on the sub-national level. Finally, we find that coups 
have negative effects on the economic situation of households, increasing unemployment and 
decreasing financial capacities of households. The adverse effect on employment is particularly 
pronounced for women and is less prevalent among men. We also find that coups decrease 
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health and life satisfaction. The adverse effects are stronger for poorer households, while richer 
households are less affected by coup activities. We further document that coups depress 
individuals’ expectations about the future and decrease the perceived importance of democracy. 
Contribution to the existing literature: This chapter contributes to the literature examining 
the growth effect of political instability. From a theoretical viewpoint, the direction of this effect 
is not clear-cut. On the one hand, the traditional perspective is that political stability fosters 
investment (Alesina et al. 1996, Alesina and Perotti 1996). On the other hand, the Oi-Hartman-
Abel effect posits that uncertainty increases investment when firms can insure against bad 
outcomes (Bloom 2014, Li et al. 2019). Political instability can also boost growth if the 
incumbent is unable or unwilling to provide property rights, an efficient legal system, or 
growth-increasing economic policies (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000). In a similar vein, long 
regime duration may increase the pervasiveness of interest-group policies and corruption 
(Olson 1982), which is negative for economic growth (e.g. Gründler and Potrafke 2019). 
Empirical evidence on the stability-growth nexus is also undetermined so far. While some 
studies support the pessimistic view of political instability (Barro 1991, Alesina et al. 1996, 
Aisen and Veiga 2013), others find indefinite relationships (Sala-i- Martín 1997, Jong-A-Pin 
2009) or positive effects of instability on growth (Campos and Nugent 2003, Berggren et al. 
2012). A key reason for the inconclusiveness of these studies is that they use different 
definitions and measures of political stability, which mix regular and irregular government 
changes with information on protests, violence, and civil conflict. This chapter also contributes 
to the literature on the relationship between coups d’états and economic growth. There is 
surprisingly little evidence on the political and economic consequences of coups (Lachapelle 
2020). Early studies in the empirical growth literature report negative correlations between 
coups and economic growth (Barro 1991, Levine and Renelt 1992, Alesina et al. 1996). These 
studies have pioneered empirical growth research during the 1990s, but restricted 
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computational capacity has left important econometric concerns unconsidered, and coups 
mainly serve as vehicles for robustness analyses. Using the database of Bjørnskov and Rode 
(2019), our study substantially exceeds the number of included countries and years compared 
with previous studies. Exploiting our georeferenced sub-national regional dataset, we are the 
first to explore the effect of coups on the sub-national level. 
Organization: This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we describe our data, show 
how coups have developed over the past six decades, and present our georeferenced dataset on 
sub-national coups d’état. In Section 5.3, we report the results of our country-level analysis, 
relating coups to economic growth. In Section 5.4, we apply our IV approach and exploit our 
sub-national dataset for causal identification. Section 5.5 examines the consequences of coups 
for household-level outcomes. Section 5.6 summarizes our findings and discusses avenues for 
future research. 
5.2 Data and descriptive evidence 
5.2.1 Data on coups d’états 
We measure coups d’état employing a novel dataset on regime types and regime changes 
compiled by Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The dataset covers all coup attempts from 1950 to 
2018 and indicates whether a coup has been successful or whether it failed. The dataset also 
includes the group which led the coup (e.g. civilian or military), the name of the coup leaders, 
and their military or civilian rank. There have been multiple coups in some of the countries 
included in the dataset, and the dataset covers detailed information also for second or third coup 
attempts. In total, the dataset includes 537 coups or coup attempts that took place in 498 
country-year observations, 34 of which included a second or third coup.2 
 
2 Unless indicated otherwise, we use the term “coup” in the remainder of this article for all coup attempts 
irrespective of whether the coup was successful or whether it failed. 
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FIGURE 5.1: DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF COUPS IN THE WORLD PER YEAR 
A coup is assigned to year t if the coup occurred in the first half of year 𝑡 (i.e. for coups between 
January and June) or in the second half of the previous year t − 1 (i.e. for coups between July 
and December). For our empirical analysis, this temporal assignment of coups defines a time 
window between 6 and 18 months after a coup until changes in per capita GDP become 
effective. This coding is important because coups are almost evenly distributed over months. 
Coding on an annual basis from January to December would yield downward biased estimates 
when coups take place at the end of a year.  
A concern may be that failed coups are underreported in the Bjørnskov and Rode (2019) 
dataset because they may attract less public attention. Two arguments speak against this 
concern: first, the number of failed coups (N = 294) in the sample exceeds the number of 
successful coups (N = 243). Second and more importantly, governments which (politically) 
survive a coup attempt have little reason to hide it. Coup attempts can be politically exploited 
to strengthen the own power (e.g. by persecuting opposition members) and allows the head of 
government to stage himself as a strong ruler. 
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We include all countries in our sample for which data on GDP per capita and coups is 
available. Our panel consists of 180 countries and covers the period 1950 to 2017, which results 
in more than 9,000 country-year observations, 432 of which saw coups or coup attempts (402 
include a single coup, 27 include two coups, and 3 include three coups). The success rate of 
coups in our sample is 46%. 102 of the countries in the sample experienced at least one coup, 
78 did not experience any coup since 1950. Table A5.1 in the Appendix provides detailed 
information on data availability and coup occurrence for all countries in our sample.  
 
FIGURE 5.2: DEVELOPMENT OF COUPS D’ÉTAT ACROSS CONTINENTS 
Figure 5.1 shows the total number of coups per year that occurred between 1950 and 2018. The 
numbers reveal distinct temporal patterns in coup occurrence. There have been roughly 5 coups 
per year during the 1950s and the early 1960s, but coup activity rose considerably during the 
1960s and the 1970s, reaching its peak in 1976 with a total of 19 coups. With a brief interruption 
in the early 1990s, the number of coups declined since the early 1980s and reached its all-time 
low in the post-2010 period. Figure 5.2 shows differences in coup occurrence across continents. 
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With an average of 3.39 coups per year, coup activity is strongest in Africa, followed by 
America (1.81) and Asia (1.42). In contrast, coups are rare events in Europe (0.21 per year), 
and almost all coups have occurred between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s. Consistent with 
the trend observable for all countries, coup activity has substantially declined in Africa and 
America during the past three decades. The decline is, however, less pronounced in Asia. 
5.2.2 The geospatial dimension of coups 
While there are some themes common to almost all coups and coup attempts, each coup has his 
own history. To establish a more complete picture of this history and the heterogeneity of coups, 
we analyze each coup of the Bjørnskov and Rode (2019) database and geocode the coups based 
on multiple sources that provide information about the regions in which the coups took place, 
including many books, scholarly articles, and newspaper articles.  
Figure 5.3 shows the geographic pattern of coups and coup attempts based on our 
geocoded data for the successful coups in Pakistan 1999 and the Central African Republic in 
2003, as well as the coup attempts in Venezuela 1992 and in Turkey 2016. The countries are 
representative for some distinct differences in the geospatial dimension of coups in our dataset.  
First, the 1999 Pakistan coup d’état was a military takeover initiated by General Pervez 
Musharraf, which unseated the publicly elected civilian government of Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif. The coup was relatively bloodless and took place only in the Prime Minister’s 
Secretariat in Islamabad (Hossain 2000). In a similar vein, General François Bozizé marched 
on the Central African Republic’s capital Bagui in March 2003 while then President Ange-Félix 
Patassé (after surviving seven previous coup attempts) stayed in Niger for a regional 
conference. Bozizé captured the presidential palace and the international airport, with little 
resistance from government troops and CEMAC peacekeepers, which allowed Bozizé to 
suspend the constitution and to seize power (The Economist 2003). Both the 1999 Pakistan 
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coup and the 2003 Central African Republic coup are exemplary for military takeovers that take 
place in the capital.  
 
FIGURE 5.3: SPATIAL DIMENSION OF COUPS 
 
Notes: The figure shows coups in Pakistan 1999, the Central African Republic 2003, as well as coup attempts in Venezuela 1992 and Turkey 
2016. Regions in dark gray mark sub-national entities with direct coup involvement, regions in light gray mark sub-national units without 
direct coup involvement. Data is a georeferenced version of the Bjørnskov and Rode (2019) dataset. 
In contrast to these successful and relatively non-violent coups, Venezuela saw two violent and 
unsuccessful coup attempts in 1992, which involved several regions in the country. The 1992 
Venezuelan coups took place in February and November and were attempts to seize control by 
the Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement-200. The first attempt was led by Hugo Chávez, the 
second attempt was directed by a group of young military officers while Chávez was in prison. 
Both attempts were directed against President Carlos Andrés Pérez and demanded about 300 
casualties and 95 injuries. In the February 1992 coup, Chávez failed to take Caracas, whereas 
other rebel forces took control of Valencia, Maracaibo, and Maracay. In the November coup 
attempt, rebelling air force officers were able to take over a state-run TV station in Caracas, 
broadcasting a video that was filmed in prison and in which Chávez called for a popular 
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uprising. Before the rebellion was crushed, the putschists were able to gain control over several 
military bases in the country.  
Finally, the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey was carried out by a faction within the Turkish 
Armed Forces, which attempted to seize control in many key regions, including Ankara, 
Istanbul, Marmaris, Malatya, and Kars. The coup had devastating consequences: during violent 
clashes, over 300 people were killed and more than 2,000 were injured. After the government 
defeated the rebellion, more than 40,000 people were detained, including soldiers, judges, and 
teachers. Another 75,000 people were arrested and over 160,000 were fired from their job on 
accusation of connections to Fethullah Gülen, the alleged coup leader. Gülen, however, denied 
being behind the attempt and accused President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of a self-coup 
(“autogolpe”) conducted to cement his political power. The coups in Pakistan, the Central 
African Republic, Venezuela and Turkey show that there are substantial differences in coup 
attempts with regard to the geographical reach, the degree of violence, and the political 
consequences. Common to these coups is that they decrease political stability. 
5.2.3 Data on economic development and growth 
Data on GDP per capita is taken from Penn World Table (PWT) version 9.1, which was released 
in April 2019 (Feenstra et al. 2015). Version 9.1 covers data on prices, output, and productivity 
for 182 countries between 1950 and 2017. The PWT is often considered the “gold standard” in 
providing harmonized cross-country measures of GDP. As our main outcome variable, we use 
the log of per capita GDP, measured in constant (2011) US dollars. To assess the consistency 
of our results, we use GDP data from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database of the 
World Bank (2019) in our robustness tests. Summary statistics for growth-related variables, 
coup-related variables and control variables (which are applied in the robustness tests) are 
shown in Table A5.2 in the Appendix. 
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FIGURE 5.4: COUP OCCURRENCE AND MEAN GROWTH RATES IN THE SAMPLE 
 
Notes: The figure shows growth rates for country-years observations with and without coups for the whole sample of country-years (left panel) 
and the sample of countries that have experienced at least one coup (right panel). 
5.2.4 Descriptive evidence on coups and growth 
Figure 5.4 shows the unconditional correlation between real per capita GDP growth and the 
occurrence of coups. The figure shows correlations based on (i) our full sample of country-year 
observations and (ii) a sample that only considers the 102 countries that experienced at least 
one coup between 1950 and 2017. We might expect that the second group of countries is 
politically more unstable in general and hence features lower per capita growth rates than 
countries without coup activity. The figure does not point to substantial differences between 
the full sample and the sample of countries with at least one coup. For both samples, however, 
the figure reveals striking differences in growth rates between country-year observations with 
and without coups. In the full sample, the average growth rate for country-year observations 
without coups is 2.3%, but it is –0.4% in years when a coup took place. When focusing on 
countries that experienced at least one coup, the average growth rate for country-years without 
coups is 2.0% compared to –0.4% in years during which a coup took place. The differences are 
even more remarkable when we restrict the sample to the post-1990s period, the period during 
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which coups became less frequent. In this case, the average growth rate is 2.1% for country-
years without coups and –1.0% for those in which a coup occurred (not illustrated). 
5.2.5 Can coups be anticipated? 
Figure 5.2 shows that the probability of coup occurrence exhibits distinct spatial patterns. An 
important conclusion is that time-invariant factors influence the ex ante probability of coups. 
Much less clear, however, is whether coups can systematically be predicted by time-varying 
factors. There is a large literature studying the determinants of coups, both theoretically and 
empirically (for an overview, see Singh 2014). This literature quarrels over the question of 
whether coups can be anticipated or predominantly contain random elements. A prominent 
argument is that coups occur more often in times when the cost of coups are low (see, e.g., Aidt 
and Albornoz 2011). For a given cost of coups, however, innate personal characteristics of 
potential coup leaders (such as their risk aversion, charisma, or ambition) can tip the balance to 
execute a coup or not (Collier and Hoeffler 2007). In a similar vein, studies analyzing the micro-
dynamics of coups argue that elites face a daunting coordination problem when contemplating 
a coup d’état (Casper and Tyson 2014), and many officers in military coups only want to join 
a coup if others join as well (Little 2017). Ultimately, the decision to eventually execute a coup 
may feature an important element of chance. Summarizing the literature on the determinants of 
coups d’état, Lachapelle (2020) concludes that “although coups have been extensively studied, 
current scholarship lacks a robust model of the determinants of military coups”.  
The reason for why there is no conclusive theory of coup occurrence may either be that 
coup attempts are not systematically caused by time-varying factors, or that these factors have 
not yet been identified. Using an extreme bounds analysis based on more than three million 
regressions, Gassebner et al. (2016) demonstrate that most of the proposed variables are 
unsuccessful in describing the occurrence of coup attempts. Their results show that from 66 
variables proposed in the empirical literature, unfavorable economic conditions, previous coups  
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FIGURE 5.5: TIMING OF COUPS AND PRE-COUP LEVELS OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS. 
 
Notes: The figure shows a scatter plot that relates the timing of coup occurrence to the level of real per capita GDP (in log terms, upper graph) 
and the growth rate of real per capita GDP (lower graph). The correlations are 0.0008 for GDP levels and –0.076 for growth rates. 
experiences, and other forms of political violence are the only factors that are correlated with 
coup attempts. Other studies confirm that coups are difficult to predict and question the 
conventional wisdom that per capita income is an important source of coup occurrence. Powell 
(2012) and Svolik (2013) show that coup attempts and incomes per capita are not statistically 
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significantly correlated.3 Supporting evidence comes from the study of Bazzi and Blattman 
(2014), who cast doubt on the effect of economic shocks on conflict and coups d’états. These 
recent results are consistent with the classical perspective that coups are random phenomena 
that cannot be systematically explained (Zolberg 1968, Decalo 1976).  
Figure 5.5 provides a graphical analysis of the correlation between pre-coup economic 
conditions and coup attempts. The figure relates the year in which coups took place to per capita 
GDP (upper graph) and its growth rate (lower graph) prior to the coup attempts. This analysis 
suggests that there is no systematical pattern between coup occurrence and the level of per 
capita GDP or its rate of change prior to coups. In both cases, the correlation is weak (0.001 for 
levels and –0.076 for growth rates). Also, we do not observe changes in the relationship between 
economic conditions and coup occurrence over time. 
5.3 Country-level results 
5.3.1 Panel difference-in-differences model 
Our first approach to estimate the effect of coups on economic development is a panel 
difference-in-differences model. Our specification follows a standard set-up (see, e.g., Beck et 
al. 2010) 
 
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿Coup𝑖𝑡 + 𝑪𝑖𝜸 + 𝑻𝑡𝝀 + 𝑖𝑡,                                               (1) 
 
where the dependent variable Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the growth rate of real per capita GDP of country 𝑖 at time 
𝑡. To eliminate cross-country differences in the propensity of coups occurrence, equation (1) 
includes country fixed effects, implemented by a full set of country dummies 𝑪𝑖. The country 
fixed effects account for any cross-country heterogeneity in time-invariant characteristics that 
 
3 Likewise, in the study of Gassebner et al. (2016), neither the pre-coup level of per capita GDP nor the growth 
rate passes the critical CDF threshold for robustness in extreme bounds analyses proposed by Sturm and De Haan 
(2005). 
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may influence the probability of coups, such as institutions, natural resources, and cultural or 
ethnic factors (see Figure 5.2). Fixed effects also eliminate cross-country differences in climatic 
factors (Masters and McMillan 2001) and natural resources (Rodríguez and Sachs 1999), which 
have been shown to influence political instability. We also include a vector of year fixed effects 
𝑻𝑡 to absorb cross-national shocks and trends in coup activity (see Figure 5.1). Our variable of 
interest Coupit is one if a coup has occurred in a given country-year, and zero otherwise. 
Table 5.1 reports variations of the difference-in-differences model of equation (1). 
Column (1) shows the results of a reduced specification without country or year fixed effects, 
columns (2) and (3) gradually introduce country and year fixed effects. Column (4) presents 
results of the standard difference-in-differences specification described in equation (1). Each of 
these models suggests a negative effect of coup activity on economic growth that is very robust 
across specifications. The genuine difference-in-differences model in column (4) shows that 
compared with periods without coup activity, the growth rate of real per capita GDP declines 
by about 2.2 percentage points when a coup takes place. The effect is statistically significant at 
the 1% level. Economically, the negative effect of coups is sizeable: the average growth rate of 
real per capita GDP for observations without any coup in our sample is 2.3%. This implies that, 
on average, a coup almost offsets economic growth. 
TABLE 5.1: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—BASELINE RESULTS, PANEL DIFFERENCE-
IN-DIFFERENCES MODEL 
GDP per capita growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
Coupit -0.027*** -0.022*** -0.026*** -0.022*** -0.021***  
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)  
Single coupit      -0.021*** 
      (0.003) 
Multiple coupsit     -0.003 -0.024 
     (0.023) (0.023) 
       
Country Fixed Effects no yes no yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects no no yes yes yes yes 
Observations 9,709 9,709 9,709 9,709 9,709 9,709 
Countries 180 180 180 180 180 180 
R2 0.008 0.059 0.058 0.109 0.109 0.109 
Notes: The table reports the results of panel difference-in-differences estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 
1). Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. Per capita GDP growth is measured in 2011 US 
dollars, data on coups d’état is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Coup” denotes whether a coup has taken place at a given year, 
“Single Coup” only considers country-year observations with one coup in a given year, and “Multiple Coups” considers country-year 
observations with multiple coups in a given year. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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Column (5) estimates whether there is an additional effect of a second or third coup in the event 
of multiple coups in one year. There is virtually no change in the effect of our measure of coups 
occurrence, which remains negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient 
estimate for a second or third coup (Multiple Coupsit) also has a negative sign, but the parameter 
estimate is far from statistical significance (p = 0.891). Column (6) compares the effect of 
multiple coups with the effect of a single coup. i.e. country-year observations with no more 
than one coup. The results corroborate the outcomes of column (5). Taken together, columns 
(5) and (6) indicate that the adverse effect of political instability on economic growth fully 
materializes with a single coup or the first of multiple coups in a given year. The observation 
that further coups do not seem to matter for economic growth suggests that a first of multiple 
coups in a given year entails political instability to an extent which subsequent coups cannot 
increase further. We interpret this result as a sign that the estimated parameter for Coupit reflects 
the effect of political instability after a coup, rather than capturing other factors—such as 
violence and conflict—that may directly accompany coups. 
Our panel difference-in-differences model rests on the identifying assumption that the 
timing of coups is unaffected by economic development prior to the coup. This is a strong 
assumption, but it is not implausible. First, the recent literature has cast doubt on the 
conventional wisdom that economic conditions trigger coup d’états and political violence 
(Bazzi and Blattman 2014, Svolik 2013, Powell 2012). Second, Figure 5.2 shows distinct 
geospatial correlation of coups, suggesting that the propensity is influenced by more 
fundamental long-term roots rather than by short-term fluctuations in economic growth. Third, 
Figure 5.5 provides a graphical analysis of our key identifying assumption. The figure suggests 
that neither the level nor the growth rate of GDP prior to coup attempts can predict the 
occurrence of coups. 
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5.3.2 Dynamic panel data model 
To further alleviate concerns about endogenous treatment effects of coups and to account for a 
potential pre-treatment correlation between economic development and coup occurrence, our 
second empirical strategy augments equation (1) by pre-coup GDP dynamics (see, e.g., 
Acemoglu et al. 2019) 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗  𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
+  𝜇 Coup𝑖𝑡 +  𝑖 + 𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡.                                      (2) 
 
The dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the log of real per capita GDP in country 𝑖 in year t. The 
specification includes four lags of GDP per capita prior to the period in which a coup takes 
place. We include four lags of GDP for two reasons: first, the standard assumption of linear 
dynamic panel models requires that the error term 𝑖𝑡 is serially uncorrelated and that coups and 
past levels of GDP are orthogonal to current and future shocks to GDP (sequential exogeneity): 
 
𝐸( 𝑖𝑡|𝑦𝑖𝑡−1, … , 𝑦𝑖𝑡0, Coup𝑖𝑡, … , Coup𝑖𝑡0 , 𝑖 , 𝑡) = 0, 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇.              (3) 
 
This assumption is less demanding than strict exogeneity, under which the parameter 𝜇 in 
equation (2) would be identified, but which is always violated when (2) contains lagged 
variables. To fulfill sequential exogeneity, it is required to include a sufficiently long pre-coup 
time period to account for GDP dynamics that may influence the probability of coup 
occurrence. 
Second, another important assumption of the dynamic panel data model is that 
conditional on fixed effects, GDP and coups follow stationary processes. This assumption 
ensures consistent parameter estimates and well-behaved limit distributions. Hamilton (2018) 
shows that the inclusion of four lags of the dependent variable creates stationary series with 
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very high probability.4 When we include four lags of the log value of GDP per capita, we can 
directly compare the coefficient size of the parameter estimates with that of our panel 
difference-in-differences model (equation 1). Under the assumptions of sequential exogeneity 
and stationarity, we estimate equation (2) with the standard within-group estimator.  
TABLE 5.2: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—BASELINE RESULTS, FULL DYNAMIC 
PANEL DATA MODEL 
Logarithm of GDP per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
Coupit -0.039*** -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.030*** -0.031***  
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)  
Single coupit      -0.031*** 
      (0.008) 
Multiple coupsit     0.018 -0.013 
     (0.013) (0.012) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 1) 0.887*** 0.851*** 0.873*** 0.827*** 0.827*** 0.827*** 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 2) 0.148** 0.146** 0.161** 0.155** 0.155** 0.155** 
 (0.068) (0.066) (0.068) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 3) 0.003 0.007 -0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 4) -0.044 -0.030 -0.039 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 
 (0.040) (0.043) (0.042) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
       
Country Fixed Effects no yes no yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects no no yes yes yes yes 
Observations 9,169 9,169 9,169 9,169 9,169 9,169 
Countries 180 180 180 180 180 180 
R2 Overall 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 
R2 Within 0.946 0.946 0.948 0.949 0.949 0.949 
R2 Between 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
Notes: The table reports the results of dynamic panel data estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 2). Robust 
standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. The log of per capita GDP is measured in 2011 US dollars, 
data on coups d’état is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Coup” denotes whether a coup has taken place at a given year, “Single 
Coup” only considers country-year observations with one coup in a given year, and “Multiple Coups” considers country-year observations 
with multiple coups in a given year. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
Table 5.2 shows the baseline estimation results. Column (1) shows the results of reduced 
specification without country or year fixed effects, columns (2) and (3) gradually introduce 
country and year fixed effects. Column (4) shows the results of the full dynamic panel data 
model described in equation (2). The first and second lag of the dependent variable is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% and the 5% significance level. The occurrence of at least 
one coup (Coupit) shows a positive effect on GDP per capita which is statistically highly 
significant at the 1% level. According to column (4), a coup thus reduces GDP per capita by 
about 3.0%. This result is in line with the descriptive results shown in Figure 5.4. Given that 
 
4 The series is stationary in case that the fourth differences of GDP are stationary, an assumption which is very 
likely to be fulfilled. 
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the average growth rate of GDP per capita in our sample for observations without any coup is 
2.3%, an effect of 3.0% reflects a high economic significance. Column (5) estimates whether 
there is an additional effect of a second or third coup in the event of multiple coups in one year. 
The variable for a second or third coup (Multiple Coupsit) does, however, not turn out to be 
statistically significant. Column (6) shows the estimation results for single coups (Single 
Coupit), i.e. country-year observations with not more than one coup, and multiple coups. The 
result for single coups is identical to the result for at least one coup while the effect of multiple 
coups does not turn out to be statistically significant. The results thus indicate that the adverse 
effect of political instability on economic growth fully materializes with a single coup or the 
first of multiple coups in a given year. Further coups do not seem to matter for economic growth 
after a first coup has occurred. 
5.3.3 Event-study analysis 
Our results rest on the assumption that there are no systematic differential trends in GDP of 
countries with and without coups d’état. To assess the plausibility of this assumption, we 
examine the dynamics between coups and economic growth by using a flexible event study. 
The flexible event study illustrates the effect of a coup in years before and years after the coup. 
Results for the pre-coup years thus allow to infer whether the common trends assumption holds, 
while results for the post-coup years show how persistent the growth effect of a coup is. The 
event study is flexible in the sense that all countries which experienced a coup can be included 
irrespective of the year in which the coup occurred. We extend our panel difference-in-
differences model and our full dynamic panel data model by estimating year-specific dummy 
variables for years before and after a coup. The sample for the flexible event study is, however, 
restricted to single coups (denoted Single Coup), i.e. each event window includes one coup—
not a second or third coup in the same year and no other single coups or multiple coups in the 
years around the event. Additional coups, either in the same year or in other years of the event 
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window, would bias the estimation results. The empirical models for the flexible event study 
are 
Δ𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛿𝑇 (Single Coup)𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑇=𝑡+3
𝑇=𝑡−4
+ 𝑪𝑖𝜸 + 𝑻𝑡𝝀 + 𝑖𝑡,                               (4) 
 
y𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗y𝑖𝑡−𝑗
𝑗=4
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑇 (Single Coup)𝑖𝑡
𝑇 +  𝑖 + 𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡
𝑇=𝑡+3
𝑇=𝑡−4
.                       (5) 
 
Bjørnskov and Rode (2019) code the year of a coup depending on the month in which the coup 
occurred (see Section 5.2.1), and the year of a coup is either described by year 𝑡 or by year 𝑡 −
1. Hence, we chose 𝑡 − 2 as the reference year for this event study. The remaining 𝑇 years 
describe years prior to and after the coup (𝑇 =  [𝑡 − 4;  𝑡 + 3]). The coefficients 𝛿𝑇 thus 
estimate the effect of a coup on GDP per capita from 𝑡 − 4 years before the coup to 𝑡 + 3 years 
after the coup. The remaining coefficients in equations (4) and (5) are identical to equations (1) 
and (2). We chose an event window of eight years to include a sufficiently large number of 
countries in the sample (𝑁 = 80), but the results are not sensitive to changes in the window 
size. 
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 illustrate the event study results following equations (4) and (5) (see 
Tables A5.3 and A5.4 in the Appendix for the numeric estimation results). Coefficient estimates 
for both event study models are not statistically significant at the 5% level for years prior to a 
coup, suggesting that the common trends assumption is fulfilled. In the year of the treatment, 
the parameter estimates are negative and statistically significant, both in year 𝑡 − 1 (i.e. the year 
of a coup in case the coup occurred between July and December) and in year 𝑡 (i.e. the year of 
a coup in case the coup occurred between January and June). In the panel difference-in-
differences model, the effects are statistically significant at the 1% level and amount to a 
reduction in growth rates by, respectively, 2.0 and 3.1 percentage points. The results are similar  
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FIGURE 5.6: EVENT STUDY RESULTS FOR THE OCCURRENCE OF A SINGLE COUP, 
PANEL DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES MODEL (RESULTS IN GROWTH RATES) 
 
 
FIGURE 5.7: EVENT STUDY RESULTS FOR THE OCCURRENCE OF A SINGLE COUP, 
FULL DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODEL 
 
Notes: Bjørnskov and Rode (2019) assign a coup to year t if the coup either occurred in the first half of year t or in the second half of the 
previous year t − 1. 
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for the dynamic panel data model. Given the coding rule of the coup variable, the negative 
coefficients for year 𝑡 − 1 and year 𝑡 are consistent with our baseline estimates.  
The estimated parameters are not statistically significant in years after the treatment, 
indicating that coups directly influence growth rates for a maximum of two periods. The event 
study does not reveal a catch-up effect in years after the coup. This suggests that treated 
countries grow at rates similar to those of untreated countries two years after a coup, but they 
do not compensate for the loss during the coup period. The absence of a catch-up effect suggests 
that the adverse effect of a coup can have long-lasting economic consequences. 
5.3.4 Robustness tests 
The validity of our estimates depends on some important assumptions underlying our empirical 
model. In this section, we investigate threats to the validity of our results caused by potential 
violations of these assumptions. 
First, we examine the robustness of our results to changes in the control group. In our 
baseline models, we exploit all available information in our dataset to arrive at the broadest 
possible sample of coups d’état and economic growth. A concern may be, however, that the 
control group is not accurately specified, as (i) the ex ante probability of coups differs between 
the group of countries with and without coups because of systematic differences in time-
invariant factors and (ii) these factors may be correlated with economic growth, i.e. countries 
that experienced coups in their younger economic history may have lower growth rates in 
general. Our baseline model includes a full set of country dummy variables to account for these 
concerns. Also, Figure 5.4 suggests that the differences in growth rates between countries with 
and without coup experience in the sample are small. To further tackle the possibility that the 
results are driven by an inadequate control group, we re-estimate our baseline model using only 
country-year observations from countries that experienced at least one coup (see Tables A5.5 
and A5.6 in the Appendix). This adjustment reduces the number of countries from 180 to 102 
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and the number of observations from 9,709 to 5,854. The parameter estimates in this reduced 
model are practically identical to the full sample. In the difference-in-differences model, a coup 
reduces GDP by 2.1 percentage points (compared to 2.2 percentage points in the baseline 
model). 
Second, we assess the stability of our results when we adjust the structure of our dataset. 
In Tables A5.7 and A5.8 in the Appendix, we alter the time dimension of our sample and re-
estimate our model using non-overlapping five-year averages. Doing so has little effect on our 
results. In our preferred specification, a coup is assigned to year 𝑡 if it occurred in the first half 
of year 𝑡 (i.e. for coups between January and June) or in the second half of the previous year 
𝑡 −  1 (i.e. for coups between July and December). This coding scheme is important to ensure 
that the coup effect can materialize in the data, but a concern may be that this coding results in 
a temporal bias. In Tables A5.9 and A5.10 in the Appendix, we test for an alternative coding of 
coup occurrence where we re-code coups to match calendar years. We do not observe any 
changes in the growth effect of coups d’état when we alter the coding scheme. 
Third, we restrict the sample to country-year observations in which a coup took place 
and examine whether multiple coups or successful coups have additional adverse effects on 
GDP per capita. If the negative effect found in our previous estimates reflects political 
instability, then we would expect that neither additional coups nor coup success directly 
influence GDP growth. Tables A5.11 and A5.12 in the Appendix report the results for multiple 
coups in a sample including all observations with coup occurrence. Tables A5.13 and A5.14 in 
the Appendix report the results for successful coups in a sample including single coups only. 
The results show that (i) the negative effect of coups is independent of coup success or failure, 
and (ii) the adverse effect of coups sets in with the first coup, and there is no further detrimental 
effect of a second or third coup. 
Fourth, we use alternative measures of GDP per capita from the World Bank (World 
Bank 2019). The number of countries and country-year observations is slightly reduced when 
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using the World Bank data, but the estimates are similar to our baseline results (see Tables 
A5.15 and A5.16 in the Appendix). 
The occurrence of coups may be driven by exogenous shocks that also affect growth 
directly. As a fifth robustness test, we account for time-varying factors that possibly confound 
our parameter estimates. The selection of potential confounding factors refers to variables that 
pass the critical CDF threshold of 0.95 in the Extreme Bounds Analysis of Gassebner et al. 
(2016). We include dummy variables for interstate and internal war from the “UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflict Dataset” by Gleditsch et al. (2002) (Version 17.2), a score for civil and ethnic 
violence from the “Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflict Regions, 1946-
2016” dataset (Version July 25, 2017), a variable for coup experience which describes the 
cumulative number of coups in a country since 1950, the dichotomous democracy indicator of 
Bjørnskov and Rode (2019), the KOF Globalization Index (see Dreher 2006, Potrafke 2015, 
Gygli et al. 2019), an index for ethnic fractionalization from the “Historical Index of Ethnic 
Fractionalization Dataset” (HIEF) (see Drazanova 2019) and—for the panel difference-in-
differences model—the second lag of GDP per capita to account for the current level of 
economic development. It is worth mentioning that control variables are redundant in a 
correctly specified difference-in-differences model with randomly assigned treatments. In such 
a setup, covariates may even be “bad controls” (see Angrist and Pischke 2009). Control 
variables for internal war or civil violence are likely to be an outcome of a coup which 
influences GDP per capita. Nevertheless, our inferences from the baseline estimation results do 
not change once these control variables are added to the models (see Tables A5.17 and A5.18 
in the Appendix). 
Sixth, we estimate the preferred specifications of our models (including country and 
year fixed effects) separately for geographic regions. Figure 5.2 shows that the number of coups 
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differs between continents, and it is a concern that our baseline results may be driven by 
individual geographic regions. The results, reported in Tables A5.19 and A5.20 in the 
Appendix, show that coups reduced GDP growth regardless of the geographic region. 
Seventh, we examine whether certain characteristics of a coup influence the growth 
effect of coups d’état. We test for the type of coup (i.e. whether the coup was led by the military, 
by civilians, or by members of the royal family) and for biographic information of the coup 
leader, including the age of the coup leader, the civil rank of the coup leader (in case of a civilian 
coup), and the military rank of the coup leader (in case of a military coup). None of these 
variables influences the growth effect of coups. The generality of the coup effect bolsters our 
argument that the adverse growth effect of coups is caused by an environment of political 
instability (see Tables A5.21 and A5.22). 
Eighth, an additional source of bias in our estimates would come from differential trends 
in GDP among countries with coup attempts. To investigate the extent to which differences in 
trends influence our results, we follow Acemoglu et al. (2019) by interacting dummies for the 
quintile of per capita GDP of countries in 1960 with a full set of period effects. The rationale 
for this strategy is to identify the effect of coups by comparing countries that were similarly 
developed at the start of our sample.5 Columns (1)-(2) of Table A5.23 in the Appendix show 
that differences in GDP trends have no impact on the effect of coups on GDP. 
Our dynamic panel data model allows us to remove the potentially confounding 
influence of any pre-coup trend in GDP. To specify the time horizon of pre-coup GDP 
dynamics, we follow Acemoglu et al. (2019) and Hamilton (2018) in using four periods prior 
to coups. In columns (3)-(5) of Table A5.23 in the Appendix, we examine the sensitivity of the 
results to changes in the specification of GDP dynamics. We reduce the time horizon before the 
 
5 To construct the quintiles, we use data from the Maddison database to maximize the number of included 
countries. The Maddison dataset compiles historical GDP data for a large number of countries. 
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treatment to one, two, and three lags, with little effect on inferences. Differences in the lag 
structure also do not influence the size of the estimated parameter: In each case, the Wald test 
does not reject the null of equality of the parameter estimates for coups in the baseline 
specification (four lags) compared to specifications with alternative lag structures presented in 
columns (3)-(5). We also run models with richer GDP dynamic including up to ten lags, with 
no effect on inferences (not reported). 
The within group estimates of our dynamic panel data models have an asymptotic bias 
of order 1/𝑇 (Nickell 1981). This bias is caused by the failure of strict exogeneity and is 
mitigated for large 𝑇. As our sample includes a total of 68 periods, we expect the “Nickell-bias” 
to be small, which motivates usage of the within estimator as our baseline approach. Column 
(6) of Table A5.23 in the Appendix reports the results from a GMM estimation that yields 
consistent estimates of the dynamic panel data model for finite 𝑇. From the sequential-
exogeneity condition, we can derive the following moment condition for the GMM framework 
 
𝐸[( 𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑡−1)(𝑦𝑖𝑠, 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑠+1)′] = 0 ∀𝑠 ≥ 𝑡 − 2,     (6) 
 
which can be employed using the “difference-GMM estimator” (Arellano and Bond 1991). 
Intuitively, the Arellano-Bond estimator accounts for correlations of our coup variable with 
past and current realizations of the error term. The difference-GMM results are very similar to 
those of our baseline dynamic panel data model, which corroborates our expectation that the 
Nickell-bias of our baseline models is small. 
A disadvantage of the difference-GMM estimator is that it is designed for “large 𝑁, 
small 𝑇” settings. For large 𝑇, the number of moment conditions is of order 𝑇2, which can lead 
to instrument proliferation (Roodman 2009) and causes an asymptotic bias of order 1/𝑁. Our 
specification of the difference-GMM estimator uses a weighting matrix proposed by Alvarez 
and Arellano (2003), which delivers consistent estimates even when 𝑇 is large. To address the 
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problem of instrument proliferation more directly, column (7) of Table A5.23 in the Appendix 
shows the results when we estimate our baseline model using the dynamic panel data estimator 
of Han and Phillips (2010). The Han-Phillips estimator imposes no restriction on the number 
of cross-sectional units and the time span other than 𝑁𝑇 ⟶ ∞, and Gaussian asymptotics apply 
irrespective of the composition of 𝑁𝑇. Again, there is virtually no change in the growth effect 
of coups. 
Finally, our baseline models rely on the assumption that the relationship between coups 
and economic growth is linear. The last column in Table A5.23 in the Appendix presents results 
of nonparametric kernel regressions with Li-Racine kernel and bootstrapped standard errors 
following Cattaneo and Jansson (2018). Nonparametric regressions make no assumption on the 
functional form of the relationship between coups and growth.6 The reported effects in column 
(8) are averages of contrasts of factor covariates and are strongly comparable to our parametric 
specifications. 
5.3.5 Coups and political transitions 
Marinov and Goemans (2014) argue that coups are the single most important factor for the 
downfall of democratic governments. Hence, a threat to the validity of our results is that our 
coup variable may capture the effect of transitions to autocracy rather than the coup effect per 
se. In our sample, the majority of coups took place within certain regime types and did not lead 
to political transitions: of the 402 single coup attempts in our sample (185 of which have been 
successful), 45 successful coups led to a transition from democracy to autocracy, 7 successful 
coups led to a transition from autocracy to democracy, and 128 (5) successful coups took place 
in autocracies (democracies) without regime transitions. 
 
6 Our nonparametric estimator takes averages of the local-linear estimates (see Li et al. 2003 and Cattaneo and 
Jansson 2018). 
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To rule out that our results are driven by regime transitions, we estimate the effect of a 
transition towards autocracy or democracy after a coup. Tables A5.24 and A5.25 in the 
Appendix show that our baseline estimates are not driven by regime transitions towards 
autocracy. A coup with a subsequent transition to autocracy is negatively related to growth. The 
correlation is statistically significant in the unconditional model (column 1) but ceases to be 
significant once we control for the general occurrence of a coup (column 2). Consistent with 
our previous results, the growth effect of coups is negative and statistically significant. The 
coup effect also remains unchanged when we control for democracy (column 3) or exclude 
country-year observations with transition to autocracy (column 4). 
We also test for potential effects of transitions towards democracy initiated by coups to 
account for the argument that coup leaders have incentives to democratize in order to establish 
political legitimacy (see, e.g., Thyne and Powell 2016). Consistent with the results for a 
transition to autocracy, there is no direct growth effect from a coup-led transition towards 
democracy, but the negative effect of the coup persists (Tables A5.26 and A5.27 in the 
Appendix). 
In Tables A5.13 and A5.14, we tested whether successful coups, i.e. coups which 
overthrew the incumbent government, have different effects on growth than failed coups. A 
related potential source of bias is that our estimates may capture the effect of a government 
change rather than the stability effect of coups. We account for this concern in Tables A5.28 
and A5.29 in the Appendix, augmenting our baseline models by an interaction term between 
government change and coups d’état.7 The results show that the negative effect of coups is not 
driven by changes in government. The effect of a coup d’état remains negative and statistically 
significant in each model, also when we exclude country-year observations with government 
changes in column (4). The Wald test suggests that the parameter estimates are not significantly 
 
7 Since the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) does not cover years prior to 1975, the sample for this analysis 
is restricted to years from 1975 onwards. 
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different from the baseline outcomes. Consistent with previous studies (see, e.g., Alesina et al. 
1996), government changes exert additional adverse effects on growth on top of the coup effect. 
Overall, the results provide support for our argument that the negative effect of coups 
stems from political instability initiated by coups d’état rather than from regime transitions or 
government changes. 
5.3.6 Coups and political institutions 
A concern may be that the institutional environment of countries and, in particular, institutional 
changes influence the likelihood of a coup d’état. Countries with underdeveloped institutions 
may be more politically unstable and hence more prone to coups. Established institutions may 
increase the hurdles of a coup, while coups are less costly when institutions are underdeveloped. 
In particular, institutional changes may influence the occurrence of coups, as (i) the cost of 
coups is low in times when institutions are vulnerable, which is typically the case when newly 
formed institutional environments are not yet established (Aidt and Albornoz 2011) and (ii) 
institutional changes may have detrimental effects for parts of the elite, increasing incentives 
to conduct a coup to preserve the status quo. A related literature argues that states “are a prize 
that can be seized, especially when the institutions that constrain power are weak” (Bazzi and 
Blattman 2014; see also Besley and Persson 2010, 2011). 
To rule out that the estimated relationship between coups and economic growth is 
confounded by institutional dynamics, we augment our empirical models by the quality of 
political institutions. As we are not interested in regime transitions (which are examined in 
Section 5.3.5), we cannot use dichotomous democracy indicators for our analysis. Instead, we 
use the Continuous Support Vector Machines Democracy Index (CSVMDI) compiled by 
Gründler and Krieger (2016, 2018, 2019), which is based on machine learning algorithms to 
classify the extent of democratization on a continuous scale between 0 and 1. To model 
institutional dynamics prior to coups, we include four lags of the CSVMDI in our baseline 
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models. The results, presented in Tables A5.30 and A5.31 in the Appendix, are very similar to 
our baseline estimates. 
5.3.7 Case study evidence 
Our results so far reflect average growth effects of coups. In the next step, we examine in more 
detail the anatomy of coups d’état by analyzing case studies of specific coups. This analysis is 
motivated by Bazzi and Blattman (2014), who argue that systematic selection of country cases 
is essential to assess robustness of studies that deal with political instability. A demanding 
requirement for the selection of country cases is that there is a sufficiently long pre-treatment 
period that is not interrupted by any coup (usually of ten years or more), along with a post-
treatment period of at least three years without additional coups or coup attempts. This 
requirement leaves us with a handful of coups that can be used to draw case study evidence. 
We carefully examine all of these events. 
Figure 5.8 shows the results of a synthetic control analysis on coups d’état in four 
countries. The figure shows the logarithm of GDP per capita for the treated country and its 
synthetic twin, which consists of a weighted average of up to 69 eligible countries without any 
coup activity. The coup in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1960 took place during the 
Congo Crisis after independence from Belgium and was led by Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, who 
finally became president after a second successful coup attempt in 1965. The coup can be 
interpreted as a symptom of high political instability after the Congo became independent 
(Haskin 2005). The coup in Thailand 1971 was a self-coup by the prime minister to gain support 
for the suppression of communist tendencies. At that time, Thailand experienced peasant revolts 
and student protests that were inspired by its neighbors Laos and Cambodia, which had come 
under communist rule one year earlier (Mezey 1973). The 1979 military coup in South Korea 
led by Major General Chun Doo-Hwan ended the Fourth Republic of Korea. It took Chun 
several months to finally gain control over most government apparatuses, resulting in high 
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political instability (Hyun-Hee et al. 2005). The coup in Cameroon 1984 was an unsuccessful 
attempt by presidential palace guards to unseat President Paul Biya and involved armed fights 
in Cameroon’s capital Yaoundé with several casualties (Randal 1984). 
 
FIGURE 5.8: SYNTHETIC CONTROL ANALYSIS FOR SELECTED COUP EXAMPLES 
 
Notes: The solid line represents the development of per capita GDP (log scale) of the treated country, the dashed line is the counterfactual 
development suggested by the synthetic control group. All countries only feature one coup during the time period used for the synthetic control 
analysis. The donor pool includes countries without coups or coup attempts. Weights: Democratic Republic of Congo: India 32.5%, Nicaragua 
67.5%; Thailand: Botswana 33.5%, Cape Verde 3%, China 25%, Malta 3.2%, Singapore 35.2%; South Korea: Botswana 48.4%, Malta 36%, 
Saudi Arabia 15.6%; Cameroon: Antigua and Barbuda 10.1%, Botswana 76.6%, Cape Verde 13.4%. 
For the majority of coups with a sufficiently large pre- and post-treatment period without further 
coups, we observe that per capita GDP develops unfavorable relative to the synthetic control 
group after the treatment. In some (relatively rare) cases, there are no statistically significant 
differences between the treated country and the control group. An important conclusion that we 
draw based on a detailed analysis of these growth-neutral coups is that there are no systematic 
patterns connecting these coups. Rather, there are specific circumstances that mitigate the 
detrimental growth effects that are unique to each coup d’état. A prominent example is the 
“constitutional coup” in Tunisia 1987, in which the new Prime Minister Zine El Abidine Ben 
Ali made a group of seven doctors sign a medical report, attesting that the aging and sick 
President Habib Bourguiba was mentally incapable. This coup, allegedly backed by Article 57 
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of the Tunisian Constitution, did not affect political stability. Ben Ali continued Bourguibas 
policies, positioning himself as his spiritual successor (see Figure A5.1 in the Appendix).  
To alleviate concerns about strategic selection of the country case studies, Appendix I 
provides synthetic control estimates and accompanying descriptions for additional country 
cases. 
5.4 The geospatial dimension of coups 
5.4.1 IV estimates: Coup contagion hypothesis 
The key identifying assumption of our baseline regressions is that coups are difficult to predict 
with time-varying factors. We now relax this assumption and develop an IV approach that 
accounts for time-varying unobservables that may confound the relationship between coups and 
growth. The descriptive analysis of coups d’états in Section 5.2.1 shows that the ex ante 
probability of coups depends on the geographic region in which a country is located. We control 
for country fixed effects in our baseline model to account for time-invariant geographic 
confounders. In the next step, we exploit the geographical pattern for causal identification.  
The political science literature has intensely studied the geographic patterns of coups. 
The most prominent explanation for the observed spatial dependency is the “coup contagion 
hypothesis”, which was first raised by Li and Thompson (1975) and later re-evaluated by 
numerous scholars. Based on stochastic statistical models, Li and Thompson (1975) find a 
correlation of military coups in a country and the occurrence of coups in neighboring countries. 
The work was the foundation for the discussion of a “coup contagion” phenomenon. Li and 
Thompson (1975) explain the spatial correlation by a behavioral reinforcement process: 
successful coups in one country inspire and encourage military leaders in geographically close 
countries to follow the example. Consistent with our argument that coups are difficult to predict, 
a recent study by Miller et al. (2018) challenges the view of a direct causal spread of coup 
attempts across country borders. However, in line with earlier studies on the coup contagion 
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hypothesis, they also report a strong spatial correlation in coup occurrence. A similar correlation 
can be found in our data. Figure 5.9 shows the total number of coups for each country between 
1950 and 2017, pointing to a strong geospatial pattern in coup occurrence.  
 
FIGURE 5.9: NUMBER OF COUPS PER COUNTRY, 1950-2017 
 
Notes: The numbers are calculated using the Bjørnskov and Rode (2019) dataset. 
We exploit the geographic correlation of coup occurrence to construct an instrumental variable 
for coups. For each country 𝑖, we first define a set 𝔖𝑖 ≡ {𝑖̃: 𝑖̃ ≠ 𝑖, 𝐿?̃? = 𝐿𝑖} of other countries 𝑖̃ 
in which coup occurrence may be correlated with coups attempts in 𝑖. We use the classification 
of the World Bank for the specification of the relevant peer group of countries, which 
consolidates countries that share a common political and economic history into regions 𝐿𝑖. As 
coups are rare events (we observe in about 5% of our country-year observations), we define a 
time-window 𝑡′ = 𝑡 − 𝜏 to be relevant for coup occurrence in 𝑡. Our baseline IV uses 𝜏 = 5. 
Based on 𝔖𝑖, we compute averages for 𝐿𝑖, leaving out 𝑖 to not violate the exclusion restriction 
(“jackknifed” averages) 
𝑍𝑖𝑡 = |𝔖𝑖|
−1 ∑ Coupit′
?̃?∈𝔖𝑖
.                                                        (7) 
 
A similar logic is used to construct instruments in the democracy literature (Acemoglu et al. 
2019, Gründler and Krieger 2016, Madsen et al. 2015). We posit that jackknifed regional 
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averages are even better suited to identify the effect of coups, as (i) coups are more difficult to 
predict than democratization events and (ii) in the majority of cases, coups can unequivocally 
be assigned to a given time period, while it takes several periods to cultivate a democracy, and 
mistiming in the coding of democratization is likely to bias the instrument. 
The corresponding empirical model is identical to the models in equations (1) and (2) 
except that coups are treated as endogenous variables, which yields (panel difference-in-
differences model equivalently) 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗 𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
+  𝜇 Coup𝑖𝑡 +  𝑖 + 𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
(8) 
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝜋𝑗  𝑍𝑖𝑡−𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝜆𝑗  𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
+  𝜓𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡. 
 
The key identifying assumption is that, conditional on GDP dynamics and country and year 
fixed effects, coups in countries 𝑖̃ ∈ 𝔖𝑖 do not influence GDP in 𝑖 via channels other than the 
encouragement of coups in 𝑖 (“exclusion restriction”). This assumption is plausible, but it may 
be violated if coups increase the probability of violent conflict with neighboring countries or 
lead to a decrease in trade. We control for these potential threats to the validity of our IV 
strategy.  
Panel A of Table 5.3 shows the second-stage results of our IV estimates, with first-stage 
results reported in panel B. Columns (1)-(3) show the outcomes for the difference-in-
differences setting and columns (4)-(6) report the results for the dynamic panel data model. For 
both estimation techniques, the first specification (columns 1 and 4) presents estimates without 
country and year fixed effects, the second specification (columns 2 and 5) includes country and 
year fixed effects, and the third specification (columns 3 and 6) adds variables that potentially  
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TABLE 5.3: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATIONS 
Growth rate and logarithm  
of GDP per capita 
 
Panel Diff-in-Diff Model 
 
Dynamic Panel Data Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Panel A: Second-stage results 
       
Coupit -0.059
*** -0.037** -0.037* -0.077*** -0.029* -0.041** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.025) (0.016) (0.020) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 1)    0.884*** 0.827*** 0.834*** 
    (0.074) (0.072)  (0.076)  
Log(GDPpc) (t – 2)    0.149** 0.155** 0.143** 
    (0.068) (0.065) (0.061) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 3)    0.004 0.002 -0.017 
    (0.044) (0.047) (0.038) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 4)    -0.043 -0.029 -0.016 
    (0.040) (0.044) (0.030) 
Importsit   0.001   0.093
*** 
   (0.001)   (0.028) 
Exportsit   -0.000   0.100
*** 
   (0.009)   (0.031) 
Interstate warit   -0.025
**   -0.032** 
   (0.012)   (0.015) 
       
 Panel B: First-stage results 
       
Z (t – 1) 24.214 15.112 14.950 21.276 15.110 14.955 
 (22.269) (17.950) (17.792) (21.125) (17.893) (17.744) 
Z (t – 2) 23.037** 17.137* 17.155* 20.609** 17.029* 17.048* 
 (10.11) (10.155) (10.159) (10.063) (10.224) (10.222) 
Z (t – 3) 8.840 2.746 2.755 6.675 2.776 2.788 
 (7.565) (5.268) (5.631) (6.912) (5.571) (5.577) 
Z (t – 4) 37.100*** 30.206*** 30.233*** 34.770*** 30.113*** 30.143*** 
 (4.555) (4.838) (4.849) (4.590) (4.815) (4.830) 
       
Country Fixed Effects no yes yes no yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects no yes yes no yes yes 
Observations 9,169 9,169 9,169 9,169 9,169 9,169 
Countries 180 180 180 180 180 180 
R2 Overall 0.113 0.050 0.052 0.982 0.981 0.959 
Equality with baseline (Wald) 0.038 0.621 0.437 0.129 0.944 0.583 
Kleibergen-Paap F 42.36 18.77 18.56 34.31 18.54 18.35 
Stock-Yogo (10% rel. bias) 10.27 10.27 10.27 10.27 10.27 10.27 
Hansen J p-val 0.302 0.305 0.320 0.511 0.514 0.767 
SW 𝜒2p-val 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: The table reports the results of panel difference-in-differences models (columns 1-3) and dynamic panel data estimations (columns 4-
6) on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth. Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. 
The log of per capita GDP is measured in 2011 US dollars, data on coups d’état is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The instrumental variable 
captures spatial correlations of coups measured by Equation (7). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, 
respectively. 
violate the exclusion restriction. The exclusion restriction may be violated if coups exert direct 
effects on neighboring countries when they initiated interstate war activity or influence trade 
between states. We account for these effects by controlling for interstate war of 𝑖 as well as for 
exports and imports. In each model, the effect of coups on GDP growth is negative and 
statistically significant. The effect size is somewhat larger than in the baseline results, indicating 
a downward bias in the baseline estimates due to time-variant unobservables. However, once 
we account for country and year fixed effects, the parameter estimates are similar to those of 
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the baseline estimates. Except for column (1), the Wald test cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the IV estimates are statistically equal to the baseline estimates. 
The validity of our IV results depends on the suitability of regional coup activity to 
instrument national coup occurrence. The test statistics reported in Table 5.3 give us confidence 
that our IV strategy is valid: the Kleibergen-Paap test clearly rejects the possibility of weak 
identification, the Sanderson-Windmeijer test and Hansen’s J test provide no sign of 
misspecification due to under- or overidentification. Also, the first-stage results reported in 
panel B show that coup occurrence is significantly correlated with regional coup occurrence 
within our five-year time window. We also test for different lag structures of 𝑍𝑖𝑡, with little 
effect on inferences. 
5.4.2 Effects of coups on the sub-national level 
We next develop a different and complementary approach to tackle endogeneity exploiting sub-
national data. To this end, we construct a new geospatial dataset of coup occurrence. We 
analyze each coup of the Bjørnskov and Rode (2019) database and geocode the coups based on 
multiple books, scholarly articles, and newspaper articles (see Section 5.2.2 for a detailed 
description of the geospatial dimension of coups). We then merge the georeferenced data to 
sub-national income levels computed by Lessmann and Seidel (2017). 
Examining the geospatial dimension of coups allows us to separate the effect of political 
instability from that of violent actions and conflict. We might expect that the negative effect of 
coups may depress growth in the geospatial area where it was initiated. However, a negative 
parameter estimate may be due to (i) the effect of political instability or (ii) the direct adverse 
effect on growth initiated by coup-induced violence and the destruction of infrastructure. The 
geospatial analysis allows us to disentangle these effects. If regions without direct coup 
involvement would be affected by coups that take place in other sub-national entities within the 
same country, this would provide strong evidence for the hypothesis that it is the instability and 
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uncertainty caused by coups that decreases growth rather than the direct effect of violence. This 
argument is a sub-national version of the coup contagion hypothesis exploited in the previous 
section. Across sub-national units, coups are contagious by definition, as sub-national entities 
share a common national government that is attempted to be unseated by a coup. 
The sub-national dataset of Lessmann and Seidel (2017) is computed based on nighttime 
lights collected from satellite data provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA). The data is available for the period between 1992 and 2012. The 
collected data on coups and regional incomes allows us to analyze 2,660 sub-national regions 
in 168 countries (due to territorial changes, there are changes in the total number of sub-national 
units over time). Our georeferenced data on coup occurrence shows that coups often occur in 
the capital, but there are many instances in which coups took place in multiple regions or in 
sub-national units outside the capital. 
The coups in Pakistan, the Central African Republic, Venezuela and Turkey discussed 
in Section 5.2.2 show that there are substantial differences in coup attempts with regard to the 
geographical reach, the degree of violence, and the political consequences. Common to these 
coups is that they reflect political instability. Looking at the geospatial dimension of coups 
allows us to separate this type of instability from direct effects caused by violent actions. We 
follow a two-step approach to examine the geospatial dimension of coups. First, we estimate 
the effect of coups in the region where the coup takes place via (panel difference-in-differences 
model equivalently) 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑟𝑡
reg
= ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑦𝑖𝑟𝑡−𝑗
reg
J
𝑗=1
+ 𝜇 Coup𝑖𝑟𝑡 + 𝑟 + 𝑡 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡,                                 (9) 
 
 170 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑟𝑡
reg
 is the log of real per capita gross regional product (GRP) of sub-national region 𝑟 
of country 𝑖 at time 𝑡, 𝑟 and 𝑡 are regional and year fixed effects, and 𝑖𝑟𝑡 is the idiosyncratic 
error.  
Second, we generate a new variable Coupc
𝑖𝑟𝑡,𝑟≠?̃?
 that assumes a value of 1 (and zero 
otherwise) for region 𝑟 when two criteria are fulfilled: (1) a coup took place in one or more 
regions ?̃? at time 𝑡 in the country to which region 𝑟 belongs, and (2) the coup did not take place 
in region 𝑟 itself, i.e. 𝑟 ≠ ?̃?. The newly constructed variable measures indirect involvement in 
coup activity: regions 𝑟 are not directly affected by violent actions that may have direct effects 
on economic growth. Hence, Coupc
𝑖𝑟𝑡,𝑟≠?̃?
 only captures the effect of political instability rather 
than that of coup-induced violence. We estimate the empirical model (panel difference-in-
differences model equivalently) 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑟𝑡
reg
= ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑦𝑖𝑟𝑡−𝑗
reg
J
𝑗=1
+  Coupc
𝑖𝑟𝑡
+  𝑟 + 𝑡 + 𝑖𝑟𝑡  ∀𝑟 ≠ ?̃?,                      (10) 
 
where we exclude regions ?̃?, i.e. regions in which coups took place, to ensure that the model 
only captures indirect coup involvement.  
The results are presented in Table 5.4. Columns (1) and (2) show the results of the panel 
difference-in-differences setting with (column 1) and without (columns 2) regions with direct 
coup involvement. Columns (3) and (4) use the same specifications for our dynamic panel data 
setting. The results strongly coincide with our baseline results obtained with country-level data. 
In the panel difference-in-differences setting, a coup lowers GDP growth by 2.1 percentage 
points, which is almost identical to the country-level estimate of 2.2 percentage points. The 
parameter estimate is somewhat smaller in the dynamic panel data model, but it is still not 
statistically distinguishable from the country-level estimate (p = 0.150).  
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TABLE 5.4: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—RESULTS ON THE SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL 
Growth rate and logarithm  
of GDP per capita 
 
Panel Diff-in-Diff Model 
 
Dynamic Panel Data Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All regions Coup regions 
excluded 
All regions Coup regions 
excluded 
     
Coupirt -0.021
***  -0.018**  
 (0.007)  (0.008)  
Coupirt,r≠r̃
c   -0.023***  -0.020*** 
  (0.009)  (0.007) 
Log(GRPpc) (t – 1)   0.816*** 0.815*** 
   (0.075) (0.075)  
Log(GRPpc) (t – 2)   0.168** 0.169** 
   (0.074) (0.074) 
Log(GRPpc) (t – 3)   -0.043 -0.042 
   (0.045) (0.045) 
Log(GRPpc) (t – 4)   -0.065 -0.066 
   (0.040) (0.040) 
     
Sub-National Unit Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 51,727 51,655 43,707 43,659 
Sub-National Units 2,660 2,660 2,659 2,659 
R2 Overall 0.297 0.298 0.935 0.935 
F-Statistic 86.66 82.64 833.1 844.3  
Notes: The table reports the results of panel difference-in-differences models (columns 1-2) and dynamic panel data models (columns 3-4) on 
the effect of coups d’état on economic growth at the sub-national level. Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported 
in parentheses. The log of per capita GRP is measured in real terms, data on coups d’état is geocoded by sub-national units using the coups 
listed in Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). Due to restrictions availability of sub-national GRP estimates, the models include the period 1992-2012. 
Sub-national regions are first-level administrative areas (ADM1). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, 
respectively. 
The parameter estimates are unaffected if we identify the effect of political instability by 
restricting the sample to sub-national units without direct coup involvement. If anything, the 
parameter estimates are larger in the models that estimate indirect effects of coups. Taken 
together, the sub-national results allow us to draw two conclusions: (i) The strong similarity 
between the estimation results on the sub-national level and the country level indicates that the 
strong negative correlation found at the national level is not mediated by time-varying 
unobservables at the country level. (ii) The fact that the parameter estimates of the country-
level and the sub-national-level analyses are identical even when we exclude regions with direct 
coup involvement suggests that the country-level estimates are not biased by direct growth 
effects of violent actions that may accompany coups. This finding also provides support for our 
hypothesis that it is political instability that initiates the negative growth effect, rather than 
direct effects of violent actions. This finding is plausible, as many coups in our dataset have 
been relatively unbloody, and we would not expect these events to exert effects as large as our 
estimated parameters.  
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Still, violent conflicts that accompany coups may be stronger on the sub-national level, 
because the spatial distribution of conflicts is asynchronous across countries. Hence, a concern 
may be that our sub-national parameter estimates are confounded by regional conflicts. To 
alleviate these concerns, we re-estimate equations (9) and (10) by including data on sub-national 
conflicts. We construct a conflict dummy variable using the UCDP Georeferenced Event 
Dataset of Sundberg and Melander (2013). The geo-coded data allows us to compute conflict 
measures that coincide with our ADM1 regions. The results, shown in Table A5.32 in the 
Appendix, illustrate that conflict goes in tandem with weak economic growth. The estimate on 
coups is stable in all models and the size of the estimated coefficient is unaffected from the 
inclusion of regional conflict. In particular, the parameter estimate is larger for coups than for 
conflict, suggesting that political instability is the relatively stronger negative correlate of 
development. In Table A5.33 in the Appendix, we provide additional robustness checks on the 
sub-national levels, where we account for cross-regional differences in human capital 
(measured via the georeferenced data provided by Gennaioli et al. 2013). Although restrictions 
in data availability reduce the number of included sub-national units, there is little impact on 
inferences, and the parameter estimates are robust in both their size and significance levels. 
5.5 Household-level results 
5.5.1 Theory 
We now shift the focus from the macro perspective to the micro level and examine how coups 
influence household-level outcomes. Previous studies mainly focus on the microeconomic 
effect of violent civil conflict: Dupas and Robinson (2010) observe a sizable decrease in 
income, expenditure, and food consumption in Kenya in the aftermath of the 2007 presidential 
election, which led to a two month period of civil conflict. In a similar vein, empirical studies 
investigate micro effects of civil conflict in Sierra Leone (Bellows and Miguel 2006), civil war 
in Rwanda (Serneels and Verpoorten 2013), and political violence in Perú (Léon 2012). The 
 173 
underlying argument of these studies is that causes and consequences of civil conflict tend to 
be visible mostly at the micro level (Balcells and Justino 2014), and that violent civil conflict 
may disrupt productive activity (Dupas and Robinson 2010). It is, however, unclear whether 
the effects identified in these studies are driven by violence or by political instability.  
We study the household-level impact of coup d’états to examine the micro effects of 
political instability. Compared to violent civil conflict or war, much less individuals are directly 
affected by a coup d’état. Potential effects of a coup should hence much more reflect the 
influence of political instability than the effect of violence.  
To date, very little is known about the household-level effects of coups, both from a 
theoretical and an empirical perspective. We posit that coups influence household-level 
outcomes by affecting labor markets. On the demand side, the arguments are similar to those 
regarding the micro effect of conflict: labor demand may decrease if firms are hesitant to hire 
employees in times when political instability makes it difficult to anticipate future market 
potentials. Also, unemployment may rise as a consequence of violence that accompanies coups, 
i.e. when infrastructure and production plants are destroyed. On the supply side, the effects are 
less clear-cut. We study labor supply effects of coups d’état based on a simple stylized model 
in the spirit of Keane and Rogerson (2012). Consider a 𝑇-period lived household with 
preferences 
 
∑ 𝛽𝑡
𝑇
[
1
1 − (
1
𝜁
)
𝑐𝑡
1−(
1
𝜁
) 1
1 − (
1
𝛿
)
ℎ𝑡
1+(
1
𝛿
)
],                                        (11) 
 
where 𝑐𝑡 and ℎ𝑡 denote consumption and working hours at age 𝑡,  and 𝛿 are preference 
parameters for consumption and working hours, and 𝛽 is the discount factor. Each individual 
has productivity 𝑡, so that a supply of ℎ𝑡 units of time results in 𝑡ℎ𝑡, which will be rewarded 
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with 𝜔. In steady state, a newly born individual with zero initial wealth faces the maximization 
problem 
∑ 𝛽𝑡
𝑇
𝑐𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽
𝑡
𝑡ℎ𝑡(1 − 𝜌)𝜔
𝑇
,                                               (12) 
 
where (1 − 𝜌) denotes the probability that 𝜔 will be received, and 𝜌 is a risk factor. There may 
be many reasons for why 𝜌 > 0, for instance when firms are insolvent and cannot pay wages. 
In our model, we argue that political instability increases 𝜌. Now consider the effects of a 
change in 𝜌 on working hours ℎ𝑡. Keane and Rogerson (2015) analyze a similar problem based 
on the elasticity of labor supply to changes in the tax and transfer scheme. We can use the same 
logic to derive the first-order condition for ℎ𝑡 
 
log ℎ𝑡 = 𝑎[( − 1) log(𝜔) − log(𝑡) − log ( 𝑐)̅ − 𝛿 log( 0)] + 𝑎 log(1 − 𝜌) + 𝛿 log( 𝑡) , 
(13)  
 
where 𝑐̅ is a constant and 𝑎 = 𝛿/( + 𝛿).8 Equation (13) helps us to arrive at two important 
conclusions. First, labor supply depends on the productivity in 𝑡 relative to the initial 
productivity in 0. This implies that factors which decrease productivity have a negative effect 
on labor supply. Second, labor supply declines for increasing 𝜌. This result indicates that 
individuals decrease their labor supply when the political instability initiated by coups increases 
the risk of defaulting wage payments.  
An important question is whether the effects differ between women and men. We might 
expect that the elasticity is smaller for chief income earners of households, a role which—in 
countries with a high frequency of coups—is mostly occupied by men. 
 
8 See Keane and Rogerson (2012, 2015) for a detailed derivation. 
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5.5.2 Empirical analysis on the household level 
To estimate the effect of coups on household-level outcomes, we use micro data from the World 
Value Survey (WVS). The WVS is the most extensive cross-country collection of micro data 
intended to measure individuals’ beliefs, values, and well-being. The WVS also measures a 
wide range of socio-economic characteristics that we can use to evaluate the influence of coups. 
At the time we conduct our study, the WVS provides data from 341,271 individuals in 97 
countries that are representative for about 90% of the world population. The key advantage of 
the WVS is its unparalleled coverage that includes both developed and developing countries. 
The data spans the period 1981-2016 and includes multiple observations of households living 
in countries during years in which a coup takes place. To analyze the microeconomic effects of 
coups, we combine our data on coup attempts with the individual-level data of the WVS.  
Data for our variables of interest are available for a maximum of about 254,000 
individuals in 85 countries. About 13,000 of the surveyed households experienced a coup, 
which is about 5% of all included observations. This proportion resembles the share of country-
year observations with coups in the data used for our baseline model on the growth effect of 
coup attempts (4.4%). We estimate empirical models of the form 
 
𝑚𝑖𝑡ℎ = 𝛿Coup𝑖𝑡 + 𝑿𝑖𝑡ℎ𝜷 + 𝑖 + 𝜑𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡ℎ,                                     (14) 
 
where 𝑚𝑖𝑡ℎ is the relevant outcome for individual ℎ living in country 𝑖 at time 𝑡. In accordance 
with our stylized model, we analyze the effect of a coup in country 𝑖 at 𝑡 (denoted with Coup𝑖𝑡) 
on employment and the financial situation of individuals. Consistent with the implications of 
the model, we also look at factors that influence the productivity of individuals, namely health 
and life satisfaction. Both variables arguably influence the ability of individuals to produce 
output and may be influenced by political instability and the accompanying tensions and 
violence. 
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The matrix 𝑿𝑖𝑡ℎ controls for individual socio-economic characteristics, including age, 
age squared, education, the decile on the national income distribution, a dummy variable for 
retired individuals, and a dummy variable for individuals that are students or on educational 
training. To account for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity in the form of institutions, 
culture, geography, and national coup history, we include a country fixed effect 𝑖 in the 
regression. We also include a wave fixed effect 𝜑𝑡 to account for cross-national trends in coup 
occurrence documented in Section 5.2.1. 
Our outcome variables are measured based on different questions of the WVS. To assess 
the financial situation of households, we use question V59 of the sixth wave of the WVS (V64, 
V132, V80, and V68 in Waves 1-5), which asks respondents: “How satisfied are you with the 
financial situation of your household? If '1' means you are completely dissatisfied on this scale, 
and '10' means you are completely satisfied, where would you put your satisfaction with your 
household's financial situation?”. The employment status is recovered from question V229 of 
Wave 6 (V220, V358, V229, and V241 in previous waves). Health is measured based on 
question V11 (alternative numbering: V82 in Wave 2 and V12 in Wave 4): “All in all, how 
would you describe your state of health these days? Would you say it is very good, good, fair, 
or poor?”. Finally, life satisfaction refers to question V10 (alternative numbering: V18 in Wave 
2 and V11 in Wave 4): “Taking all things together, would you say you are: Very happy, quite 
happy, not very happy, or not at all happy?”. 
Table 5.5 presents our results on the effects of coups on the household level. The table 
reports estimates of two model specifications for each outcome variable (financial situation of 
households, unemployment, health, life satisfaction): (i) a specification that only includes fixed 
effects and our coup variable (labeled “reduced”) and (ii) a fully-specified model that includes 
individual control variables. The results show that coups worsen the financial situation of 
households, increase unemployment, and decrease health and life satisfaction. Each effect is 
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statistically significant at the 1% level and relatively unaffected by the introduction of 
individual controls.  
TABLE 5.5: EFFECTS OF COUPS D’ÉTAT ON THE HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL 
 Financial situation Unemployment Health Life satisfaction 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Reduced Controls Reduced Controls Reduced Controls Reduced Controls 
         
Coupit -0.300
*** -0.387*** 0.010*** 0.019*** -0.197*** -0.173*** -0.289*** -0.294*** 
 (0.037) (0.034) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) 
         
Income decileith  0.342
***  -0.013***  0.047***  0.049*** 
  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
         
Ageith  -0.057
***  -0.013***  -0.017***  -0.010*** 
  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
         
Age squaredith  0.001
***  0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
         
Studentith  -0.006  -0.195
***  -0.030***  -0.013** 
  (0.020)  (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
         
Retiredith  -0.030  -0.109
***  -0.170***  -0.051*** 
  (0.020)  (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
         
Educationith  0.055
***  -0.003***  0.032***  0.008*** 
  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
         
Unemployedith  -0.475
***    -0.081***  -0.142*** 
  (0.018)    (0.006)  (0.006) 
         
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Wave Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Households 249,231 249,231 254,079 254,079 246,880 246,880 248,953 248,953 
Countries 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 
R2 0.146 0.249 0.049 0.105 0.105 0.211 0.117 0.151 
F Statistic 525.241 979.195 124.733 278.151 340.778 726.276 384.855 469.743 
Notes: The table reports estimations on the effect of coup d’états on the household level, with robust standard errors (adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity) in parentheses. Household-level data is taken from the World Value Survey (WVS). We include all observations for which 
data on coups and data on household characteristics are available. Our combined dataset covers a maximum of 254,079 households in 85 
countries observed between 1981 and 2016. The financial situation is measured with (referring to the last wave; alternative questions of earlier 
waves in parentheses) question V59 (V64, V132, V80, and V68 in earlier waves), where respondents are asked to classify their satisfaction 
with their household’s financial situation on a scale running from 1 to 10. Employment status is measured with question V229 (V220, V358, 
V229, and V241 in previous waves). Health is measured based on question V11 (V82 and V12 in earlier waves), where respondents classify 
their health level as “very good”, “good”, “fair”, or “poor”. Life satisfaction refers to question V10 (V18 and V11 in earlier waves), where 
respondents classify their life satisfaction on a 4-scale index. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, 
respectively. 
Possible threats to the identification of the coup effect on the individual-level outcomes come 
from differences across age cohorts or sub-national regions. To examine the influence of these 
factors on our results, we re-estimate our micro-level models with cohort fixed effects and 
region fixed effects, with very little impact on inferences: while the model on the effect of coup 
activity on unemployment in column (3) of Table 5.5 yields an estimate of 0.10, the effect is 
0.11 and remains statistically significant at the 1% level when we include cohort and region 
fixed effects. The same applies to the other outcomes and model specifications (not reported).  
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FIGURE 5.10: EFFECT OF COUPS ON INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS DEPENDENT ON THE 
INCOME DECILE OF HOUSEHOLDS 
 
Notes: The figure shows the effect of coups on household characteristics dependent on the income decile of households in the national income 
distribution. The results are derived based on approximately 250,000 households in 85 countries (see Table 5.5). Vertical lines represent the 
95% confident intervals. 
It is conceivable that the effect of coups on individual-level outcomes varies across income 
groups. In particular, the effects may be different between the elite and the working class. To 
examine differences in the coup effect relative to the position of the household on the national 
income ladder, we re-estimate our models with interaction terms that account for the income 
decile of the respondent. The results are visualized in Figure 5.10 and indicate distinct pattern 
of the coup effect relative to the income level. The figure suggests that the financial situation 
and the health level of the poorest 10% is relatively unaffected by coups. However, coups 
substantially decrease the financial situation and the health level of individuals from the second 
income decile to the upper middle class. Top-income earners on average are not affected by 
coups. While the employment effect is negative for all income groups except for the poorest 
10%, coups influence life satisfaction of the poor and the middle class, but have little effect on 
life satisfaction of top-income earners.  
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FIGURE 5.11: GENDER DIFFERENCES IN THE EFFECT OF COUPS 
 
Notes: The figure shows the effect of coups on the financial situation, unemployment, health and life satisfaction conditional on the gender of 
the respondents. The results are derived based on approximately 250,000 households in 85 countries (see Table 5.5). Vertical lines represent 
the 95% confident intervals. 
Figure 5.11 examines gender differences in the coup effect. While we do not find large 
differences between women and men regarding the financial situation, the employment effect 
seems predominately caused by an adverse employment effect for women, while employment 
of men on average remains unaffected by coups. One interpretation of this result may be that in 
countries with higher exposure to coups, the elasticity of labor supply is lower for men than for 
women. We also observe that the negative effects of coups on health and life satisfaction are 
almost only driven by an adverse effect on women.  
Finally, in Table A5.34 in the Appendix, we examine whether coups influence 
individuals’ expectations and preferences. We associate the experience of a coup with 
expectations about the future, measured by question V50, where respondents are asked to 
classify their view on the statements “humanity has a bright future” versus “humanity has a 
bleak future”. We use this data to construct a dummy for negative future expectations. We also 
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examine the extent to which individuals have confidence in their government (V115, measured 
on a four-scale ladder) and attitudes towards democracy (V140, measured on a ten-scale 
ladder). Again, we report unconditional correlations and estimates conditioned on socio-
economic characteristics. The results show that the experience of a coup d’état depresses 
individuals’ expectations about the future. Coups also decrease confidence in the government 
and lower the subjective importance of democracy. Given the importance of expectations and 
preferences for decision making (Falk et al. 2018), the results of Table A5.34 suggest that coups 
can also have economically important psychological effects that go beyond proximate socio-
economic factors. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Motivated by the growing interest in and lack of evidence for the economic effects of political 
instability, we study how coups d’état influence economic growth. Our results show that there 
is a statistically and economically significant negative effect of coups on per capita GDP 
growth. Across manifold model specifications on the country-level and the sub-national level, 
a coup is associated with a decrease in per capita GDP of 2-3 percentage points. The abundance 
of evidence, drawn from manifold empirical techniques and all leading to very similar results, 
gives us confidence that there is a causal effect of coups d’état on future GDP growth. 
Our focus on coups d’état highlights a particular aspect of political instability, one that 
mirrors the zeitgeist of countries’ political environment. Against the backdrop of increasing 
instability tendencies in the Western world, our results paint a pessimistic picture but advocate 
for the establishment of a stable political environment. We propose several directions for future 
research. First, more quantitative country case studies are needed to better understand the 
political instability caused by coups. Our synthetic control analyses provide a first step in this 
direction, but the specific circumstances are yet to explore. Second, the mechanisms through 
which coups d’état and political instability influence economic development are still poorly 
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understood. Third, our microeconomic results show how socio-economic characteristics of 
individuals react to coups in the short-run, but more research should be conducted on the long-
run effects of political instability. 
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Appendix I: Additional country case studies 
This section provides accompanying case study evidence to Section 5.3.7. We show the result 
of synthetic control methods for coups with the typical pattern of a decrease in the development 
of GDP relative to the synthetic control group (Argentina 1988, Thailand 2006, and Egypt 
2013), and also show results for the 1987 coup in Tunisia, for which this pattern cannot be 
observed.  
The coup in Tunisia 1987 is said to be a “constitutional coup” in which Prime Minister 
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali replaced the aging and sick President Habib Bourguiba, backed by the 
Tunisian Constitution. The synthetic control analysis for this successful coup shows no effect 
on GDP per capita. This is not surprising, given that there was no change in policies and no 
increase in uncertainty after the unseating of Bourguiba.  
Argentina experienced several uprisings by the Argentine Army from 1987 to 1990 of 
which, however, none overturned the government. The synthetic control analysis shows the 
typical pattern of a reduction in GDP after the coup. In contrast to many other coups, however, 
there was a catch-up effect in GDP per capita in the aftermath of the 1988 Argentinian coup 
that was initiated in the early 1990s.  
Thailand experienced a successful coup in 2006, which was led by the Royal Thai Army. 
The military unseated Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra after a year of political crises and 
unrest associated with his government. Under military rule, human rights and freedom of 
expression have been restricted, Thailand received a new constitution and the party of Thaksin 
Shinawatra was banned from the elections in 2007. The turmoil that accompanied the 2006 
coup in Thailand led to a period of high political instability. 
In a similar vein, the successful military coup in Egypt 2013 overthrew the 
democratically elected President Morsi and suspended the Egyptian constitution. The coup was 
justified with the repression of the opposition by Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood and 
disappointment about the democratization process in Egypt. 
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FIGURE A5.1: SYNTHETIC CONTROL ANALYSIS FOR SELECTED COUP EXAMPLES 
 
Notes: The solid line represents the development of per capita GDP (log scale) of the treated country, the dashed line is the counterfactual 
development suggested by the synthetic control group. All countries only feature one coup during the time period used for the synthetic control 
analysis. The donor pool includes countries without coups or coup attempts. Weights: Tunisia: Belize 4.7%, Botswana: 21.8%, Cape Verde 
17.8%, Malaysia 5.6%, Mexico 16.5%, Nicaragua 5.1%, Singapore 4.2%, Vietnam 14.4%; Argentina: Antigua and Barbuda 13.9%, Botswana: 
4.2%, China 4.6%, Costa Rica 15.6%, Kuwait 0.9%, Mauritius 1.3%, Mongolia 18.3%, St. Lucia 12.8%, St. Vincent and Grenadines 25.5%, 
Vietnam 2.8%; Thailand: Barbados 1.2%, Malaysia 50%, Ukraine 31.2%, Uzbekistan 17.6%; Egypt: Albania 42%, India 13.7%, Kazakhstan 
21.8%, St. Lucia 0.6%, Uzbekistan 21.9%. 
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Appendix II: Supplementary tables 
TABLE A5.1: LIST OF COUNTRIES 
 
ID Country Coups Years From To Included in event study
1 Albania  - 48 1970 2017 no
2 Algeria 3 58 1960 2017 yes
3 Angola 1 48 1970 2017 yes
4 Anguilla  - 48 1970 2017 no
5 Antigua and Barbuda  - 48 1970 2017 no
6 Argentina 10 68 1950 2017 yes
7 Armenia  - 28 1990 2017 no
8 Aruba  - 48 1970 2017 no
9 Australia  - 68 1950 2017 no
10 Austria  - 68 1950 2017 no
11 Azerbaijan 1 28 1990 2017 yes
12 Bahamas  - 48 1970 2017 no
13 Bahrain 2 48 1970 2017 yes
14 Bangladesh 10 59 1959 2017 yes
15 Barbados  - 58 1960 2017 no
16 Belarus  - 28 1990 2017 no
17 Belgium  - 68 1950 2017 no
18 Belize  - 48 1970 2017 no
19 Benin 11 59 1959 2017 yes
20 Bermuda  - 48 1970 2017 no
21 Bhutan  - 48 1970 2017 no
22 Bolivia 17 68 1950 2017 yes
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina  - 28 1990 2017 no
24 Botswana  - 58 1960 2017 no
25 Brazil 5 68 1950 2017 yes
26 British Virgin Islands  - 48 1970 2017 no
27 Brunei  - 48 1970 2017 no
28 Bulgaria 1 48 1970 2017 yes
29 Burkina Faso 7 59 1959 2017 yes
30 Burundi 12 58 1960 2017 yes
31 Cambodia 5 48 1970 2017 yes
32 Cameroon 1 58 1960 2017 yes
33 Canada  - 68 1950 2017 no
34 Cape Verde  - 58 1960 2017 no
35 Cayman Islands  - 48 1970 2017 no
36 Central African Republic 8 58 1960 2017 yes
37 Chad 14 58 1960 2017 yes
38 Chile 2 67 1951 2017 no
39 China  - 66 1952 2017 no
40 Colombia 4 68 1950 2017 no
41 Comoros 14 58 1960 2017 yes
42 Congo, Dem. Rep. 4 68 1950 2017 yes
43 Congo, Republic of 6 58 1960 2017 no
44 Costa Rica  - 68 1950 2017 no
45 Cote d'Ivoire 4 58 1960 2017 yes
46 Croatia  - 28 1990 2017 no
47 Curacao  - 13 2005 2017 no
48 Cyprus 1 68 1950 2017 yes
49 Czech Rep.  - 28 1990 2017 no
50 Denmark  - 68 1950 2017 no
51 Djibouti 1 48 1970 2017 yes
52 Dominica 2 48 1970 2017 no
53 Dominican Republic 3 67 1951 2017 no
54 Ecuador 10 68 1950 2017 yes
55 Egypt 3 68 1950 2017 yes
56 El Salvador 3 68 1950 2017 yes
57 Equatorial Guinea 5 58 1960 2017 yes
58 Estonia  - 28 1990 2017 no
59 Ethiopia 5 68 1950 2017 yes
60 Fiji 4 58 1960 2017 yes
61 Finland  - 68 1950 2017 no
62 France 1 68 1950 2017 yes
63 Gabon 1 58 1960 2017 yes
64 Gambia, The 5 58 1960 2017 yes
65 Georgia 2 28 1990 2017 no
66 Germany  - 68 1950 2017 no
67 Ghana 10 63 1955 2017 yes
68 Greece 4 67 1951 2017 yes
69 Grenada 2 48 1970 2017 yes
70 Guatemala 10 68 1950 2017 yes
71 Guinea 4 59 1959 2017 yes
72 Guinea-Bissau 9 58 1960 2017 yes
73 Haiti 9 58 1960 2017 yes
74 Honduras 8 68 1950 2017 yes
75 Hong Kong  - 58 1960 2017 no
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TABLE A5.1 CONTINUED: LIST OF COUNTRIES 
 
ID Country Coups Years From To Included in event study
76 Hungary  - 48 1970 2017 no
77 Iceland  - 68 1950 2017 no
78 India  - 68 1950 2017 no
79 Indonesia 2 58 1960 2017 no
80 Iran 2 63 1955 2017 no
81 Iraq 5 48 1970 2017 yes
82 Ireland  - 68 1950 2017 no
83 Israel  - 68 1950 2017 no
84 Italy  - 68 1950 2017 no
85 Jamaica 1 65 1953 2017 yes
86 Japan 1 68 1950 2017 yes
87 Jordan 1 64 1954 2017 no
88 Kazakhstan  - 28 1990 2017 no
89 Kenya 1 68 1950 2017 yes
90 Kuwait  - 48 1970 2017 no
91 Kyrgyzstan 1 28 1990 2017 yes
92 Laos 2 48 1970 2017 yes
93 Latvia  - 28 1990 2017 no
94 Lebanon 1 48 1970 2017 yes
95 Lesotho 4 58 1960 2017 yes
96 Liberia 4 54 1964 2017 no
97 Lithuania  - 28 1990 2017 no
98 Luxembourg  - 68 1950 2017 no
99 Macao  - 48 1970 2017 no
100 Macedonia  - 28 1990 2017 no
101 Madagascar 7 58 1960 2017 no
102 Malawi 1 64 1954 2017 yes
103 Malaysia  - 63 1955 2017 no
104 Maldives 4 48 1970 2017 yes
105 Mali 5 58 1960 2017 yes
106 Malta  - 64 1954 2017 no
107 Mauritania 10 58 1960 2017 no
108 Mauritius  - 68 1950 2017 no
109 Mexico  - 68 1950 2017 no
110 Moldova  - 28 1990 2017 no
111 Mongolia  - 48 1970 2017 no
112 Montenegro  - 28 1990 2017 no
113 Morocco 2 66 1950 2015 no
114 Mozambique 1 58 1960 2017 yes
115 Myanmar 2 56 1962 2017 yes
116 Namibia  - 58 1960 2017 no
117 Nepal 2 58 1960 2017 yes
118 Netherlands  - 68 1950 2017 no
119 New Zealand  - 68 1950 2017 no
120 Nicaragua  - 68 1950 2017 no
121 Niger 7 58 1960 2017 yes
122 Nigeria 10 68 1950 2017 no
123 Norway  - 68 1950 2017 no
124 Oman 1 48 1970 2017 no
125 Pakistan 7 68 1950 2017 yes
126 Panama 8 68 1950 2017 yes
127 Paraguay 5 67 1951 2017 yes
128 Peru 7 68 1950 2017 yes
129 Philippines 6 68 1950 2017 yes
130 Poland 1 48 1970 2017 yes
131 Portugal 2 68 1950 2017 no
132 Qatar 3 48 1970 2017 no
133 Romania  - 58 1960 2017 no
134 Russia 1 28 1990 2017 no
135 Rwanda 2 58 1960 2017 yes
136 Sao Tome and Principe 2 48 1970 2017 yes
137 Saudi Arabia  - 48 1970 2017 no
138 Senegal 1 58 1960 2017 no
139 Serbia  - 28 1990 2017 no
140 Seychelles 2 58 1960 2017 yes
141 Sierra Leone 12 57 1961 2017 yes
142 Singapore  - 58 1960 2017 no
143 Sint Maarten  - 13 2005 2017 no
144 Slovak Republic  - 28 1990 2017 no
145 Slovenia  - 28 1990 2017 no
146 South Africa  - 68 1950 2017 no
147 South Korea 2 65 1953 2017 yes
148 Spain 3 68 1950 2017 no
149 Sri Lanka 2 68 1950 2017 yes
150 St. Kitts & Nevis  - 48 1970 2017 no
151 St. Lucia  - 48 1970 2017 no
152 St.Vincent & Grenadines  - 48 1970 2017 no
153 Sudan 7 48 1970 2017 yes
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TABLE A5.1 CONTINUED: LIST OF COUNTRIES 
ID Country Coups Years From To Included in event study
154 Surinam 7 48 1970 2017 yes
155 Swaziland 1 48 1970 2017 yes
156 Sweden  - 68 1950 2017 no
157 Switzerland  - 68 1950 2017 no
158 Syria 7 58 1960 2017 no
159 Taiwan  - 67 1951 2017 no
160 Tajikistan 1 28 1990 2017 no
161 Tanzania 2 58 1960 2017 yes
162 Thailand 13 68 1950 2017 yes
163 Togo 9 58 1960 2017 yes
164 Trinidad &Tobago 1 68 1950 2017 yes
165 Tunisia 2 58 1960 2017 yes
166 Turkey 6 68 1950 2017 yes
167 Turkmenistan  - 28 1990 2017 no
168 Turks and Caicos  - 48 1970 2017 no
169 UAE 2 48 1970 2017 yes
170 UK  - 68 1950 2017 no
171 USA  - 68 1950 2017 no
172 Uganda 7 68 1950 2017 yes
173 Ukraine  - 28 1990 2017 no
174 Uruguay 1 68 1950 2017 yes
175 Uzbekistan  - 28 1990 2017 no
176 Venezuela 8 68 1950 2017 yes
177 Vietnam  - 48 1970 2017 no
178 Yemen  - 29 1989 2017 no
179 Zambia 3 63 1955 2017 yes
180 Zimbabwe 1 64 1954 2017 yes
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TABLE A5.2: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min p25 p75 Max 
Growth-related variables        
GDP growth (PWT) 9709 0.021327 0.062933 -0.670144 -0.002638 0.048140 0.941375 
GDP per capita (PWT) 9889 12965.8 30798.17 131.3002 2274.093 14473.53 792461.3 
GDP growth (WB) 7846 0.021397 0.057925 -0.649924 -0.00096 0.046086 1.403708 
GDP per capita (WB) 8019 10965.81 16168.53 132.3032 1099.682 14061.38 116232.8 
        
Coup-related variables        
Coup 9889 0.043685 0.204403 0 0 0 1 
Single coup 9889 0.040651 0.197491 0 0 0 1 
Multiple coups 9889 0.003034 0.054998 0 0 0 1 
Successful coup 9889 0.018708 0.135497 0 0 0 1 
Failed coup 9889 0.021944 0.146507 0 0 0 1 
Civilian coup 9889 0.010719 0.102981 0 0 0 1 
Military coup 9889 0.031955 0.175888 0 0 0 1 
Royal coup 9889 0.001011 0.031785 0 0 0 1 
Transition to autocracy 9889 0.004449 0.066558 0 0 0 1 
Transition to aemocracy 9889 0.000708 0.026597 0 0 0 1 
Government change 9889 0.005663 0.075042 0 0 0 1 
Age of coup leader 432 38.11806 21.32986 0 32 52 89 
Civilian rank index 432 0.277778 0.718768 0 0 0 3 
Military rank index 432 6.643519 4.16401 0 4 11 12 
        
Control variables        
Interstate war 9889 0.018505 0.134777 0 0 0 1 
Internal war 9889 0.130549 0.336924 0 0 0 1 
Civil and ethnic violence 7852 0.623026 1.581165 0 0 0 10 
Coup experience 9889 1.746183 2.809321 0 0 2 17 
Democracy 9889 0.499848 0.500025 0 0 1 1 
Government change 9889 0.095864 0.294420 0 0 0 1 
KOF Globalization Index 7152 51.08496 17.29259 14.2923 38.23158 63.45823 91.16795 
Ethnic Fractionalization Index 7175 0.433986 0.270748 0 0.187 0.669 0.89 
Notes: The table reports summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical estimations. GDP growth reports GDP per capita growth. Data refers to WB = World Band and PWT = Penn World Tables. GDP is measured 
in constant 2011 US dollars (PWT) and constant 2010 US dollars (WB) and expressed in absolute values. “Transition to Autocracy” and “Transition to Democracy” show regime transitions after a coup d’état. “Government 
Change” reports changes in government after a coup d’état. A description of the variables and corresponding data sources can be found in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.4. Column labeled “Std. Dev.” reports the standard deviation, 
“p25” gives the 25th percentile, “p75” reports the 75th percentile. 
1
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TABLE A5.3: FLEXIBLE EVENT STUDY ANALYSIS—PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR THE PANEL 
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES MODEL 
GDP per capita growth  
  
Treatment variable at the corresponding time pre- and post coups Parameter estimates 
  
Single coup (T ≤ t – 4) -0.011 
 (0.007) 
Single coup (T = t – 3) -0.001 
 (0.007) 
Single coup (T = t – 2) - 
  
Single coup (T = t – 1) -0.020*** 
 (0.007) 
Single coup (T = t) -0.031*** 
 (0.010) 
Single coup (T = t + 1) 0.002 
 (0.009) 
Single coup (T = t + 2) 0.002 
 (0.008) 
Single coup (T ≥ t + 3) 0.003 
 (0.008) 
  
Country Fixed Effects yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes 
Observations 1,058 
Countries 80 
R2 0.228 
Notes: The table reports the results of the flexible event study analysis (equation 4), which is shown graphically in Figure 6. Standard errors in 
parentheses. All standard errors account for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the country level. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
TABLE A5.4: FLEXIBLE EVENT STUDY ANALYSIS—PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR THE FULL 
DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODEL 
Logarithm of GDP per capita  
  
Treatment variable at the corresponding time pre- and post coups Parameter estimates 
  
GDP per capita, first laga 0.775*** 
 (0.064) 
GDP per capita, second laga 0.056 
 (0.046) 
GDP per capita, third laga 0.063 
 (0.058) 
GDP per capita, fourth laga 0.047 
 (0.060) 
Single coup (T ≤ t – 4) -0.020* 
 (0.012) 
Single coup (T = t – 3) 0.000 
 (0.011) 
Single coup (T = t – 2) - 
  
Single coup (T = t – 1) -0.019* 
 (0.009) 
Single coup (T = t) -0.036** 
 (0.015) 
Single coup (T = t + 1) 0.003 
 (0.010) 
Single coup (T = t + 2) 0.006 
 (0.011) 
Single coup (T ≥ t + 3) -0.002 
 (0.013) 
  
Country Fixed Effects yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes 
Observations 1,030 
Countries 80 
R2 Overall 0.919 
R2 Within 0.919 
R2 Between 0.996 
Notes: The table reports the results of the flexible event study analysis (equation 5), which is shown graphically in Figure 7. Standard errors in 
parentheses. All standard errors account for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the country level. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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TABLE A5.5: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—SAMPLE OF COUNTRIES WITH AT LEAST 
ONE COUP BETWEEN 1950 AND 2017, PANEL DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES MODEL 
GDP per capita growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
Coupit -0.024*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.021*** -0.021***  
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)  
Single coupit      -0.021*** 
      (0.003) 
Multiple coupsit     -0.003 -0.024 
     (0.023) (0.023) 
       
Country Fixed Effects no yes no yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects no no yes yes yes yes 
Observations 5,854 5,854 5,854 5,854 5,854 5,854 
Countries 102 102 102 102 102 102 
R2 0.009 0.050 0.051 0.092 0.092 0.092 
Notes: The table reports the results of panel difference-in-differences estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 
1). Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. Per capita GDP growth is measured in 2011 US 
dollars, data on coups d’état is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Coup” denotes whether a coup has taken place at a given year, 
“Single Coup” only considers country-year observations with one coup in a given year, and “Multiple Coups” considers country-year 
observations with multiple coups in a given year. The sample is restricted to country-year observations of countries that experienced at least 
one coup in the sample period between 1950 and 2017. For details, see Table A5.1. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% 
significance level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A5.6: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—SAMPLE OF COUNTRIES WITH AT LEAST 
ONE COUP BETWEEN 1950 AND 2017, FULL DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODEL 
Logarithm of GDP per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
Coupit -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.025***  
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)  
Single coupit      -0.025*** 
      (0.007) 
Multiple coupsit     0.018 -0.007 
     (0.014) (0.013) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 1) 1.103*** 1.075*** 1.083*** 1.039*** 1.039*** 1.039*** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 2) -0.029 -0.024 -0.011 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 3) -0.009 -0.006 -0.015 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 4) -0.068*** -0.069*** -0.059*** -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.063*** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
       
Country Fixed Effects no yes no yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects no no yes yes yes yes 
Observations 5,548 5,548 5,548 5,548 5,548 5,548 
Countries 102 102 102 102 102 102 
R2 Overall 0.992 0.992 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.993 
R2 Within 0.963 0.963 0.966 0.966 0.966 0.966 
R2 Between 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
Notes: The table reports the results of dynamic panel data estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 2). Robust 
standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. The log of per capita GDP is measured in 2011 US dollars, 
data on coups d’état is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Coup” denotes whether a coup has taken place at a given year, “Single 
Coup” only considers country-year observations with one coup in a given year, and “Multiple Coups” considers country-year observations 
with multiple coups in a given year. The sample is restricted to country-year observations of countries that experienced at least one coup in the 
sample period between 1950 and 2017. For details, see Table A5.1. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, 
respectively. 
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TABLE A5.7: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—SAMPLE OF NON-OVERLAPPING FIVE-
YEAR AVERAGES, PANEL DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES MODEL 
GDP per capita growth (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Coupit -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.013*** -0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
     
Country Fixed Effects no yes no yes 
Year Fixed Effects no no yes yes 
Observations 2,051 2,051 2,051 2,051 
Countries 180 180 180 180 
R2 0.013 0.139 0.088 0.212 
Notes: The table reports the results of panel difference-in-differences estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 
1). Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. Per capita GDP growth is measured in 2011 US 
dollars, data on coups d’état is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Coup” denotes whether a coup has taken place at a given year. 
Estimates are based on non-overlapping five year averages (1960-1964; 1965-1969; ...), where each five-year interval serves as a unit of 
observation. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A5.8: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—SAMPLE OF NON-OVERLAPPING FIVE-
YEAR AVERAGES, FULL DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODEL 
Logarithm of GDP per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Coupit -0.105*** -0.094*** -0.102*** -0.076*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 1) 0.966*** 0.911*** 0.967*** 0.860*** 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.026) 
     
Country Fixed Effects no yes no yes 
Year Fixed Effects no no yes yes 
Observations 1,881 1,881 1,881 1,881 
Countries 180 180 180 180 
R2 Overall 0.967 0.967 0.970 0.968 
R2 Within 0.847 0.847 0.863 0.866 
R2 Between 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.992 
Notes: The table reports the results of dynamic panel data estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 2). Robust 
standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. Per capita GDP growth is measured in 2011 US dollars, data 
on coups d’état is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Coup” denotes whether a coup has taken place at a given year. Estimates 
are based on non-overlapping five year averages (1960-1964; 1965-1969; ...), where each five-year interval serves as a unit of observation. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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TABLE A5.9: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—ALTERNATIVE CODING SCHEME OF 
COUPS (CALENDAR YEARS), PANEL DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES MODEL 
GDP per capita growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
Coupit -0.026*** -0.021*** -0.026*** -0.021*** -0.021***  
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  
Single coupit      -0.021*** 
      (0.004) 
Multiple coupsit     0.006 -0.015 
     (0.017) (0.016) 
       
Country Fixed Effects no yes no yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects no no yes yes yes yes 
Observations 9,709 9,709 9,709 9,709 9,709 9,709 
Countries 180 180 180 180 180 180 
R2 0.007 0.058 0.058 0.109 0.109 0.109 
Notes: The table reports the results of panel difference-in-differences estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 
1). Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. Per capita GDP growth is measured in 2011 US 
dollars, data on coups d’état is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Coup” denotes whether a coup has taken place at a given year, 
“Single Coup” only considers country-year observations with one coup in a given year, and “Multiple Coups” considers country-year 
observations with multiple coups in a given year. The coding scheme of coups d’état differs from the original coding of Bjørnskov and Rode 
(2019) and re-codes coups to match calendar years. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A5.10: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—ALTERNATIVE CODING SCHEME OF 
COUPS (CALENDAR YEARS), FULL DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODEL 
Logarithm of GDP per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
Coupit -0.035*** -0.030*** -0.033*** -0.025*** -0.026***  
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)  
Single coupit      -0.026*** 
      (0.007) 
Multiple coupsit     0.005 -0.021* 
     (0.012) (0.011) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 1) 0.888*** 0.852*** 0.874*** 0.828*** 0.828*** 0.828*** 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 2) 0.148** 0.145** 0.161** 0.155** 0.155** 0.155** 
 (0.068) (0.066) (0.068) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 3) 0.004 0.007 -0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 4) -0.044 -0.030 -0.039 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 
 (0.040) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) 
       
Country Fixed Effects no yes no yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects no no yes yes yes yes 
Observations 9,169 9,169 9,169 9,169 9,169 9,169 
Countries 180 180 180 180 180 180 
R2 Overall 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 
R2 Within 0.946 0.946 0.948 0.949 0.949 0.949 
R2 Between 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
Notes: The table reports the results of dynamic panel data estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 2). Robust 
standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. The log of per capita GDP is measured in 2011 US dollars, 
data on coups d’état is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Coup” denotes whether a coup has taken place at a given year, “Single 
Coup” only considers country-year observations with one coup in a given year, and “Multiple Coups” considers country-year observations 
with multiple coups in a given year. The coding scheme of coups d’état differs from the original coding of Bjørnskov and Rode (2019) and re-
codes coups to match calendar years. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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TABLE A5.11: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—EFFECT OF TWO OR MORE COUPS, 
SAMPLE OF COUNTRY-YEARS WITH COUPS, PANEL DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES MODEL 
GDP per capita growth (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Multiple coupsit -0.009 0.014 0.006 0.025 
 (0.022) (0.018) (0.027) (0.022) 
     
Country Fixed Effects no yes no yes 
Year Fixed Effects no no yes yes 
Observations 427 427 427 427 
Countries 102 102 102 102 
R2 0.001 0.410 0.163 0.547 
Notes: The table reports the results of panel difference-in-differences estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 
1). Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. Per capita GDP growth is measured in 2011 US 
dollars, data on coups d’état is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Multiple Coups” considers country-year observations with 
multiple coups in a given year. The sample is restricted to country-year observations in which a coup has taken place. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A5.12: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—EFFECT OF TWO OR MORE COUPS, 
SAMPLE OF COUNTRY-YEARS WITH COUPS, FULL DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODEL 
Logarithm of GDP per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Multiple coupsit 0.017 0.021* 0.027 0.024 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.016) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 1) 1.091*** 0.959*** 1.041*** 0.921*** 
 (0.129) (0.094) (0.121) (0.080) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 2) -0.127 -0.084 -0.128 -0.133 
 (0.168) (0.152) (0.154) (0.152) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 3) 0.104 0.152 0.090 0.163* 
 (0.097) (0.096) (0.093) (0.087) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 4) -0.091 -0.061 -0.028 0.004 
 (0.072) (0.076) (0.074) (0.076) 
     
Country Fixed Effects no yes no yes 
Year Fixed Effects no no yes yes 
Observations 398 398 398 398 
Countries 96 96 96 96 
R2 Overall 0.980 0.979 0.982 0.981 
R2 Within 0.929 0.930 0.944 0.946 
R2 Between 0.983 0.980 0.984 0.978 
Notes: The table reports the results of dynamic panel data estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 2). Robust 
standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. The log of per capita GDP is measured in 2011 US dollars, 
data on coups d’état is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Multiple Coups” considers country-year observations with multiple 
coups in a given year. The sample is restricted to country-year observations in which a coup has taken place. *, **, and *** indicate significance 
at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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TABLE A5.13: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—EFFECT OF COUP SUCCESS, SAMPLE 
OF COUNTRY-YEARS WITH SINGLE COUPS, PANEL DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES MODEL 
GDP per capita growth (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Successful coupit -0.010 -0.009 -0.013 -0.013 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) 
     
Country Fixed Effects no yes no yes 
Year Fixed Effects no no yes yes 
Observations 397 397 397 397 
Countries 101 101 101 101 
R2 0.005 0.378 0.181 0.533 
Notes: The table reports the results of panel difference-in-differences estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 
1). Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. Per capita GDP growth is measured in 2011 US 
dollars, data on coups d’état is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Successful Coup” considers country-year observations with 
coups that were successful in unseating the ruling government in a given year. The sample is restricted to country-year observations in which 
a single coup has taken place. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A5.14: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—EFFECT OF COUP SUCCESS, SAMPLE 
OF COUNTRY-YEARS WITH SINGLE COUPS, FULL DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODEL 
Logarithm of GDP per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
Successful coupit -0.012 -0.012 -0.014 -0.016 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 1) 1.105*** 0.958*** 1.060*** 0.932*** 
 (0.143) (0.104) (0.135) (0.093) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 2) -0.133 -0.090 -0.133 -0.157 
 (0.181) (0.161) (0.169) (0.166) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 3) 0.105 0.159 0.084 0.167* 
 (0.104) (0.106) (0.097) (0.096) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 4) -0.100 -0.064 -0.037 0.004 
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.079) (0.079) 
     
Country Fixed Effects no yes no yes 
Year Fixed Effects no no yes yes 
Observations 370 370 370 370 
Countries 96 96 96 96 
R2 Overall 0.979 0.978 0.982 0.980 
R2 Within 0.928 0.929 0.943 0.946 
R2 Between 0.983 0.980 0.985 0.979 
Notes: The table reports the results of dynamic panel data estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 2). Robust 
standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. The log of per capita GDP is measured in 2011 US dollars, 
data on coups d’état is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Successful Coup” considers country-year observations with coups that 
were successful in unseating the ruling government in a given year. The sample is restricted to country-year observations in which a single 
coup has taken place. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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TABLE A5.15: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—BASELINE SPECIFICATION WITH 
WORLD BANK GDP DATA, PANEL DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES MODEL 
GDP per capita growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
Coupit -0.025*** -0.020*** -0.024*** -0.019*** -0.019***  
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  
Single coupit      -0.019*** 
      (0.004) 
Multiple coupsit     -0.003 -0.022 
     (0.018) (0.018) 
       
Country Fixed Effects no yes no yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects no no yes yes yes yes 
Observations 7,846 7,846 7,846 7,846 7,846 7,846 
Countries 171 171 171 171 171 171 
R2 0.008 0.086 0.069 0.148 0.148 0.148 
Notes: The table reports the results of panel difference-in-differences estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 
1). Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. Per capita GDP growth is measured in 2011 US 
dollars, data on coups d’état is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Coup” denotes whether a coup has taken place at a given year, 
“Single Coup” only considers country-year observations with one coup in a given year, and “Multiple Coups” considers country-year 
observations with multiple coups in a given year. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A5.16: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—BASELINE SPECIFICATION WITH 
WORLD BANK GDP DATA, FULL DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODEL 
Logarithm of GDP per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
Coupit -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.014***  
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  
Single coupit      -0.014*** 
      (0.004) 
Multiple coupsit     0.015* 0.001 
     (0.009) (0.008) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 1) 1.252*** 1.191*** 1.243*** 1.173*** 1.173*** 1.173*** 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 2) -0.185** -0.164** -0.175** -0.153* -0.153* -0.153* 
 (0.085) (0.080) (0.084) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 3) 0.017 0.017 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.022 
 (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 4) -0.085*** -0.063*** -0.091*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.070*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
       
Country Fixed Effects no yes no yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects no no yes yes yes yes 
Observations 7,333 7,333 7,333 7,333 7,333 7,333 
Countries 171 171 171 171 171 171 
R2 Overall 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
R2 Within 0.982 0.982 0.983 0.984 0.984 0.984 
R2 Between 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
Notes: The table reports the results of dynamic panel data estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 2). Robust 
standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. The log of per capita GDP is measured in 2011 US dollars, 
data on coups d’état is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Coup” denotes whether a coup has taken place at a given year, “Single 
Coup” only considers country-year observations with one coup in a given year, and “Multiple Coups” considers country-year observations 
with multiple coups in a given year. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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TABLE A5.17: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—CONTROLLING FOR POTENTIAL 
CONFOUNDING FACTORS, PANEL DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES MODEL 
GDP per capita growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
Coupit -0.027*** -0.020*** -0.028*** -0.021*** -0.020***  
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  
Single coupit      -0.020*** 
      (0.005) 
Multiple coupsit     -0.006 -0.026 
     (0.022) (0.021) 
Interstate warit -0.020 -0.038** -0.020 -0.038** -0.038** -0.038** 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Internal warit -0.003 -0.010** -0.004 -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Civil and ethnic violenceit -0.001 -0.005*** -0.001 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Coup experienceit -0.001 -0.003** -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Democracyit -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
KOF Globalization Indexit 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ethnic Fractionalization Indexit -0.016** -0.118** -0.017** -0.113** -0.112** -0.112** 
 (0.007) (0.049) (0.007) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 2) -0.018*** -0.058*** -0.016*** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.056*** 
 (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
       
Country Fixed Effects no yes no yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects no no yes yes yes yes 
Observations 5,514 5,514 5,514 5,514 5,514 5,514 
Countries 138 138 138 138 138 138 
R2 0.053 0.175 0.096 0.209 0.209 0.209 
Notes: The table reports the results of panel difference-in-differences estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 
1). Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. Per capita GDP growth is measured in 2011 US 
dollars, data on coups d’état is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Coup” denotes whether a coup has taken place at a given year, 
“Single Coup” only considers country-year observations with one coup in a given year, and “Multiple Coups” considers country-year 
observations with multiple coups in a given year. Dummy variables for interstate and internal war are constructed based on data from the 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Version 17.2). Scores for civil and ethnic violence are taken from the Major 
Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) and Conflict Regions, 1946-2016 dataset (Version July 25, 2017). Coup experience is measured with 
the cumulative number of coups in a country since 1950. Democracy is measured via the dichotomous democracy indicator of Bjørnskov and 
Rode (2019). Globalization is measured with the KOF Globalization Index of Dreher (2006) and Gygli et al. (2019). Data on ethnic 
fractionalization is from the Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization Dataset (HIEF) (see Drazanova 2019). The second lag of GDP per 
capita accounts for the current level of economic development. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, 
respectively. 
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TABLE A5.18: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—CONTROLLING FOR POTENTIAL 
CONFOUNDING FACTORS, FULL DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODEL 
Logarithm of GDP per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
Coupit -0.032*** -0.026*** -0.031*** -0.026*** -0.028***  
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)  
Single coupit      -0.028*** 
      (0.009) 
Multiple coupsit     0.035** 0.006 
     (0.016) (0.013) 
Interstate warit -0.023 -0.039* -0.023 -0.040** -0.040** -0.040** 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Internal warit -0.001 -0.008 -0.001 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Civil and ethnic violenceit -0.001 -0.005*** -0.001 -0.004** -0.004** -0.004** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Coup experienceit -0.000 -0.003*** -0.000 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Democracyit -0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
KOF Globalization Indexit 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ethnic Fractionalization Indexit -0.013** -0.042 -0.017*** -0.091* -0.092* -0.092* 
 (0.005) (0.053) (0.005) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 1) 1.107*** 1.043*** 1.101*** 1.032*** 1.032*** 1.032*** 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 2) -0.053* -0.046 -0.037 -0.030 -0.031 -0.031 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 3) 0.014 0.018 -0.001 0.004 0.005 0.005 
 (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 4) -0.085*** -0.084*** -0.077*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.075*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
       
Country Fixed Effects no yes no yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects no no yes yes yes yes 
Observations 5,442 5,442 5,442 5,442 5,442 5,442 
Countries 138 138 138 138 138 138 
R2 Overall 0.995 0.994 0.995 0.994 0.994 0.994 
R2 Within 0.952 0.952 0.955 0.956 0.956 0.956 
R2 Between 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
Notes: The table reports the results of dynamic panel data estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 2). Robust 
standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. Per capita GDP growth is measured in 2011 US dollars, data 
on coups d’état is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Coup” denotes whether a coup has taken place at a given year, “Single 
Coup” only considers country-year observations with one coup in a given year, and “Multiple Coups” considers country-year observations 
with multiple coups in a given year. Dummy variables for interstate and internal war are constructed based on data from the UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Version 17.2). Scores for civil and ethnic violence are taken from the Major Episodes of Political 
Violence (MEPV) and Conflict Regions, 1946-2016 dataset (Version July 25, 2017). Coup experience is measured with the cumulative number 
of coups in a country since 1950. Democracy is measured via the dichotomous democracy indicator of Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). 
Globalization is measured with the KOF Globalization Index of Dreher (2006) and Gygli et al. (2019). Data on ethnic fractionalization is from 
the Historical Index of Ethnic Fractionalization Dataset (HIEF) (see Drazanova 2019). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% 
significance level, respectively. 
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TABLE A5.19: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—REGIONAL DIFFERENCES, PANEL DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES MODEL 
GDP per capita growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Africa Africa Africa America America America Asia-Oceania Asia-Oceania Asia-Oceania Europe 
           
Coupit -0.020*** -0.019***  -0.023*** -0.023***  -0.024* -0.024**  -0.055*** 
 (0.005) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.005)  (0.012) (0.011)  (0.018) 
Single coupit   -0.019***   -0.023***   -0.024**  
   (0.004)   (0.005)   (0.011)  
Multiple coupsit  -0.009 -0.028  0.004 -0.020***  -0.011 -0.035  
  (0.025) (0.025)  (0.008) (0.006)  (0.141) (0.141)  
           
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 2,910 2,910 2,910 2,311 2,311 2,311 2,503 2,503 2,503 1,985 
Countries 50 50 50 41 41 41 49 49 49 40 
R2  0.103 0.103 0.103 0.176 0.176 0.176 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.322 
Notes: The table reports the results of panel difference-in-differences estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 1). Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are 
reported in parentheses. Per capita GDP growth is measured in 2011 US dollars, data on coups d’état is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Coup” denotes whether a coup has taken place at a given 
year, “Single Coup” only considers country-year observations with one coup in a given year, and “Multiple Coups” considers country-year observations with multiple coups in a given year. The regional 
classification refers to the classification of the World Bank. There have been no multiple coups in Europe. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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TABLE A5.20: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—REGIONAL DIFFERENCES, FULL DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODEL 
Logarithm of GDP per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Africa Africa Africa America America America Asia-Oceania Asia-Oceania Asia-Oceania Europe 
           
Coupit -0.023** -0.025**  -0.042*** -0.043***  -0.027 -0.030  -0.046** 
 (0.010) (0.011)  (0.008) (0.009)  (0.018) (0.018)  (0.021) 
Single coupit   -0.025**   -0.043***   -0.030  
   (0.011)   (0.009)   (0.018)  
Multiple coupsit  0.020 -0.005  0.002 -0.041**  0.094*** 0.064**  
  (0.022) (0.020)  (0.021) (0.019)  (0.030) (0.029)  
Log(GDPpc) (t – 1) 1.012*** 1.012*** 1.012*** 0.615*** 0.615*** 0.615*** 1.052*** 1.052*** 1.052*** 0.821*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.133) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 2) -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.215** 0.215** 0.215** -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 0.084 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.091) (0.091) (0.091) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.068) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 3) 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.042 0.042 0.042 -0.037 -0.036 -0.036 0.145** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.070) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 4) -0.054** -0.054** -0.054** 0.102 0.102 0.102 -0.059** -0.059** -0.059** -0.153*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.021) 
           
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 2,760 2,760 2,760 2,188 2,188 2,188 2,356 2,356 2,356 1,865 
Countries 50 50 50 41 41 41 49 49 49 40 
R2 Overall 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.984 
R2 Within 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.880 0.880 0.880 0.978 0.978 0.978 0.979 
R2 Between 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.997 
Notes: The table reports the results of dynamic panel data estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 2). Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in 
parentheses. Per capita GDP growth is measured in 2011 US dollars, data on coups d’état is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Coup” denotes whether a coup has taken place at a given year, 
“Single Coup” only considers country-year observations with one coup in a given year, and “Multiple Coups” considers country-year observations with multiple coups in a given year. The regional classification 
refers to the classification of the World Bank. There have been no multiple coups in Europe. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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TABLE A5.21: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—COUP CHARACTERISTICS AND 
BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION OF THE COUP LEADER, PANEL DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES MODEL 
GDP per capita growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Type of coup Type of coup Type of coup Age of coup 
leader 
Civil rank of 
coup leader 
Military rank 
of coup leader 
       
Civilian coupit -0.186 0.001     
 (0.139) (0.010)     
Military coupit -0.187  -0.001    
 (0.138)  (0.010)    
Royal coupit  0.187 0.186    
  (0.138) (0.139)    
Age of coup leaderit    -0.000   
    (0.000)   
Civil rank indexit     -0.006  
     (0.007)  
Military rank indexit      0.000 
      (0.001) 
       
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 397 397 397 397 397 397 
Countries 101 101 101 101 101 101 
R2 0.538 0.538 0.538 0.530 0.531 0.529 
Notes: The table reports the results of panel difference-in-differences estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 
1). Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. Per capita GDP growth is measured in 2011 US 
dollars, data on coups d’état is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The sample is restricted to country-year observations in which a coup has 
taken place. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
 
 
TABLE A5.22: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—COUP CHARACTERISTICS AND 
BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION OF THE COUP LEADER, FULL DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODEL 
Logarithm of GDP per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Type of coup Type of coup Type of coup Age of coup 
leader 
Civil rank of 
coup leader 
Military rank 
of coup leader 
       
Civilian coupit -0.129 0.014     
 (0.128) (0.015)     
Military coupit -0.143  -0.014    
 (0.123)  (0.015)    
Royal coupit  0.143 0.129    
  (0.123) (0.128)    
Age of coup leaderit    0.000   
    (0.000)   
Civil rank indexit     -0.002  
     (0.008)  
Military rank indexit      -0.000 
      (0.002) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 1) 0.945*** 0.945*** 0.945*** 0.937*** 0.936*** 0.937*** 
 (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.091) (0.092) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 2) -0.163 -0.163 -0.163 -0.166 -0.163 -0.163 
 (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161) (0.160) (0.164) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 3) 0.164* 0.164* 0.164* 0.167* 0.167* 0.167* 
 (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.097) (0.096) (0.096) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 4) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.006 0.005 0.004 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.077) (0.079) (0.079) 
       
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 370 370 370 370 370 370 
Countries 96 96 96 96 96 96 
R2 Overall 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.980 0.980 
R2 Within 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.946 
R2 Between 0.979 0.979 0.979 0.979 0.979 0.979 
Notes: The table reports the results of dynamic panel data estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 2). Robust 
standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. Per capita GDP growth is measured in 2011 US dollars, data 
on coups d’état is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The sample is restricted to country-year observations in which a coup has taken place. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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TABLE A5.23: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATION STRATEGIES 
Growth rate and logarithm of GDP 
per capita 
GDP in 1960 
Quintiles × Year Effects Alternative Lag Structure Difference GMM 
Han and Phillips 
Estimator 
Nonparametric 
Estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Panel DiD Dynamic Panel One Lag Two Lags Three Lags Dynamic Panel Dynamic Panel  
         
Coupit -0.021*** -0.026*** -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.030*** -0.028*** -0.020*** -0.023*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 1)  1.034*** 0.953*** 0.839*** 0.840*** 0.805*** 0.869***  
  (0.025) (0.006) (0.071) (0.073) (0.076) (0.167)  
Log(GDPpc) (t – 2)  -0.014  0.117 0.141** 0.152**   
  (0.027)  (0.117) (0.063) (0.064)   
Log(GDPpc) (t – 3)  -0.006   -0.024 0.005   
  (0.028)   (0.049) (0.046)   
Log(GDPpc) (t – 4)  0.060***    -0.025   
  (0.017)    (0.044)   
         
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
GDP (1960) × Year effects yes yes no no no no no no 
Observations 6,415 6,178 9,709 9,529 9,349 8,989 9,709 9,889 
Countries 144 144 180 180 180 180 180 180 
R2 Overall 0.175 0.994 0.990 0.990 0.990  0.999  
R2 Within  0.960 0.951 0.951 0.950    
R2 Between  0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999    
Notes: The table reports the results on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth estimated with alternative estimation strategies. Columns (1)-(2) interact the quintile of the distribution of per capita 
GDP in 1960 with year effects to account for differences in the growth path of GDP. Columns (3)-(5) use alternative specifications to model GDP dynamics in the full dynamic panel data model. Robust 
standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. Columns (6)-(8) employ alternative estimating strategies, including difference GMM (column 6), the Han and Phillips 
estimator (Han and Phillips 2010, column 7), and nonparametric kernel regressions with Li-Racine kernel and bootstrapped standard errors (column 8). The reported effects in column (8) are averages of 
contrasts of factor covariates. Per capita GDP growth is measured in 2011 US dollars, data on coups d’état is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Coup” denotes whether a coup has taken 
place at a given year. Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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TABLE A5.24: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—CONTROLLING FOR TRANSITIONS INTO 
AUTOCRACY, PANEL DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES MODEL 
GDP per capita growth     
 All observations  
(incl. Transitions) 
Transitions 
excluded 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Transition to autocracy (after coup) -0.020*** -0.000 0.001  
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)  
Coupit  -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.022*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Democracyit   0.003  
   (0.003)  
     
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 9,709 9,709 9,709 9,665 
Countries 180 180 180 180 
R2 0.105 0.109 0.110 0.109 
Notes: The table reports the results of panel difference-in-differences estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 
1). Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. Per capita GDP growth is measured in 2011 US 
dollars, data on coups d’état and democracy is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Coup” denotes whether a coup has taken place 
at a given year. The variable “Transition to Autocracy (after Coup)” is a dummy variable that is 1 if a democratic country becomes autocratic 
after a coup d’état and 0 otherwise. Column “Transition excluded” excludes country-year observations in which coups led to a transition to 
autocracy. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A5.25: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—CONTROLLING FOR TRANSITIONS INTO 
AUTOCRACY, FULL DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODEL 
Logarithm of GDP per capita     
 All observations  
(incl. Transitions) 
Transitions 
excluded 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Transition to autocracy (after coup) -0.028** -0.001 0.002  
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)  
Coupit  -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.030*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Democracyit   0.008  
   (0.006)  
Log(GDPpc) (t – 1) 0.829*** 0.827*** 0.827*** 0.827*** 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 2) 0.155** 0.155** 0.155** 0.155** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 3) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 4) -0.030 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) 
     
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 9,169 9,169 9,169 9,126 
Countries 180 180 180 180 
R2 Overall 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 
R2 Within 0.949 0.949 0.949 0.948 
R2 Between 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
Notes: The table reports the results of dynamic panel data estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 2). Robust 
standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. Per capita GDP growth is measured in 2011 US dollars, data 
on coups d’état and democracy is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Coup” denotes whether a coup has taken place at a given 
year. The variable “Transition to Autocracy (after Coup)” is a dummy variable that is 1 if a democratic country becomes autocratic after a coup 
d’état and 0 otherwise. Column “Transition excluded” excludes country-year observations in which coups led to a transition to autocracy. *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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TABLE A5.26: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—CONTROLLING FOR TRANSITIONS INTO 
DEMOCRACY, PANEL DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES MODEL 
GDP per capita growth     
 All observations  
(incl. Transitions) 
Transitions 
excluded 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Transition to democracy (after coup) -0.026* -0.006 -0.008  
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)  
Coupit  -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Democracyit   0.003  
   (0.003)  
     
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 9,709 9,709 9,709 9,702 
Countries 180 180 180 180 
R2 0.105 0.109 0.110 0.109 
Notes: The table reports the results of panel difference-in-differences estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 
1). Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. Per capita GDP growth is measured in 2011 US 
dollars, data on coups d’état and democracy is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Coup” denotes whether a coup has taken place 
at a given year. The variable “Transition to Democracy (after Coup)” is a dummy variable that is 1 if an autocratic country becomes democratic 
after a coup d’état and 0 otherwise. Column “Transition excluded” excludes country-year observations in which coups led to a transition to 
democracy. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A5.27: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—CONTROLLING FOR TRANSITIONS INTO 
DEMOCRACY, FULL DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODEL 
Logarithm of GDP per capita     
 All observations  
(incl. Transitions) 
Transitions 
excluded 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Transition to democracy (after coup) -0.010 0.018 0.013  
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)  
Coupit  -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.030*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Democracyit   0.008  
   (0.005)  
Log(GDPpc) (t – 1) 0.829*** 0.827*** 0.827*** 0.827*** 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 2) 0.155** 0.155** 0.155** 0.155** 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 3) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 4) -0.030 -0.029 -0.029 -0.029 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
     
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 9,169 9,169 9,169 9,162 
Countries 180 180 180 180 
R2 Overall 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 
R2 Within 0.948 0.949 0.949 0.949 
R2 Between 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
Notes: The table reports the results of dynamic panel data estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 2). Robust 
standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. Per capita GDP growth is measured in 2011 US dollars, data 
on coups d’état and democracy is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Coup” denotes whether a coup has taken place at a given 
year. The variable “Transition to Democracy (after Coup)” is a dummy variable that is 1 if an autocratic country becomes democratic after a 
coup d’état and 0 otherwise. Column “Transition excluded” excludes country-year observations in which coups led to a transition to democracy. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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TABLE A5.28: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—CONTROLLING FOR GOVERNMENT 
CHANGE, PANEL DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES MODEL 
GDP per capita growth     
 All observations  
(incl. Government Changes) 
Gov. changes 
excluded 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Government changeit × coupit -0.043*** -0.025* -0.013  
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)  
Coupit  -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.014*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
Government changeit   -0.015***  
   (0.003)  
     
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 7,295 7,295 7,295 6,318 
Countries 180 180 180 180 
R2 0.125 0.127 0.133 0.133 
Notes: The table reports the results of panel difference-in-differences estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 
1). Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. Per capita GDP growth is measured in 2011 US 
dollars, data on coups d’état and democracy is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Coup” denotes whether a coup has taken place 
at a given year. The variable “Government Change” is a dummy variable that is 1 if there was a (regular or irregular) change in government in 
a particular year, and 0 otherwise. Column “Gov. Changes excluded” excludes country-year observations in which a government change 
(regular or irregular) took place. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A5.29: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—CONTROLLING FOR GOVERNMENT 
CHANGE, FULL DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODEL 
Logarithm of GDP per capita     
 All observations  
(incl. Government Changes) 
Gov. changes 
excluded 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Government changeit × coupit -0.046*** -0.019 -0.007  
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.019)  
Coupit  -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.026** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Government changeit   -0.014***  
   (0.004)  
Log(GDPpc) (t – 1) 0.823*** 0.822*** 0.821*** 0.805*** 
 (0.077) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 2) 0.159** 0.159** 0.159** 0.170** 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.073) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 3) -0.020 -0.020 -0.020 -0.015 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 4) -0.024 -0.023 -0.023 -0.020 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.051) 
     
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 7,217 7,217 7,217 6,263 
Countries 180 180 180 180 
R2 Overall 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.989 
R2 Within 0.918 0.919 0.919 0.915 
R2 Between 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
Notes: The table reports the results of dynamic panel data estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 2). Robust 
standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. Per capita GDP growth is measured in 2011 US dollars, data 
on coups d’état and democracy is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Coup” denotes whether a coup has taken place at a given 
year. The variable “Government Change” is a dummy variable that is 1 if there was a (regular or irregular) change in government in a particular 
year, and 0 otherwise. Column “Gov. Changes excluded” excludes country-year observations in which a government change (regular or 
irregular) took place. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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TABLE A5.30: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—PRE-COUP DYNAMICS IN POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONS, PANEL DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES MODEL 
GDP per capita growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
Coupit -0.026*** -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.021***  
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  
Single coupit      -0.021*** 
      (0.004) 
Multiple coupsit     -0.001 -0.022 
     (0.016) (0.016) 
Political Institutions (t – 1) -0.008 -0.009 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Political Institutions (t – 2) 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.010 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Political Institutions (t – 3) -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Political Institutions (t – 4) 0.006 0.007 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
       
Country Fixed Effects no yes no yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects no no yes yes yes yes 
Observations 7,784 7,784 7,784 7,784 7,784 7,784 
Countries 170 170 170 170 170 170 
R2 0.012 0.078 0.056 0.122 0.122 0.122 
Notes: The table reports the results of panel difference-in-differences estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 
1). Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. Per capita GDP growth is measured in 2011 US 
dollars, data on coups d’état is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Coup” denotes whether a coup has taken place at a given year, 
“Single Coup” only considers country-year observations with one coup in a given year, and “Multiple Coups” considers country-year 
observations with multiple coups in a given year. The quality of political institutions is measured based on the continuous democracy indicator 
compiled by Gründler and Krieger (2016, 2018, 2019). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
 
TABLE A5.31: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—PRE-COUP DYNAMICS IN POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONS, FULL DYNAMIC PANEL DATA MODEL 
Logarithm of GDP per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
Coupit -0.035*** -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.027*** -0.028***  
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)  
Single coupit      -0.028*** 
      (0.008) 
Multiple coupsit     0.021 -0.008 
     (0.015) (0.013) 
Political Institutions (t – 1) 0.000 0.004 0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Political Institutions (t – 2) 0.006 0.005 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Political Institutions (t – 3) -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Political Institutions (t – 4) 0.017 0.025** 0.013 0.008 0.008 0.008 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 1) 1.057*** 1.015*** 1.043*** 0.984*** 0.984*** 0.984*** 
 (0.041) (0.043) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 2) -0.003 0.001 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.015 
 (0.034) (0.032) (0.033) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 3) 0.019 0.022 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.012 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Log(GDPpc) (t – 4) -0.080*** -0.077*** -0.072*** -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.068*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
       
Country Fixed Effects no yes no yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects no no yes yes yes yes 
Observations 7,784 7,784 7,784 7,784 7,784 7,784 
Countries 170 170 170 170 170 170 
R2 Overall 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994 
R2 Within 0.957 0.958 0.960 0.961 0.961 0.961 
R2 Between 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
Notes: The table reports the results of dynamic panel data estimations on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth (equation 2). Robust 
standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are reported in parentheses. Per capita GDP growth is measured in 2011 US dollars, data 
on coups d’état is from Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The variable “Coup” denotes whether a coup has taken place at a given year, “Single 
Coup” only considers country-year observations with one coup in a given year, and “Multiple Coups” considers country-year observations 
with multiple coups in a given year. The quality of political institutions is measured based on the continuous democracy indicator compiled by 
Gründler and Krieger (2016, 2018, 2019). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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TABLE A5.32: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—RESULTS ON THE SUB-NATIONAL 
LEVEL, ACCOUNTING FOR SUB-NATIONAL CONFLICT 
Growth rate and logarithm  
of GDP per capita 
 
Panel Diff-in-Diff Model 
 
Dynamic Panel Data Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All regions Coup regions 
excluded 
All regions Coup regions 
excluded 
     
Coupirt -0.018***  -0.015***  
 (0.006)  (0.008)  
Coupirt,r≠r̃
c   -0.022***  -0.019*** 
  (0.006)  (0.007) 
Conflictirt -0.008** -0.008** -0.006* -0.006* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Log(GRPpc) (t – 1)   0.815*** 0.814*** 
   (0.075) (0.076) 
Log(GRPpc) (t – 2)   0.168** 0.169** 
   (0.073) (0.073) 
Log(GRPpc) (t – 3)   -0.043 -0.042 
   (0.045) (0.045) 
Log(GRPpc) (t – 4)   -0.065 -0.065 
   (0.040) (0.040) 
     
Sub-National Unit Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 51,727 51,655 43,707 43,650 
Sub-National Units 2,660 2,660 2,659 2,659 
R2 Overall 0.300 0.301 0.935 0.935 
F-Statistic 83.23 79.77 810.2 811.5 
Notes: The table reports the results of panel difference-in-differences models (columns 1-2) and dynamic panel data estimations (columns 3-
4) on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth at the sub-national level. Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are 
reported in parentheses. The log of per capita GRP is measured in real terms, data on coups d’état is geocoded by sub-national units using the 
coups listed in Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). Due to restrictions availability of sub-national GRP estimates, the models include the period 1992-
2012. Sub-national regions are first-level administrative areas (ADM1). The dummy variable for conflict is constructed using the UCDP 
Georeferenced Event Dataset of Sundberg and Melander (2013). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, 
respectively. 
 
 
TABLE A5.33: COUPS D’ÉTAT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH—RESULTS ON THE SUB-NATIONAL 
LEVEL, ACCOUNTING FOR SUB-NATIONAL HUMAN CAPITAL 
Growth rate and logarithm  
of GDP per capita 
 
Panel Diff-in-Diff Model 
 
Dynamic Panel Data Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All regions Coup regions 
excluded 
All regions Coup regions 
excluded 
     
Coupirt -0.022***  -0.022***  
 (0.006)  (0.006)  
Coupirt,r≠r̃
c   -0.019***  -0.020*** 
  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Human capitalirt 0.036 0.036 0.028 0.028 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.024) (0.024) 
Log(GRPpc) (t – 1)   0.896*** 0.895*** 
   (0.041) (0.041) 
Log(GRPpc) (t – 2)   0.112** 0.112** 
   (0.052) (0.052) 
Log(GRPpc) (t – 3)   -0.073 -0.072 
   (0.051) (0.051) 
Log(GRPpc) (t – 4)   -0.045 -0.045 
   (0.042) (0.042) 
     
Sub-National Unit Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 45,646 45,594 38,660 38,619 
Sub-National Units 2,315 2,315 2,315 2,315 
R2 Overall 0.342 0.343 0.948 0.948 
F-Statistic 96.83 91.80 1244.8 1306.5 
Notes: The table reports the results of panel difference-in-differences models (columns 1-2) and dynamic panel data estimations (columns 3-
4) on the effect of coups d’état on economic growth at the sub-national level. Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering by countries) are 
reported in parentheses. The log of per capita GRP is measured in real terms, data on coups d’état is geocoded by sub-national units using the 
coups listed in Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). Due to restrictions availability of sub-national GRP estimates, the models include the period 1992-
2012. Sub-national regions are first-level administrative areas (ADM1). Human capital is constructed using the UCDP Georeferenced Event 
Dataset of Sundberg and Melander (2013). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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TABLE A5.34: EFFECTS OF COUPS D’ÉTAT ON THE HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL—THE INFLUENCE ON 
PERCEPTIONS AND PREFERENCES 
 Expectations:  
Future will be bleak 
Confidence in  
government 
Attitudes towards  
democracy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Reduced Controls Reduced Controls Reduced Controls 
       
Coupit 0.446*** 0.447*** -0.055*** -0.052*** -0.134** -0.111** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.014) (0.014) (0.053) (0.053) 
       
Income decileith  -0.001  0.003***  0.012*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
       
Ageith  -0.001  -0.004***  0.013*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
       
Age squaredith  0.000  0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
       
Studentith  -0.031***  0.004  0.079*** 
  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.024) 
       
Retiredith  0.035***  -0.021***  -0.049** 
  (0.010)  (0.008)  (0.022) 
       
Educationith  0.003***  -0.018***  0.089*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003) 
       
Unemployedith  0.013  -0.054***  -0.053** 
  (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.021) 
       
Country Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Wave Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Households 41,390 41,390 226,995 226,995 131,820 131,820 
Countries 45 85 85 85 79 79 
R2 0.172 0.173 0.130 0.135 0.075 0.085 
F Statistic 303.3 257.3 532.1 515.1 149.7 161.2 
Notes: The table reports estimations on the effect of coup d’états on the household level, with robust standard errors (adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity) in parentheses. Household-level data is taken from the World Value Survey (WVS). We include all observations for which 
data on coups and data on household characteristics are available. Our combined dataset covers a maximum of 254,079 households in 85 
countries observed between 1981 and 2016. Expectations about the future are taken from question V50, where individuals are asked “For each 
of the following pairs of statements, please tell me which one comes closest to your own views: Humanity has a bright future versus humanity 
has a bleak future”. We construct a dummy that assumes a value of 1 if individuals answer that the future will be bleak, and zero otherwise. 
Confidence in government is measured using question V115 (V138, V153, V142, and V289 in earlier waves). The question asks people “I am 
going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of 
confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?”. We re-code the variable so that higher values reflect greater 
confidence in government. Attitudes towards democracy are measured on a ten-scale ladder running from 1 to 10. Information stems from 
question V140 (V162 in earlier waves) where respondents are asked “How important is it for you to live in a country that is governed 
democratically? On this scale where 1 means it is ‘not at all important’ and 10 means ‘absolutely important’ what position would you choose?". 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% significance level, respectively. 
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6. Conclusion 
Introduction and conclusion to each chapter have extensively framed the individual research 
topics by motivating the research question and by providing an overview on content and results.  
This concluding chapter therefore briefly reviews and highlights how this dissertation 
contributes to the literature on defense economics, economic growth and the role of political 
institutions as well as which implications for politics and public debate can be drawn.  
Chapter 2 contributes to the scarce literature on compliance with international 
agreements. The chapter is the first to examine government changes as one potential reason for 
non-compliance by using the NATO two percent target. The credibility problem when national 
governments commit themselves to international agreements may well apply to other policy 
fields and may have implications for the design of future treaties or agreements in terms of 
incentive compatibility and enforcement. Chapter 3 builds on the large existing literature on 
the determinants of national defense spending. The chapter is the first to cover the entire third 
wave of democracy with new SIPRI data on defense spending as well as uses state-of-the-art 
estimation techniques. Both chapters estimated demand functions for national defense 
spending, which contributes to scholars’ knowledge about government spending and the 
allocation of defense capabilities. Specifically, national defense spending reflects the outcome 
of a public choice which is channeled via political institutions and the decision-making of 
governments. The first two chapters thus showed the challenges and restrictions democracies 
face when political turnarounds are required. The quantitative analysis of national defense is of 
particular interest after the bipolar world with two opposed blocks has been replaced by 
multifaceted security matters, e.g. through international terrorism, the rise of China as both an 
economic and military power or new tensions between Russia and the Western world which 
remind of the Cold War. 
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While Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 explained the spending of public funds, which is 
primarily a result of political decision-making, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 explained output in 
goods and services, which is the result of a value-creation process. Chapter 4 estimated firm-
level output in arms and used defense spending, i.e. the demand for security from external 
threats, as an explanatory variable. Chapter 5 estimated the output of an economy and 
examined the effect of coups d’état, i.e. one aspect of internal insecurity and political instability, 
on economic growth. All four chapters, thus, dealt with questions of security and stability from 
different perspectives.  
Chapter 4 is the first empirical work relating supply and demand for military goods by 
means of arms production, national defense spending and arms trade. The chapter showed how 
the demand for defense spending by the national government and foreign governments has 
shaped a country’s defense industry structure and contributes to the debate on burden sharing 
and armament on a more abstracted level than the simple view on defense spending levels can 
provide. Chapter 5 showed that coups d’état have drastic consequences for economic growth. 
The chapter contributes to the large literature on economic growth and fills a gap which in this 
level of detail has previously been left blank in the literature. It furthermore anticipates 
consequences from increasing political instability in the Western world, as we observe the rise 
of populism and signs of decay of international institutions (e.g. the Brexit) since the late 2010s.  
This dissertation primarily contributes to the literature on defense economics, economic 
growth, and the role of political institutions. It thereby also contributes to the literature in related 
fields such as compliance with international agreements, free-riding, or government spending. 
For several reasons, the prospects for research in these fields are promising: first, defense 
economics will be of increasing interest in times of rising worldwide defense budgets and new 
international powers like China, which strive to extend their geopolitical influence. Second, 
understanding economic growth will with high probability remain an evergreen in economic 
research. Third, the role of political institutions will be of further interest in times of political 
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turbulences in the Western world and the declining victory march of democracy worldwide. All 
of these developments add further complexity to the topics discussed in this dissertation and 
serve as fruitful starting points for future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
